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St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Donna Shalala
205 F.3d 937
6th Cir.
2000
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 has stated a deciding whether defendant just

fair and reason to allow withdrawal ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CARE CENTRE, plea, the factors to be considered are: Plaintiff- Appellant, 1) elapsed of time that be- the amount with- v. plea tween the and the motion to 2) (or absence) it; presence draw SHALALA, Defendant-Appellee. Donna a valid reason for the failure move No. 98-3965. proceedings; withdrawal earlier 3) whether the defendant has asserted United Appeals, States Court of 4) innocence; or maintained his the cir- Sixth Circuit. entry underlying cumstances of the Argued: Oct. 1999. 5) plea; guilty the defendant’s nature 6) background; degree to which Decided and Filed: Feb. prior experience the defendant has had 7) justice system;

with the criminal

potential prejudice government granted. motion to withdraw is Bashara,

United States F.3d (6th Cir.1994). applied pre

The district court determined,

ceding within factors

discretion, inappropri that withdrawal was (J.A. 84-85).

ate. The district court 1) given:

did not abuse its discretion

length entry of time of time between plea

defendant’s and his motion for with (almost 2) year),

drawal one the absence of 3) plea breach of agreement, de 4) guilt,

fendant’s confession of the careful

reading plea agreement’s terms 5) plea hearing,

defendant at the de (Id.). history. criminal

fendant’s

CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing opinion

For the

the district court is AFFIRMED. *2 (briefed), P. A. Dennis

Jenifer Belt briefed), Shumaker, (argued Witherell Toledo, Ohio, Kendrick, for Plain- Loop & tiff-Appellant. Cavalier, Reed, Fox, C. Gina M.

Thomas DC, Smith; Shaw, McClay, Washington, & for Amicus Curiae. of the U.S. Sydlow,

Holly Taft Office Toledo, Ohio, Division, Attorney, Western briefed), De- U.S. (argued Ted Yasuda Services, Human & partment of Health V, Counsel, Region of the General Office Illinois, DefendanL-Appellee. Chicago, JONES, Thus, MOORE, patient’s total costs Before: than less GILMAN, they would at other Judges. Circuit facilities. facilities,' many Like health care a num- JONES, J., NATHANIEL R. delivered ber of patients St. Francis’s are Medicare MOORE, court, in which opinion *3 recipients. Consequently, Medicare reim- GILMAN, 948-951), J., (pp. joined. J. burses St. Francis for the reasonable costs separate dissenting opinion. a delivered provided patients.1 of services to Medicare 1395x(u) (v)(l)(A). See U.S.C. & Pur- OPINION regulations, suant to Medicare rules and JONES, R. NATHANIEL Circuit from 1983 to St. Francis was reim- Judge. bursed for such reasonable actual costs of provided. Because St. Francis’s Plaintiff-Appellant St. Francis Health (“St. Francis”) actual costs exceeded the routine appeals Centre Care (“RCLs”) limits for each of these grant summary judg- district court’s years, requested, St. Francis and was Defendant-Appellee ment for Donna Sha- granted, “upward adjustment” an lala, to its Secretary Department However, cost limits. in the 1991 and 1992 Human (“Secretary”). Health and Services periods, cost reporting the Medicare inter- Secretary St. Francis contends that mediary requests denied St. Francis’s in denying request erred for Medicare “upward adjustment.”2 an ap- St. Francis hospi- reimbursement for the pealéd to the Provider Reimbursement Re- tal-based skilled services. For the nursing (“PRRB”), herein, view Board which reversed the reasons stated we AFFIRM. Thereafter, intermediary’s decision. Administrator of the Health Financ- Care I. (“HCFA”), Administration the Secre- A. tary’s delegate, reviewed and reversed the PRRB’s decision. Pursuant to 42 operates St. Francis a rehabilitation hos- 1395oo(f)(l), St. Francis thereafter filed pital, hospital-based nursing a skilled facil- (“HB-SNF”), Complaint in federal district court seek- ity general nursing facility, ing review of the decision. and a in rural HCFA’s St. living transitional center Secretary Francis and the filed cross mo- Only Ohio. is rele- St. HB-SNF summary judgment. tions for The district purposes appeal. vant for this goal motion, rehabilitate, court denied St. Francis’s of St. Francis’s is to HB-SNF granted Secretary’s motion. simply patients. rather than maintain See St Shalala, Thus, Francis Health Care Centre v. routinely provides St. Francis “com- 1998). (N.D.Ohio F.Supp.2d 887 This prehensive therapy” rehabilitation for the appeal timely ensued. majority patients. Although vast of its St. therapy Francis’s intensive rehabilitation B. in higher per per pa-

