St. Lawrence v. Bartley
269 Ga. 94
Ga.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 Act 34-9-23, holds that the in the form of OCGA lative action must be ing employers “bring- “liberally its construction involves construed” when [the Act] provisions employees within the opinion provide protection an has rendered The both.” holding statutory language contrary plain mandate of this Abernathy, employee provides protection an who no that the Act has sustained arising injury his in the course of out of and an employment. justly interpret OCGA 34-9-1 claim that we cannot This Court

(4) the beneficent “sound and consistent with in manner which is a supra objective employee’s this Co., when we bar Act,” Southwire directly injury recovery of and that has arisen out for an medically- unenlightened employment on the in the course of his insupportable pre- “injury” unless there is there can be no basis that interpret damage. physical I Because would concurrent cedent or “injury” employees protection — providing 34-9-23 as with OCGA consistent injury Abernathy, mental a who sustained like — employment, respectfully injury dissent. must a result of his Benham and Justice to state that Chief Justice I am authorized join in this dissent. Sears 26, 1998 January Decided 23,1998. February denied

Reconsideration appellant. Eugene Black, Jr., C. for Goldsmith, Handelman, Willis, Lewis

Gardner, Sweat & Todd S. Westby, Antonowich, Hamilton, Andrew J. Lamb, Marshall & R. Ralph Farnham, Hiers, Drew, Kniffen, C. Hamilton, Eckl & Daniel J. appellee. Hiers, Potter, B. Currie, R. Kenneth McGhee & Robert Swift, George, Wallach, Wallach, curiae. Still, Alex B. amici Bartles & LAWRENCE v. BARTLEY.

S97A2039. ST. Justice. Hunstein, April 1997 and detained in Lakiesha was arrested County war- Al St. Lawrence Chatham Sheriff from South Carolina on the basis of arrest warrants rant issued Bartley’s alleged crimi- counts of the commission that state of five peti- July deposit fraud. In filed nal tion for habeas warrant had been account offense alleging that no formal demand or Carolina and that she was received from South problem justice.” the absent war- Because the with rant resolved hearing, minutes before the addressed claim that jus- she was not tice. court heard testimony by that she is a Florida resi- dent who was Savannah attending that other than as a college; toddler, she had Carolina; never set foot in South several *2 any months of written, before the bad checks in issue were Bartley’s car been identification, broken into and her and checkbook, other stolen; items were that shortly thereafter Bartley lost all of purse and its contents while on that the and campus; break-in loss reported were and police campus security, and respectively; that of because these matters the Bartley notified Savannah of police address new when she moved to Atlanta. testi- mother (when fied her daughter that was with her in in Florida December some of the bad written), checks were not give but could the precise dates. The State only adduced the extradition warrant. The habeas court granted Bartley’s petition writ of habeas corpus, finding Bartley that was in not time at the of the commission of alleged the crimes and thus could not have “fled from from that See State. OCGA 17-13-23. We affirm. §

1. The State the by contends habeas court erred ruling that Bart- not a ley was from habeas correctly recog- nized that it was not for it to look behind appropriate the probable finding cause of the demanding state, see Rhodes v. State, 255 Ga. (338 676) (1986), that, 391 as the habeas court in asy- the state, lum it was limited to determining “readily the four verifiable” in Doran, facts discussed v. Michigan 530, 439 U. S. 289 SC 521) (1978) 58 LE2d the (upholding constitutionality of the Uniform Act, Criminal Extradition codified in as Georgia OCGA 17-13-20 et § (1) 767) Gibson, (1996). See Marini v. 267 seq.). See OCGA The only also 17-13-23. one of four those facts in issue here is whether i.e., was from she justice,1 whether committed or was with a charged crime in one left jurisdic- tion, and was found the territory within of another state when it was subject sought her to the criminal process former state. Roth, v. Anderson 17-13-23,

Pursuant to OCGA the demand for extradition recog- the by alia, nized Governor inter in alleged, that was the demanding state at the time of the alleged commission of the that she crime and thereafter fled from argues the state. The State that where these allegations properly by the demand- presented requirements The other are whether the extradition documents on their are in face order; petitioner charged state; demanding whether in has been with a crime petitioner person Michigan whether is the named in the extradition. Doran, supra, 439 U. S. at 289. accepted Governor, an like can- accused state allegations any challenge in basis of these the factual

not corpus proceeding Georgia. The relies on several opinions led to conclude that issued this Court which “have some demanding in the state at the time of the accused whether recognized . . . as a issue.” Jen- of crime is viable commission the However, Garrison, 42, n. kins v. those forth distinguishable this case for the reasons set cases are namely, they Jenkins, either warrants issued involved whereby predecessor statute, 17-13-25 and its OCGA accused to the state is authorized the surrender though state at the the accused was not within even time the the committed, or else involved situations wherein sufficiency challenging the evidence to probable cause to believe he was establish by Michigan challenge the time of the foreclosed supra, supra. Likewise, Garrison, 439 U. S. at 289. Jenkins v. supra, misplaced Gibson, case State’s reliance on Marini distinguishable accused, it decided who is is present Georgia because having mistakenly after been released incar- *3 demanding qualifies “fugitive as a from ceration in the purposes. Contrary position, the is the State’s law well established that person governor’s [a] held on the warrant issued in who is response is to habeas a entitled establishing upon relief he is not from a justice.” [Cit.] supra, 267 v. Gibson,

