141 Wis. 205 | Wis. | 1910
The power to issue mandatory injunctions is recognized as an appropriate function of courts of equity. In In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658, the court, speaking of a preliminary injunction which was assailed as unwarranted because it was mandatory in its character, states:
“Perhaps, to a certain extent, the injunction may be termed mandatory, although its object was to continue the existing •state of things and to prevent an arbitrary breaking off of the •current business connection between the roads. But it was clearly not beyond the power of a court of equity, which is not ■always limited to the restraint of a contemplated or threatened action, but may even require affirmative action, where the circumstances of tire case demand it.” See, also, Bispham, Principles of Equity, § 400; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1359, note.
Sec. 2774, Stats. (1898), contemplates the issuance of temporary injunctional orders in all cases where it appears that a party’s rights cannot be effectually vindicated unless the opposing party be restrained from so acting or proceéding in such a way as will clearly tend to defeat the object of the suit. Bartlett v. L. Bartlett & Son Co. 116 Wis. 450, 93 N. W. 473. See cases cited.
The question arises: Does the record now before us disclose a case wherein this power should be applied to protect the plaintiff in its rights? The facts of the case are practically without dispute. In so far as the rights of the parties are properly within the jurisdiction of a civil court, there is no •dispute in the facts respecting the defendants’ status as corporate officers of the congregation. It is conceded that their election as members of the boafd of directors in January, 1909, was not approved by the archbishop as provided by the by-laws of the corporation; that the majority of the directors at a regular meeting removed them from office; and that the vacancies thus created were filled by the appointment of others
It is argued that the order issued is mandatory in its terms- and operates to disturb the status quo of the controversy, in that it directs defendants forthwith to surrender and deliver-up to the pei’sons selected by the directors as their successors-in office the books, money, papers, and all other articles belonging to the congregation and now in their possession; and in that it restrains them from further control over them and from exercising any of the functions or performing any of the duties of the offices of directors and of secretary and treasurer of the corporation; and in that this order in effect determines the whole controversy, which should only be adjudicated in the final judgment in the action. The propriety of this preliminary order depends upon the rights of the parties under the exigencies of the situation presented to the court. The-inquiry first in order pertains to- the right of the defendants to continue in office under the facts and circumstances shown. It is contended that their rights to hold the offices cannot be-determined in this preliminary proceeding, but must be held in abeyance until final judgment is awarded. As stated, the facts admitted by the defendants present at this stage of the case the question of their right to continue in office, and constitute the basis for an adjudication of this preliminary question as well as that for final judgment. There is no circumstance in the case to furnish a ground for preventing the court from fully determining the questions involved or which demands postponement of their consideration for the protection of the rights of the parties. It clearly appears that if the defendants are not entitled to- hold the offices to which they claim
The primary question, therefore, is: Does the record show that a trial must be had to ascertain the facts and cireum-■stanees establishing the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the books and other articles of the congregation ? There is no dispute that the archbishop did'not approve, as required by the by-laws, the defendants’ selection in 1909 as the lay inem-bers of the board of directors by the members of the congregation, and that the board of directors by a majority vote removed them from the offices and selected two qualified lay members to fill the vacancies thus created in the offices. If the archbishop and the board of directors possessed authority to act for the corporation in these respects, it is obvious that the defendants had no right to continue in office and in control of tire affairs of the congregation, and that the court prop■erly granted the preliminary relief to prevent a continuance -of the wrongdoing of the defendants which would defeat the object of the suit.
It is averred that the terms of the statutes granting authority to Roman Catholic congregations to incorporate confers no power to prescribe by-laws providing that the archbishop must approve the selection by the members of the congregation ■of the lay members of the board of directors to entitle them to hold the office, and providing that a majority of the members of the board of directors may remove such members from •office if such majority deem it necessary for the best interests of the corporation. The statutes on this subject are embraced 'in secs. 2001 — 10 to 2001 — 17, Stats. (1898). Sec. 2001 — 12 provides that the two laymen selected under see. 2001 — 10 •as trustees “shall be and remain members of said corporation
Tbe point is made that tbe court erred in allowing respondent to file an undertaking conditioned to abide and perform any final judgment that should be rendered in favor of tbe appellants. Sec. 3061, Stats. (1898), clearly gives tbe trial court power to authorize tbe respondent to- file such an undertaking upon tbe making of tbe orders in question, and we perceive no error in the action.
Tbe orders appealed from were properly made in both cases and must be upheld.
By the Gourt. — It is so ordered.