results diem costs compared peers, plan tient therapy to its this Medicare reimbursement de- patient stays. veloped by also results shorter has been refined over per 1. The initial decision of whether the health 2. The 1991 and 1992 diem amounts were terminology as follows. The used in this foot- provider care should reimbursed is made explained note is by "intermediary,” usually pri- which is infra: company. yearly vate health insurance basis, On a $120.94 $139.06 $136.11 $143.98 $110.58 $116.90 ActualCosts Francis's intermediary determines of Mean HB-SNF Costs 112% amount which Medicare must reimburse the Statutory HB-SNF RCL poli- in accordance with Medicare J.A. at 120-21. The concluded procedures. 1395g, §§ cies and See U.S.C. per day is less [St. Francis's] cost "[s]ince 1395h(c)(l). cost, peer group excep- than the uniform no is allowed.” J.A. at 442. tion the cost Act which addressed Secretary. the Medicare Congress and by years HB- FS-SNFs differences faced between Congress, Beginning the two limits for costs, adjusting the cost recognized that Medicare rising HB-SNFs, of em- instead payment For groups. Medicare cost-based original (112% of level pro- previous 112% ploying little incentive provided structure peer costs of the efficiently. Congress per diem operate viders amount Congress lowered that group), Act the Medicare amended the 112% under of the difference reimbursable 50% costs” “reasonable and FS-SNFs. “any part of in- level for HB-SNFs should exclude Medicare costs)— ((112% x per diem unnecessary in the HB-SNF to be cost found curred costs))). (112% per x diem Still ser- FS-SNF health delivery needed efficient 1395x(v)(l)(A). *4 established the cost limits § dissatisfied with vices.” U.S.C. DEFRA, since enacted Congress has by which HCFA cost limits original The and to costs further measures to contain SNFs as free- categorized established HB- and of differing treatment reduce or and as urban hospital-based or standing FS-SNFs; post-date changes latter these rural, for permitted reimbursement case, Despite of this however.4 the events of of the mean cost up to 115% SNFs to the medicare changes plethora this group.” category, “peer or respective their always has plan, Congress reimbursement the cost limit subsequently reduced HCFA Secretary’s authority to intact left mean peer group costs. to 112% adjustments to cost limits “to make Therefore, entitled facility each was while appropriate.” extent the deems peer group 112% of to receive § 1395yy(c). 42 U.S.C. costs, peer types different the four had means, type of and therefore each group C. limit. The cost facility a different had cost history in the back- legislative this With were significantly limits for HB-SNFs a Medicare Act this case involves (FS- ground, free-standing SNFs higher than for (42 a regu- provision 1395yy(a)), U.S.C. SNFs). cost limits of separate Advocates (42 provision interpreting lation higher incurred argued that HB-SNFs 413.30), provision and a PRM care of the more intensive costs because (PRM 2534.5) regula- interpreting rendered, higher cost lim- justifying However, tion. opponents argued all its. of care provide the same standard

SNFs Statutory 1395yy: The 1. 42 U.S.C. separate cost limits not warrant- were Limits for Cost Framework ed. be the RCLs to Congress established from several Congress, aware results in 42 to different SNFs U.S.C. applied costs,3 HB-SNF en- higher studies of § 1395yy: (DEFRA), Act acted the Deficit Reduction determining 2319(b), Secretary, 98-369, § The 98 Stat. 494 Pub.L. may be (1984). payments amount of added new section to DEFRA Medicare cost only for costs concluded that associated 3. Several studies 50% essentially rejected process. difference HB-SNFs and allocation This cost to variations in the and FS- differing was attributable for HB- FS-SNFs reimbursement Inefficiency intensity of care or case-mix. SNFs. likely of the other was cause deemed Budget Act recently, in the More Balanced of the cost difference. 4432(a), 105-33, § 111 Stat. of 258, Pub.L. (1997), Congress eliminated 414-20 Budget Reconciliation Act In the Omnibus as the system cost as well two-tiered limits 103-66, § 107 Stat. Pub.L. plan. retrospective cost-based reimbursement (1993), Congress limits at froze cost prospective place, Congress In their enacted year levels for the next two fiscal fiscal per system diem payment based on federal years provision eliminated the authoriz- to HB-SNFs rate. additional reimbursement subchapter respect particular provid- under this needs or situations of made 413.30(a). routine costs of extended care ers.” Id. at regulation service recognize provides as reason- as follows: services shall (in delivery able the efficient of health % H* services) per diem costs of such services (a)(2) principle. General Reimbursable per to the extent that such diem costs may costs not exceed the costs following per exceed the diem limits.... necessary estimated HCFA to be § 1395yy(a). then delivery efficient of needed health establishes that the RCL for FS-SNFs may services. HCFA establish estimat- equal per to” 112% of the “mean “shall ed cost limits for direct or indirect over- diem routine service costs” of FS-SNFs. all or specific for costs of items or HB-SNFs, § 1395yy(a)(l). Id. at For groups services or items equal RCL “shall be to” the sum of the These imposed prospec- limits will be following: plus the FS-SNFs cost limit tively may per be calculated on a percent 50% of the amount which 112% admission, beneficiary, per per dis- per of the HB-SNFs mean diem routine diem, visit, charge, per per or other exceeds the service cost FS-SNFs basis. 1395yy(a)(3). Despite limit. Id. at ‡ ^ # # H* *5 limits, Congress, recogniz- these (f) Exceptions. Limits established under area, Secretary’s expertise the in this may adjusted upward this section be for Secretary afforded the the discretion to provider a under the circumstances “upward adjustments” make to these stat- (f)(1) specified in paragraphs through utory RCLs: (f)(5) adjustment of An this section. is Secretary may adjustments The make in only made to the extent the costs are (a) the limits set forth in subsection of reasonable, attributable to the circum- respect any this section with skilled specified, separately stances identified facility nursing [SNF] to the extent the provider, by the and verified the Secretary appropriate, deems based intermediary. upon mix beyond case or circumstances (1) Atypical provider services. The can the facility. control of the The Secre- show that the— publish tary shall the data and criteria (i) Actual of or fur- cost items purposes to be used for of this subsec- provider appli- nished a exceeds the tion on an annual basis. cable limit because such items or ser- § 1395yy(c). 42 U.S.C. scope, vices are in nature and compared gener- to the items or services Secretary’s 2. 42 The C.F.R. 413.30: ally by providers similarly furnished Regulation Adjusting for Cost classified; and Limits ’ (ii) Atypical items or fur- services are Pursuant to the discretion af- special nished because of the of needs forded in 42 Secretary the patients necessary the treated and are 1395yy(c), Secretary implemented the delivery in the efficient of needed health 413.30, which forth the “set[s] care. general may rules under which es- HCFA added). (emphasis 42 C.F.R. 413.30 recognized on tablish limits costs as in determining reasonable Medicare 3. PRM5 program payments” and “also sets forth a. The Provision governing exemptions, exceptions, rules adjustments July to limits established un- In HCFA established new exception der this section that may methodology handling HCFA make as for re- appropriate special methodology in of Fran- quests consideration which St. —the PRM, guidance 5. The or Provider Reimbursement in order to Man- issues ual, non-binding ais set of rules that the cost limit or disaggregated methodol- in this case.6 challenges cis per hospital-based percent of the No. in Transmittal forth is set ogy per diem cost If the SNF’s (“Determination cost. Reason- diem § 2534.5 per diem cost peer group Limit or exceeds of Cost Excess Costs in able center, must higher cost Cost”) for cost pertains to Mean percent per diem costs Excess explained. July after 1984: periods reporting cost the circum- attributable to are not which cost, pro- determining reasonable In re- exception is upon which stances excess per diem costs vider’s re- justified may cannot be quested a test for low subject to cost limit in the amount in either a reduction sult per compared occupancy and are excep- exception a denial of or similarly peer group7 costs of diem tion. providers. classified % ^ [*] [*] [*] v PRM 2534.5 short, for HB-SNF costs (emphasis above the added). RCL, permits reimbursement methodology periods begin- reporting ... cost With of 112% of only those costs excess 1, 1984-,for free- July each ning prior which are attribut- per the mean diem hospital-based each group standing atypical services. the HB-SNF’s able to applied ratio is each cost center’s group, “gap” approach creates [ie., applica- RCL] cost limit level within the 112% HB-SNF RCL and reporting period the cost ble to any of cannot recover HB-SNFs which For requested. exception propri- It is the above the RCL. their re- group with cost hospital-based each conse- as well ety “gap,” of this periods beginning porting after Francis facilities like St. quences has on 1,1984, applied to 112% July the ratio is *6 it, is at fall within which happen to (not cost per diem group’s the mean in this case. issue limit), adjusted by wage the the cost adjust- year reporting cost index and PRM b. Illustration 2584-5 the re- applicable factor to cost ment exception is the porting period for which operation of PRM is the the Because requested. following illustra- complex, the somewhat court, help- tion, is provided by the district ... is per diem actual The SNF’s component the ful: compared appropriate to = = mean statutory $80 112%of FS-SNF RCL