Marini v. Ga. at 399 Accord Jenkins Garri- supra, son, at 44. petitioner] [the

If can show that he was not in the demand- ing day alleged crime, on the of the of commission the duty corpus proceed- it ing be of the in a habeas would the [Cits.] discharge him. A Griffin, Sellers v. court nation of questioning demanding improperly is not state’s determi- probable weighing cause, an accused’s defenses charged deciding or innocence when it requirement Michigan supra, Doran, the fourth in v. decid- follows justice, petitioner inquiry whether a necessarily addressing petitioner whether the entails demanding present in the state at the time of the commission of the jurisdiction, alleged crime, found in the thereafter left and was territory supra, of this State. Roth, See Anderson v. 231 Ga. at 370. recognized, See also OCGA 17-13-23. As has been “[t]here though proof distinction, is a subtle, often between purposes negativing of absence from the state for of the con- proof pur- dition of extradition and of an alibi as such for poses establishing of innocence.” (Minn. 1972). Wagner Hedman,

State Ex Rel. v. 195 NW2d carefully Because the habeas court here limited its review to a deter- requirements Michigan supra, mination whether improperly expand scope proceedings been met and did not by inquiring legal sufficiency Bartley’s statutory into the or consti- inquiry defenses, tutional find we no error in the habeas court’s into the limited issue whether was a regard, duly-executed

In that it is well established that the war- prima rant facie evidence that the accused was gen- state at the time of the commission of the crime. See erally supra, Broyles Sellers v. Griffin, 566; 226 Ga. at Mount, (1) (30 It was thus upon petitioner corpus pro-

incumbent in this habeas ceeding persuade judge, by preponderance the trial evidence, that the [of crime]. [Cit.] state at the time the commission of the Jarvis, Ward v. 240 Ga. 668-669 See 63) (1976) Stynchcombe (petitioner Rhodes, 238 Ga. 74 proving by prepon- carries burden of absence evidence); supra, derance of the 566 see also Sellers v. Griffin, 226 Ga. at (person governor’s held warrant extradition habeas proceeding must introduce evidence “sufficient to overcome the issue”). applying preponder- cases, case on the These ance of the review, evidence standard of are consistent with our hold- ings general controlling weight that the rules of evidence *4 and suf- ficiency apply corpus proceedings, including thereof habeas prove burden on the habeas to his case to the satisfaction of the corpus judge by preponderance of the evidence. Crawford (1) (253 Linahan, 243 Ga. 161 clearly case, In the instant the habeas court did not err when it found that was not in the state at the time of the commission of the crimes and thus was not a by Bartley as our review the evidence adduced shows that she car- proof by preponderance ried her burden of of the evidence. There- ruling fore, the habeas court’s is affirmed. Bart- error court’s refusal to dismiss

2. find no in the habeas We ley’s petition as moot. habeas except Carley Judgment concur, the Justices and All affirmed. specially.

Thompson, JJ, who concur concurring specially. Justice, Carley, Bartley’s grant majority’s of Ms. I in the affirmance of the concur petition compelled sepa- I relief, but am write for habeas explain my doing rately reasons for so. so as majority notes, is a distinction As the there fundamental upon premised § 17-13-23 an an extradition OCGA and between By proceeding brought pursuant § OCGA 17-13-25. extradition requires showing terms, present “that the accused was OCGA 17-13-23 at the the commission of the in the time of alleged . he the state. .’’No crime that thereafter fled from . required seeking showing under such when extradition OCGA (2), fn. 6 Garrison, 42, 17-13-25. Jenkins v. 265 Ga. against proceedings brought Ms. The extradition presence proof Therefore, of her were based in OCGA 17-13-23. alleged at Carolina the time of the commission of the crime South necessary corpus proceeding. Although Bartley’s presence issue, Ms. was in alleged clearly Michigan guilt not. or innocence of the 521) (1978); 530, 439 U. S. 282 SC 58 LE2d Hutson v. 539) Stoner, 244 Ga. The concedes one, that the distinction these two is a “subtle” but it between issues major- explanation, does not discuss distinction. Absent an ity’s holding appears incongruous, suggesting although that, Bartley’s guilt may or be issue of Ms. innocence addressed directly, habeas court nevertheless was authorized address indirectly. that issue issues believe distinction between two is best perspective

