18 Colo. 400 | Colo. | 1893
delivered the opinion of the court.
This being an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien under the statute, the appellant contends that a judgment for money is not warranted, the claim of a lien having been abandoned. This was undoubtedly, at one time, the law in this state. See Hart v. Mullen, 4 Colo. 512. But in the case of Cannon v. Williams, 14 Colo. 22, a majority of the court held that this rule was changed by the mechanic’s lien act of 1883; and, although the writer of this opinion did not concur in that conclusion, nevertheless, it having been pronounced by a majority of the court, it must now be considered as controlling the practice in this state. The present action having been begun under the lien law of 1883, the power of the court to enter a money judgment, notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiff to sustain his lien, is stare decisis, and will be followed ; certainty in the practice being of first importance.
At the trial it was conceded that plaintiff was employed and rendered services for the defendant company for a number of years. There was much contention, however, as to the terms of this employmeñt, and as to the length of time it continued; the plaintiff contending that he ivas employed at the rate of $150 per month until such time as the mines of the company should be running smoothly, and that then he was to receive the usual compensation allowed mining superintendents at Leadville. The defendant claims the contract to be that the plaintiff was to receive $150 per month until such time as the mines of the company should reach a dividend-paying basis, and that, as no dividends had ever been paid, the amount of his compensation was to be computed upon the basis of $150 per month, only. Plaintiff claims that he commenced work for the defendant company, under his contract, on the first day of September, 1885, and continued in the discharge of his duties as superintendent until the 1st day of October, 1888. The defendant, while admitting that plaintiff commenced work at the time stated,
The appellant company contends that the court erred in the rejection of certain evidence offered by it. It claims as one ground why it sought to terminate the services of the plaintiff on January 1, 1888, that, some time during the preceding month, plaintiff, by reason of sickness, old age, and mental infirmities, became unable to perform the services he had undertaken to perform. To establish this fact the Avitness G. L. Hassell was asked: “ What was Mr. Isaacs’ condition physically and mentally, at the time that he reached New York; and when did you first learn of his condition at that time ? ” In answer to this question the witness stated that plaintiff, at the time, was neither mentally nor physically competent to do anything. This answer was stricken
The court refused to allow witnesses to testify as to what third parties had said in reference to plaintiff’s physical and mental condition before leaving Leadville, and this ruling is assigned for error. Such testimony was clearly hearsay, and therefore incompetent. The trial judge refused to allow other witnesses to testify as to plaintiff’s condition of health early in the month'of December, 1887. Such testimony could have no bearing upon the issues presented to the jury, except, possibly, in so far as it might have tended to establish his condition after the 1st day of January, 1888. As there was an abundance of direct evidence showing his condition after that date, the exclusion of the evidence cannot justly be regarded as prejudicial or reversible error.
The judgement will be affirmed.
Affirmed.