Assume: FS-SNF mean 112%of the HB-SNF Assume: $120 = = (112% + FS-SNF mean 50% statutory 112%of the Then: RCL HB-SNF mean) of the FS-SNF HB-SNF mean—-112% = = ,50($120 $80) + + $20 $80 $80 — = $100 directly would be entitled above statuto- the RCLs the aforementioned Based on corresponding maximum reimburse- to with HB-SNF ry/regulatory language, and ment rates: listed below per diem actual costs groups: peer clarify different SNF 7. There are four providers and and to intermediaries (2) policies (1) Free- Secretary's Hospital-based; Urban Urban the regulations. reimbursement (4) (3) Hospital-based; and standing; Rural 2534.5(B). Freestanding. See PRM Rural pertain fis- exceptions at to issue 6. While Hospital- peer group is Urban St. Francis's 1992, they governed are years cal based. were filed 2534.5 because PRM 22, 1994, December 1994. August Maximum Actual Costs Reimbursement $150 $140 $130 $130 $120 $110 ($120) 112% of HB-SNF mean $120 $100 (the “gap”) <— $110 $100 —> ($100) statutory HB-SNF RCL $100 $100 90 80 90 80 $ $ $ $ ($80) 112%of FS-SNF (ie., RCL) statutory FS-SNF (6th Cir.1996). Summary judgment Note that with actual costs between is SNFs (the RCL) (the appropriate pleadings, depositions, “if the HB-SNF $100 $120 level), interrogatories, answers to and admissions only recompensed 112% $100 file, amount). affidavits, (the together any, “gap” This is the RCL show that there is no issue to genuine decries. Francis moving par material fact and that the way conceptualize to this for- Another ty judgment is entitled to as a matter of possible mula that there are three cate- is 56(c); law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. accord Terry provider’s actual gories of actual costs: Barr, Moreover, F.3d at “the (1) than equal costs can be less or to underly inferences to be drawn from the (2) RCL; or statutory greater equal than ... light facts must be viewed statutory to the RCL but less than 112% party opposing most favorable to the (3) mean; peer group greater of its or than motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. peer group of its mean. equal 574, 587, Corp., Zenith Radio 475 U.S. 2534.5, provid- if the Pursuant (1986) (citation S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 538 equal than or er’s actual costs are less omitted). “[fjactual However, disputes RCL, provider statutory is reim- unnecessary that are irrelevant or will bursed the full amount of its actual costs Liberty Lobby, counted.” Anderson 1); (category provider’s if the costs are Inc., 242, 248, S.Ct. 2505, greater equal statutory than or (1986). L.Ed.2d 202 RCL, but less than 112% the HB-SNF mean, only reimbursed in reviewing Secretary’s (catego- the amount of the RCL may terpretation regulations, courts *7 2); ry greater provider’s costs Secretary’s only if it overturn the decision equal than or to 112% of the HB-SNF “arbitrary, capricious, is an abuse dis mean, provider is reimbursed in the cretion or otherwise not accordance RCL, plus amount of the with the law.” Thomas Univ. v. Jefferson atypical amount attributable to additional Shalala, 504, 512, 2381, 114 512 U.S. S.Ct. up services to the total amount (1994) (citation omitted); 129 L.Ed.2d 405 actual exceed the 112% of the County Hosp. also Harris Dist. v. Sha see 3). (category Accordingly, category (5th Cir.1996). lala, 220, 64 F.3d 221 Fur (2) represents provider which a “gap” for ther, “give courts are to substantial defer will not be reimbursed above the RCL agency’s interpretation to an of its ence despite having amount costs above the Thomas regulations.” own Jefferson provider That does not have the 512, 2381; RCL. Univ., 114 see 512 U.S. at S.Ct. that were opportunity to show its costs Safety and Health Occupational Martin v. 151, Comm’n, 144, reasonable and for 111 Review (1991) (“Be 1171, L.Ed.2d 117 S.Ct.