understood when considered from the of the technical dif- proceeding exist and a crimi- ferences which nal between extradition trial. The issue an extradition is not innocence, but whether the accused should be extradited determination order for that state. be made Bartley’s requires, § 17-13-23 a condition OCGA of Ms. Georgia, showing from the she in South Carolina that, thereafter, of the crime left that time she state. supporting demand for documents evidence in South at the that she was Carolina relevant subsequently Grimes, fled. time and that she Baldwin v. (1960); Smith, Dawson supporting uncontested, If SE the demand and docu- *5 prima ments, evidence, would authorize Ms. extra- O’Neal, dition to South Carolina. DeWitt v. 225 Ga. 645 SE2d 144) (1969). Bartley opportunity However, the law allows Ms. validity prima by appli- contest the facie evidence means of an corpus. cation for a writ of habeas OCGA 17-13-30. a crimi- Unlike proving nal trial in which the State would have the burden of her presence crime, at the scene of the the burden onwas Ms. proceeding the habeas the date the crime was to show that she was not in South Carolina on supra; Grimes, committed. Baldwin v. 427) (1953). Foster, Mathews v. She presented testimony that she was not and the State offered no addi- tional evidence whatsoever. The is, issue for resolution therefore, testimony whether her authorized the habeas court to refuse to order guilt her extradition to South Carolina for a determination of her Bartley’s testimony certainly innocence. Ms. did not demand that South Carolina’s for her extradition be denied. Ward v. Jarvis, 240 Ga. 668 However, the habeas testimony having court found that and, found, credible so it Rutledge was authorized to refuse to order her Tolbert, extradition. 240 Ga. 116 An accused who meets the evi- “ dentiary proving burden of that she ‘was not within the any State at the time acts indictment, stated nor at time when the were, ever, committed, if is not a . . .’ [Cit.]” supra Smith, Dawson v. However, at 351 unlike a criminal Bartley prevailed trial, the fact that Ms. judicata would not constitute a res defense to a subse- quent part effort on the of South Carolina to obtain her extradition.

Broughton Griffin, 244 Ga. 365 Therefore, if certainly long- Ms. did not commit the it is in her best conclusively term interest to have her innocence established in a proceeding. ques- Extradition should be facilitated in order that the ultimate tion of or innocence can state, be determined in the “ ‘expense, jeopardy inconvenience, but involved in ” defending against charge a criminal another state’ must also be (Minn. 1972). Hedman, considered. State v. 195 NW2d having conclusively Rather than accede to her innocence determined statutory right Carolina, in South Ms. exercised her attempt by contesting presence to avoid extradition South Car- According major- olina on the date was committed. ity, Bartley’s challenge to extradition successful because she evidentiary by “preponderance satisfied her burden of the evi- appropriate evidentiary dence.” If the standard issue first impression in this I would hold that an accused can avoid if the habeas court finds that the state’s convincing evi- “clear and countered has been facie evidence However, Georgia Hedman, at 422-423. supra State v. dence.” See of the evidence” adopt “preponderance cases cited decisis, agree of stare and, adhering principle standard Moreover, if the even authority here. controlling those decisions evidence,” judg- convincing “clear and were standard applicable Bartley’s uncon- affirmed, since Ms. case would still be ment evidentiary higher meet testimony is sufficient tradicted *6 law at 351 Under Smith, supra Dawson v. standard. brings Carolina and until South that, unless state, I agree this by a prove pre- fails to at the rele- from that state her absence the evidence ponderance to OCGA 17-13-23. extradited time, she cannot be vant spe- joins Thompson that Justice authorized to state I am cial concurrence. January 26, 1998 Decided February 23,1998. denied

Reconsideration Lock, T. Assistant Lawton, Jr., David Attorney, District Spencer Attorney, appellant. District Cohen, for appellee.

Davis MAYS III. OF W. ROY THE MATTER S98Y0455. IN Per curiam. III, Roy Mays alleg- against filed a W. complaint Bar Rule 4-102: Stan- of Bar following standards his violation (d) (failure conclusion written statement provide dard (e) in ille- engaging matter); (knowingly Standard contingency of a rule); Standard 45 to a contrary disciplinary conduct or conduct gal (fail- (f) authorization); Standard matter client (settling a without (A) lawyer’s (commingling records); Standard complete keep ure to (failure to to disci- respond client’s); his and Standard fund with authorities). timely failed to Mays respond Although plinary complaint appeared answered the he Investigation, Notice of master. evidentiary hearing special before Mays of fact: findings the following master made The special matter on a contin- injury in a personal a client represent agreed settled and advised client her case been basis, told the gent The client the settlement proceeds. check representing pick up later however, days until two check, to negotiate unable funds received account personal into his trust Mays deposited when