55 Ala. 493 | Ala. | 1876
Appellant, a corporation of the State of
Demands of this nature have several times been brought before this court. It has always held, that debts contracted as this was, are the proper debts of the persons occupying the position of trustees, by whom they were created. As was said by Judge A. J, Walker, in Sanford v. Howard: “ The purchases of trustees, including executors, administrators, and guardians, when made in obedience to the duties of the trust, impose upon them a personal liability. The seller,” or, we may insert, the person to whom a debt is contracted, “must look to them for payment, and they must look to the trust estate for reimbursement.” This is everywhere, in this country, as well as in England, held to be the law; and appellant’s counsel admit it. But they insist that, while this is so, the circumstances of the present case, and of others like it, should make them exceptions to the general rule, and give them direct access by a court of equity to the
But the case now before us is entirely without those features, which commended that of Coopwood v. Wallace, according to the opinion of the eminent judge who wrote the opinion in it, to the court which made the decision. As he explained that case, in Jones v. Dawson, supra, “the administrators who employed the attorney had resigned, after having come to a final settlement with the Orphans’ Court. They were not indebted to. the estate, nor had they charged the estate with the fees due to the attorney,” who was complainant in that cause. They were also insolvent. Therefore, it was thought, he ought to be paid out of the estate which had received the benefit of his services. But, when the present bill was filed, Augustini was still administrator and guardian. He had not come to a settlement in the court; and having “ wasted and squandered all of the personal estate- of the said Dominique Pizzini,” he must have been indebted to it. Sureties had been required of him in those capacities, for the protection of the minors, who could not take care of themselves] and those sureties had become insolvent. "Would it not, then, be a remarkable departure from the rule established by all the precedents in similar cases, if we should hold that those whom the law was most solicitous, on account of their defenseless condition, to protect, by requiring securities to be furnished for their benefit, after losing recourse against their guardian and his bondsmen, by their failures, and a large part, perhaps the largest part, of their patrimony by his devastavit, now should be required, by the decree of a court of equity, in effect, to stand as sureties for their guardian to his creditors ? We are not willing to make such a precedent. It was in the power of the plaintiff to require payment from time to time of the expenses for the education and board of these minors, from Mr. Augustini, out
Let the decree of the chancellor be affirmed.