II. applying agency’s regulation cause reviews an order complex changing This Court circumstances calls or summary judgment unique expertise de novo and and granting upon agency’s piresume we legal policymaking prerogatives, uses the same standard as used authoritatively interpret Terry power court. See Barr Sales that the district Co., component is a regulations Inc. v. All-Lock 96 F.3d its own Agency, costs, regardless their reasonable lawmaking powers.”); delegated agency’s a HB- they are a FS-SNF or (“The whether Harris, Secretary’s at 221 F.3d Br. 29. SNF. See St. Francis’s at Sec- regulations Medicare interpretation of ond, § argues that PRM 2534.5 Francis St. weight plainly unless it is controlling given policy grounds because is unreasonable on regula or inconsistent erroneous dispa- and HB-SNFs it treats FS-SNFs omitted). tion.”)(internal quotations regime places FS-SNFs rately. The inter sum, regulatory if “it is a reasonable at a distinct ad- provide atypical services must defer to it.” Shala ... we pretation all their reimbursing them for vantage, Guernsey Hosp., Memorial U.S. la hand, HB-SNFs re- costs. On the other 94-95, 131 L.Ed.2d 106 115 S.Ct. pro- less than full reimbursement for ceive (1995). cost; the same services at same viding pro- regime penalizes thus them and III. ser- such vides disincentive Secretary’s that the agree Because we argues that this result vices. St. Francis capri- arbitrary or interpretation is intent; policy true “turns the tables” on the cious, hold- affirm the district court’s indeed, we origi- it maintains that should “re- nally intended that HB-SNFs ing. freestanding more than facilities be- ceive A. recognized it incur [HB-SNFs] cause providing the same services” more costs reasons Francis offers several St. Francis’s Br. than the FS-SNFs. St. interpretation of Secretary’s legal that the Third, argues that because 32. St. Francis 413.30(f) in PRM § C.F.R. —embodied interpreted applica- previously HCFA requirement § short 2534.5—falls differently, the new inter- regulations ble interpretations not be “arbi Fi- pretation is not entitled to deference. discretion, or capricious, an abuse trary, that PRM nally, St. Francis asserts with law.” 5 not in accordance otherwise procedurally § invalid because 2534.5 is 706(2)(A). importantly, Most St. U.S.C. rule, yet passed it was not is a substantive that PRM 2534.5 contra Francis asserts and comment re- pursuant to the notice plain statutory regulatory lan dicts Proce- quirements of the Administrative contends that both guage. It U.S.C. (“APA”). Act, § 553 dure 5 U.S.C. “dic 1395yy(a) and C.F.R. B. tate” that a who demonstrates in excess of its cost limit are that its costs with the district court that St. agree We 1) has shown that PRM 2534.5 due to Francis 2) arbitrary capricious interpretation or reasonable, attributable, is an identified 1395yy of either 42 verified, reimbursement is entitled to § 413.30. limit. in full above the cost Therefore, argues, Br. at 24. St. Francis Statutory Regulatory Text *8 § lan plain contradicts the 2534.5 argument that PRM St. Francis’s first regulation by the statute and guage of plain § inconsistent with the 2534.5 “is (and “arbitrary”) limit imposing a blanket governing reg- of the statute and language excepted only requiring that costs be to Br. at 23. We ulation.” St. Francis’s the extent that total costs exceed that contention because the disagree with this limit. Secretary explicitly granted statute argu- St. Francis offers several other and because she exercised broad discretion First, ments to case. St. Fran- bolster its with the clear this discretion consistent § that PRM does not cis asserts 2354.5 made in the stat- policy Congress choices ute. intent behind square legislative with the It to provisions. points

the Medicare Act § 1395yy in 42 Congress Neither U.S.C. report Finance Committee which Senate § Secretary nor the 42 C.F.R. 413.30 like it claims makes clear that facilities St. be reimbursed mandated that HB-SNF recover all statutory RCL set amount above Francis should be able to of

945 between 112% of the mean therefore the difference 1395yy. §in St. Francis forth per diem costs for HB-SNFs FS- it claims the lan- its case when overstates course, just Congress Of as did SNFs. provisions “dictates that a guage of these Secretary gen- should not address how that its costs who demonstrates adjustments in reim- erally grant upward 1) limit are due to in excess of its cost bursements, specify it also did not how the 2) rea- of light do so in of this new Secretary should sonable, attributable, and veri- identified for ineffici- regime accounting HB-SNFs’ fied, in full is entitled to reimbursement ency. again, granted Yet she was discre- Br. at limit.” above the cost make this determination. tion to added). Instead, provi- (emphasis both statute, of aspects Given these we mere- phrased permissive, in the sions are agree with the district court that the Sec- Secretary “may” adjust ly that the stating retary’s interpretation regulation § upward. 1395yy(c); U.S.C. cost limits reasonable, in the PRM is and statute 413.30(f). Moreover, § neither 42 C.F.R. First, agree with arbitrary. we the Secre- guidance as to the level provision provides way tary the best to characterize the Secretary must make. adjustment applies the PRM is that effect of provides Specifically, C.F.R. all to ac- “discount factor” to HB-SNFs adjusted “may” be although limits for the “unreasonable costs” above count only be ad- “atypical,” they when should As the district court those of FS-SNFs. the costs are justed upward “to the extent for unrea- recognized, discounting these 413.30(f). As reasonable.” C.F.R. comports general sonable costs explicitly placed Secretary argued, this sys- recognition by Congress that “certain “typicality” ser- the determination un- ... associated with temic inefficiencies of costs vices versus “reasonableness” reasonable costs associated [] within her discretion.8 Francis, HB-SNFs.” St F.Supp.2d at Having what the statute does noted fact, PRM calculation reduces what it does do. do, important it is to note by the the reimbursement to HB-SNFs supra, Congress responded As discussed very proportion same demonstrating that about half to studies be inefficient—half of the dif- deemed to cost of HB-SNFs was due greater ference in costs between FS-SNFs and sys- two-tier inefficiency by establishing a Likewise, guideline com- HB-SNFs.9 being from prevents 413.30, tem which HB-SNFs al- ports with 42 C.F.R. Secretary for those inefficient costs. the extent reimbursed to determine lows Hence, HB-SNFs, Congress set the services are to which costs 413.30(f). fifty percent of “reasonable.” statutory cost limit at new Guernsey, determining parts reasonable costs.” with other 8. This is consistent Act, which also (quoting ] Medicare 115 S.Ct. 1232 "authorize! promulgate regulations 'estab- 1395x(v)(l)(A)). lishing be used’ for the method or methods mean, the HB-SNF $120 as again, $80 if we take of the FS-SNF 112% 9. Once 112% mean, application 2534.5 are as follows: the results of the of PRM Amount Reimbursed Costs Actual $130 $150 $140 $130 $120 $110 $100 ($120) of HB-SNF mean $120 (the $100 "gap”) $110 <— —> ($100) $100 RCL HB-SNF $100 *9 $ 90 $ 80 $ 90 ($80) $ of FS-SNF 112% RCL) (i.e., FS-SNF level, the amount it is actual costs and the between an HB-SNF’s at or above the difference Once 112% $20, the HB-SNF mean and 112% the difference between which is half of reimbursed is to, Thus, (which $40). adjustments her the determining upward bid in is FS-SNF mean Secretary regarding of HB-SNF’s—that very very assumptions the inefficiencies using the is ratio—and establishing HB-SNF’s. prescribed the RCL for the statute for are more effi- create conclusion that FS-SNFs sum, § 2534.5 does not PRM HB-SNFs, be than and thus should cient system in contravention “two-tier” favorably. differ- more Stated reimbursed To the con- regulation. the statute their unreason- ently, once discounted for Secretary merely acted within trary, by Congress, able costs as determined by putting granted was she the discretion rela- are treated HB-SNFs and FS-SNFs ratio established very cost place into the same. tively § 1395yy in by Congress by 42 413.30.10 upon elaborated Third, how Francis misunderstands St. it operates

PRM when it attacks Policy Arguments policy grounds. on being irrational 2. that the Specifically, St. Francis believes agree also with the district We it regime is irrational because deems policy arguments Francis’s that St. court unreasonable, be below the 112% level to unavailing. PRM 2534.5 are against they reasonable when exceed but First, con given Congressional the clear But Francis’s Br. at 34. amount. See St. general suffer from that HB-SNFs clusion accurate characterization of this is not an inefficiencies, through Secretary, court the PRM’s effect. As the district intermediary, required should stated, applies to the costs the “discount” provider’s submitted reim to review each RCL; all have of all above the HB-SNFs if its costs request bursement to determine unreason- costs which are deemed to be light Particularly reasonable. were able, “systematically and all are undercom- patient vastly different services and SNFs’ pensate[d] exactly the same manner.” im populations, requirement such a would Francis, F.Supp.2d at 894. The pose high burden and cost on the Secre once ex- only difference rendered is that tary' required by span beyond the statute the 112% thresh- burden cess costs —a old, resulting portion of the excess costs arbitrary It was regulation. or the neither from services can be reimbursed. capricious for the instead to nor factor “un- reflecting Yet the discount discount account for introduce a factor to still im- reasonable” costs of HB-SNFs systemic cost inefficiencies identified pacts upon all the 112% HB-SNFs above by Congress, allowing while still HB level; words, in other there is still an SNFs to obtain reimbursement when which, amount of their costs deemed un- demonstrate that costs above the 112% PRM, reasonable those HB-SNFs threshold are due supra cannot recover. See n. 9. Second, argues errs it St. Francis when unfairly disadvantages

that PRM 2534.5 Argument APA St. Francis’s relative to for “no HB-SNFs FS-SNFs legitimate reason.” St. Francis’s Br. at 32. agree Finally, we can not with St. simply Congress’s argument that PRM 2534.5 is ignores This assertion Explanation agree Secretary's arguments Act of 1984: of Provi- 10. We duction First, regarding legislative history. histo- Approved by sions 21, the Committee on March inconclusive, sparse ry generally (Comm. 1984) Vol. 1 at 947 Print given weight little when the should be text of 2534.5, added). through (emphasis clearly dispute. the statute so resolves this Secretary by granted the discretion Second, history even the to which St. Francis Act, plain is indeed con- text of the Medicare Secretary's points does not contradict provides sistent with this directive because reading guage statutory language. The lan- determining general formula for the extent report from the Senate that St. Francis costs are "reason- to which an HB-SNF's "[fjacilities emphasizes ceptions eligible ex- is that able.” receive, justified, up could where Comm, all their reasonable costs.” Senate Finance, Sess., Cong., 2d Re- 98th Deficit

947 interpretive rule. The rule nition of an pursu adopted not it was invalid because reimburse not effect new substantive does procedures and comment the notice ant to 553(b). prior inconsistent with ment standards APA, the 5 U.S.C. in set forth central characteristic of a regulations another the sustained Guernsey, In Court —the Guernsey, rule. 514 U.S. substantive See concerning reim PRMs Secretary’s of the 1232; Shalala, 99, Warder v. at 115 S.Ct. so, stated doing the Court bursement. Cir.1998). (1st Rather, 73, 149 F.3d subject to was not the PRM at issue that in above, reasonably explained the requirement of and comment the notice terprets regulation a statute and “prototypical APA it was the because general terms placed the determination interpretive an rule.” example of as the “reasonableness” of costs such 99, 1232. See 5 U.S.C. 115 S.Ct. at in hands of “typicality” the of services the 553(b)(A) (establishing that notice Secretary. agree We Secre “interpretive required are not comment partially performs this tary that the PRM rules, policy, or general statements by means which HB- by providing role procedure organization, agency rules of are ac systemic unreasonable costs SNFs’ the Court defined Specifically, practice”). exceptions. in determining counted an as those “issued interpretive rules Thus, Friedrich, in PRM “cre just as agency’s public advise the agency to F.2d at 837. ates no new law.” 894 rules statutes of the construction “Rather, interprets it lan U.S. Guernsey, 514 which it administers.” applied particular ... as to a medi guage (citation omitted). at 115 S.Ct. Id.; of treatment.” cal service or method the force and “do not have Such rules Warder, (finding an also 149 F.3d see are not accorded of law and effect interpretive be ruling administrative adjudicatory process,” and in the weight ambiguity” “it an area of addresse[d] cause change” which not effect a “substantive do ground and did not “stake out existing regulations. with is inconsistent already of which not [was] basic tenor Secretary also Friedrich v. Id. See itself’) (internal quota in the law outlined Cir.1990) (6th HHS, (holding F.2d 829 omitted). tions and citation coverage determination that a national contrary are anchored arguments to rule). interpretive Secretary was that PRM 2534.5 prior argument at PRMs looking Lower court decisions ap plain language “contradicts Guernsey, con with have been consistent in purports it plicable regulation that interpretive are rules cluding 35, a Francis’s Br. at conten terpret,” St. and comment require notice and do Similarly, disagree. which we tion with See, Mary’s Hosp. v. rulemaking. e.g., St. argument APA dissenting opinion’s & Blue Shield Blue Cross Ass’n/Blue underlying view that emerges from its also (2d Shield, F.2d & Blue Cross an inter be considered the PRM cannot that PRM rules “have Cir.1986)(stating because of 42 C.F.R. pretation ‘interpretive consistently held to be been regulation key terms of that “confuses” rules,’ notice exempt from the and thus unrelated to the reasonableness and is Columbus requirements”); and comment Again, based atypical service costs. Califano, Inc. v. Community Hosp., light and in supra discussion our Cir.1980) (8th (stating F.2d interpreting agency to an deference owed rules). interpretive PRMs are simply disagree we regulations, its own Thus, simple fact that this conclusion. beyond the Even APA’s comply with the required as inter generally categorized was PRMs issuing procedures notice and comment by PRM 2534.5 pretive, the work done PRM 2534.5.11 Guernsey defi- it within the Court’s places regulations. As this interpretation of its tent” unpersuasive St. Francis’s also find 11. We stated, agencies "[a]dministrative Secretary’s Court has argument regarding the "inconsis- *11 HB-SNFs, average per diem cost of IV. 2, limit HB- and is Level the cost $100 find PRM 2534.5 to do not Because we represent the All of these numbers SNFs. interpretation capricious arbitrary be an cost, daily per person, operat- average issue, we regulation of the statute nursing facilities. ing various skilled AFFIRM. services, provide atypical that Facilities GILMAN, dissenting. Judge, Circuit expensive, may which tend to be more upward adjustments expenditures Ad- requirement of the seek A fundamental (APA) Act is that Procedure above their cost limits. Under reim- ministrative pro- given up notice of persons process originally review set interested bursement op- regulations 413.30(f), and an posed substantive the Health Care comment. See 5 U.S.C. portunity to Financing granted upward Administration that majority concludes 553. The adjustments that demon- to HB-SNFs Provider Reimbursement question, rule (1) strated that their costs were reason- (the rule), is ex- Manual (2) able, services, atypical attributable to APA’s notice and comment empt from the (4) (3) identified, indepen- separately “interpretive” an because it is requirement 413.30(f). dently verified. See C.F.R. 553(b)(A). I believe that rule. id. See 1984-1990, years In the Francis re- St. Because the the PRM rule is substantive. compensation regula- full this ceived under without notice and rule was enacted tion for its direct service costs exceed- comment, it should there- opportunity for limit, having ed its cost demonstrated invalid. fore be declared expenses reasonable and its extra were legitimately providing due to the costs of I. BACKGROUND if atypical example, services. For majority, gov- by the explained As averaged Francis’s routine costs had $100 different cost erning statute establishes per per person day during years, those hospital- free-standing limits for versus atypical and its direct service costs had Free- nursing based skilled facilities. per day, facility totaled then the would $30 (FS- standing nursing skilled facilities have recovered the above its cost limit $30 SNFs) 112% of equal have a cost limit upon making showing called for in the FS-SNFs, per the mean diem costs of all regulation. 1. parties which the Level The refer as changed system. The PRM rule this nursing hospital-based cost limit for skilled rule, atypical Under the PRM St. Francis’s (HB-SNFs) computed through facilities expenditures only service are recoverable first, step process: one two determines to the extent its total costs exceed all per 112% of the mean diem costs of num- Using Level 3. the same illustrative HB-SNFs, parties refer which the to as before, bers St. Francis’s routine 3, compared Level that number is then atypical service costs are its ser- $100 midway with Level 1. The amount $30, only vice costs are it would recover HB- Levels 1 and limit for 3 is the cost 3)) (($130 eosts)-($120 total Level SNFs, $10 parties which the refer to as Level expended Thus, majority’s $30 illustrative sce- nario, 1, provider’s When a total costs do not ex- limit for is Level the cost FS- $80 SNFs, 3, 3, equaling is Level 112% of ceed Level none of its service $120 Workers, 335, 351, prior construction Iron 98 S.Ct. are not bound their own (1978) (stating We review the 54 L.Ed.2d 586 that when an statute.... therefore mind[,] "chang[es] administrative Commission's construction of statute represents regard to the shift it from the courts still sit in review of the administra- without prior Corp. approach the construction....” Crounse tive decision and should not [its]

ICC, Cir.1986) (6th (cit- de novo and with- 781 F.2d construction issue regard ing NLRB out to the administrative understand- v. Local Union No. Internation- statutes”)). Bridge, Ornamental al Ass'n Structural & four reimbursement Thus, requirement in 1991 and are recoverable. *12 At a 42 413.30. C.F.R. requests for criteria set out 1992, Francis’s when St. under maximum, were evaluated PRM rule conflicts adjustment the upward case, not recov- rule, facility impos- could the In either it PRM prior regulation. the cost above its expenditures any of its HB- er on the restrictions es new financial 2) did (Level total costs its limit because requiring no- regulates, it thus that SNFs true even This was Level 3. exceed not to enactment. prior tice and comment that acknowledges Secretary the though § 553. 5See U.S.C. legitimate- were expenditures promulgated, PRM rule was Before the atypical ser- provision the ly spent for HB- to reimburse Secretary was free the vices. atypical services for provided that SNFs costs, those costs including all of their ANALYSIS II. Indeed, applicable the limit. above PRM is substantive A. The rule 1991, Secretary rou- the years prior the following has set out court This adjustments to St. upward tinely granted na- determining the guidelines broad Francis, all direct ex- reimbursing of its inter- rule: “An an administrative ture of Under atypical services. penditures for what the admin- simply states pretive rule however, rule, no the PRM means, only reminds agency istrative spent whether amounts longer determines On existing duties.... parties of affected 2 and Levels services hand, action the by its other if The costs compensated. 3 should be duties, law, rights or new intends to create services, other- even such to be a considered properly the rule is four requirements to the wise conform Thomas, v. Michigan rule.” legislative 413.30(f), recovera- are never 42 C.F.R. Cir.1986) (cita- (6th 176, 182-83 F.2d 805 ble. omit- marks quotation tions and internal to a requirement adds a new A rule that ted). rules interpretive exemption for The substantive, requirements is existing set of by the courts narrowly construed must be comment before notice and requires important purposes served in view Human Dep’t See Ohio can be enacted. requirements. procedural APA’s by the Svcs., & Human Health Dep’t v. 186, Svcs. Reich, See, 11 F.3d v. e.g., Caraballo Cir.1988) (6th (holding 1228, 1235 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir.1993). 195 a “main- adoption of department’s that the its conclusion that defending In ceiling” for noninstitution- tenance amount than sub- interpretive rather PRM rule is Medicaid of institutionalized spouses alized stantive, emphasizes that majority comment notice required recipients statute, § 1395yy, 42 U.S.C. controlling that was requirement a added because it process exemption-granting leaves existing implicit in compelled by or depart- Her Secretary’s discretion. Sullivan, v. Perales see also regulations); pre- subject on the prior regulation ment’s (deter- Cir.1991) (2d 1348, 1354 F.2d 948 discretion, subject four to the that serves when it rule was substantive mining a that above. See listed requirements submissions state Medicaid required 413.30(f). main- majority therefore possessed state guide simply rule is a assurance tains that the PRM documentation); v. Linoz of discretion. Secretary’s exercise supporting Cir.1986) (9th 871, Heckler, rule “the does F.2d [PRM] It concludes reimbursement department a new substantive (concluding effect regula- prior inconsistent service for ambulance payment standards excluding sub- of a characteristic solely central to ob- tions—the to another hospital from one Op. at 947. rule.” physician stantive specialty of a tain where “instead rule minimum, was substantive At a disagree. respectfully I regulation, pre-existing clarifying fifth, simply unwaivable rule adds per exception”). carved out a se. remaining [it] cases cited the Sec- Guernsey v. retary, case of Shalala Memorial the challenged modification was an 1232, Hosp., adjudicative 115 S.Ct. ruling specific as to a party (1995),upon majori- L.Ed.2d 106 which the general legislative rather than a rule. See relies, ty just is consistent with the cases Montana Power Co. Environmental (“We (9th cited. See id. at S.Ct. 1232 Agency, Protection 608 F.2d Cir.1979) agree can that APA rulemaking would still (affirming an Environmental *13 required adopted be PRM 233 a new Protection Agency determining order position inconsistent with when power Secre- construction of a plant “com- tary’s existing regulations”). menced,” even though the order was incon- prior adjudicative sistent with rulings of Moreover, other courts have held that 103, agency); NLRB v. Local Int’l rule, rules like the PRM which impose Bridge, Ass’n Structural and Ornamen- binding on an agency’s constraints existing Workers, 335, tal Iron 98 S.Ct. discretion, generally are considered sub- 651, (1978) 54 L.Ed.2d 586 a (affirming Dep’t Svcs., stantive. See Ohio Human cease by and desist order issued the Na- 862 F.2d at 1234 (concluding that a rule tional Labor Relations striking, Board to a substantive, part, was it because was union, uncertified which the union alleged “mandatory, advisory”); not Guardian prior was inconsistent with a ruling of the Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Federal Sav. agency). 658, Corp., Loan Ins. F.2d 666-67 (D.C.Cir.1978) (“If appears it agency that a When an adjudi- so- functions as an policy body, called statement it purpose is in or cative is under obligation no to act likely narrowly effect one that with consistency limits ad- or to notice and discretion, ministrative it an opportunity will be taken for comment by interested what it binding parties. Thomas, is—a rule Michigan of substantive See law.”). (“An F.2d at 184 administrative agency may prior reexamine its may decisions and The Secretary argues “nothing for depart precedents from its provided the agency bids an from changing its inter departure explicitly is rationally justi- pretations.” I not quarrel do fied.”). Because the PRM rule under con- proposition that an agency may change its sideration a legislative enactment rather rulings interpretations over time. An adjudicative order, than an any modifica- free, however, is not adopt new tions that it prior makes to regulations are regulations substantive without notice and required to have preceded by been notice Indeed, comment. in both by cases cited comment. 5See U.S.C. 553. in which an agency modified regulations, the change preceded was B. The PRM rule cannot be construed by notice and comment. See American “interpretation” as an of 42 C.F.R. Trucking Co., Ass’ns v. A.T. Ry. & S.F. § 413.30 397, 404, 1608, U.S. 87 S.Ct. The majority concludes that denying (1967) L.Ed.2d 847 (allowing the Inter compensation to HB-SNFs for the costs state Commerce adopt Commission to atypical services below Level the PRM rules, pursuant comment, to notice and rule simply fleshes out the meaning previous altered its policies regard terms “reasonableness” of “typi- costs and service); trailer-on-flatcar Western cality” of services contained in 42 C.F.R. States, Coal League v. United Traffic Op. 413.30. I respectfully dis- (5th Cir.1983) F.2d (allowing the agree. Interstate Commerce Commission to change its methodology for evaluating a regulation The in question, 42 C.F.R. carrier’s market 413.30, dominance enacting a providers allows compen- to seek new regulation pursuant to notice and sation for “items or services are [that] comment). atypical in nature scope.” In denying I find costs. for those compensated be exceed will do not for costs compensation results these to construe unpersuasive confuses seemingly rule Level “rea- a measure factor” or “discount a atypical services. atypical costs atypically sonableness.” costs provider’s fact that it is necessarily mean that does high re- PRM rule should be Because Conversely, atypical services. providing interpre- than substantive as more garded below-average has hospital the fact that enacted without tive, it was and because necessarily establish does comment, rule should notice absence of majori- Contrary to invalid. declared neces- fears, case would not present a result underlying such ty’s The facts undisputed Secretary to conduct it is point, sarily require because this confirm re- every provider’s review of provided case-by-case that St. Francis Secretary is years 3 for request. below Level imbursement at a cost pre- differ- a critical that will guidelines There is thus free to establish question. *14 atypical eligibili- costs and atypical provider’s sumptively determine ence on rule, which focuses thereby PRM reliev- adjustments, The upward services. ty for out or flesh costs, case-by- define does not of the burden atypical of her re- must, services atypical meaning guidelines analyses. Those case regulation. prior in the to the dictates however, ferred with be consistent must be regulation, governing attempts to construe majority also and com- to the notice pursuant enacted interpretation rule as the PRM the APA. procedures of a ment in 42 C.F.R. requirement It views “reasonable.” costs be provider’s grant reverse I would therefore to the two- parallel rule as a Secretary and for the summary judgment by 42 U.S.C. system established tier judg- to enter instructions remand the cost reduced system 1395yy. That I Because Francis. of St. favor ment to Level Level 3 from HB-SNFs limit for disposition trial court’s reverse would ac- factor” 2, establishing a “discount above, I find no discussed ground on their found to what for count covered issues the other to reach need to FS- compared inefficiency as relative opinion. majority’s opinion, majority’s SNFs. alleged in the similarly factors PRM rule re- and discounts HB-SNFs

inefficiency of accord- atypical

imbursement Op. at 945-946.

ingly. See America, STATES UNITED analysis reveals Closer Plaintiff-Appellee, sys- two-tier analogous rule aas not function PRM rule does tem. factor,” “discount commonly understood Connie David LANZOTTI compensation denies completely because Hughes, Defendants- L. atypical spent on first amounts Appellants. words, an HB-SNF In other 98-2728, Nos. 98-2750. ser- routine spends $100 Appeals, Court from States anywhere $1 $20 United vices and no reimburse- Circuit. will receive Seventh atypical services costs. service its all for ment at 27, 1999 Oct. Argued deemed arbitrarily expenditures are These 15, 2000 Feb. Decided or, alternatively, in efficient to be 100% factor.” “discount subjected to raises hospital same that the the extent To however, it $20, above

Case Details

Case Name: St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Donna Shalala
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 25, 2000
Citation: 205 F.3d 937
Docket Number: 98-3965
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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