{¶ 2} The St. Clairs first purchased the Allstate umbrella insurance policy on July 29, 1999. The policy renewed every year on the same date. The declarations page of the 1999 policy stated, "Uninsured Motorists Insurance Rejected." But Allstate admitted that it did not have a signed waiver from the St. Clairs in 1999 rejecting uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) coverage. Ohio law at the time required a signed waiver. Because of the invalid waiver, under the holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court in Linko v.Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America1 and Gyori v. JohnstonCoca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc.,2 on July 26, 1999, when the policy first came into effect, the St. Clairs had UM/UIM benefits that arose by operation of law.
{¶ 3} But the legislature superseded the holdings of Linko
and Gyori by statute in S.B. No. 97, effective October 31, 2001. This act amended R.C.
{¶ 4} In March 2005, St. Clair as executor sought to recover UIM benefits under the umbrella pоlicy and filed a declaratory-judgment action. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. St. Clair argued that the UIM benefits remained in the policy despite the enactment of S.B. No. 97. Allstate countered that the provisions of S.B. No. 97, which became effеctive before the policy renewed in July 2002, governed the rights of the parties and eliminated any UIM coverage that had arisen by operation of law during a previous contract period. The trial court granted Allstate's motion and overruled St. Clair's mоtion. St. Clair then filed this appeal.
{¶ 5} In his sole assignment of error, St. Clair challenges the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Allstate and its denial of his motion. We review a trial court's decision on a summary-judgment motion de novo, applying the standards set out in Civ.R. 56.4
{¶ 6} The partiеs are disputing which law governed their rights and duties under the insurance contract. "For the purposes of determining the scope of coverage of an underinsured motorist claim, the statutory law in effect at the time of entering into a contract for automobile liability insurance controls the rights and duties of the contracting parties."5
{¶ 7} In Ohio, the commencement and cancellation of an automobile insurance policy is governed by R.C.
{¶ 8} This latter provision, division (E), was added as an amendment to R.C.
{¶ 9} Allstate argues that R.C.
{¶ 10} Allstate recognizes that this interpretation of R.C.
{¶ 11} The court's holding in Wolfe prevented an insurer during this two-year guaranteed period from canceling bargained-for coverages, except by agreement of the parties and in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions governing cancellations. Additionally, the holding prevented an insurer during this two-year guaranteed period from adopting statutory changes that would have the effect of canceling coverages that had arisen by operation of law. In other words, under Wolfe, an insurer could not incorporate new statutes such as S.B. No. 97 into the policy until after the expiration of the two-year guaranteed period and the start of a new guaranteed period.
{¶ 12} In amending R.C.
{¶ 13} Our holding is consistent with the Second Appellate District's decision in Arn v. McLean10 and the Tenth Appellate District's decision in Advent v. Allstate Ins.Co.,11 in which the respective courts entertained facts very similar to those in this case. In Arn, the court rejected the insured's argument that UIM coverage arose by operation of law at the time of a renewal in an umbrella policy even though the benefits would have arisen by law at the start of the two-year guaranteed period.12 In Advent, the court rejected the insured's argument that UM/UIM coverage arose by operation of law in an amount equal to the liability coverage limit at the time of renewal even though the higher limit would have arisen by operation of law at the start of the two-year guaranteed period.13
{¶ 14} The Arn court addressed the argumеnt that the incorporation of S.B. No. 97 into the renewed policy would retroactively impair the insured's contract rights.14 The court rejected this argument after noting that S.B. No. 267 had become effective prior to the start of the two-year guaranteed period and that S.B. No. 97 had become effective prior to the start of a new policy period during the two-year guaranteed period.15
{¶ 15} Ultimately, both the Arn and the Advent courts held that because of the amendments to R.C.
{¶ 16} Like the Arn and the Advent courts, we hold that the amendments to R.C.
{¶ 17} St. Clair makes an additional argument against summary judgment. He argues that even if the rеnewal policy could have been governed by the provisions of S.B. No. 97, automatically removing the coverage by operation of law, Allstate failed to effectively "change" the policy. He claims that Allstate violated its own protоcol of announcing to the insured any change in the policy; because Allstate failed to announce the change, the change could not have taken place.
{¶ 18} Allstate counters by arguing that it did actually incorporate the S.B. No. 97 changes into the policy and that it informed the St. Clairs of these changes. The cover page of the renewal policy stated, "This policy renewal offer contains your renewal documents, including the Policy Declarations, which lists your coveragеs, limits, premium, and any discounts you're receiving. * * * Also enclosed in this mailing are ImportantNotices that provide information about your insurance policy andthat describe changes affecting your coverage. * * * Please be sure to read these Important Notices and all of the other documents enclosed in this mailing completely and cаrefully."
{¶ 19} A notice included in the renewal package provided the following information:
{¶ 20} "We'd like to let you know that we've made some changes to Uninsured Motorists Insurance coverage. Uninsured Motorists Insurance coverage will no longer be avаilable to be added to Personal Umbrella or Recreational Package policies. If you don't currently have Uninsured Motorists Insurance coverage on your policy, you will not be able to add it.
{¶ 21} "If you currently have Uninsured Motorists Insurance cоverage on your policy, you will continue to have the coverage at your existing limits. Effective immediately, you can increase or decrease your limits for Uninsured Motorists Insurance coverage by simply calling your Allstate representative and letting him or her know what change you'd like to make to your existing coverage. There will be no forms to sign. You can also remove Uninsured Motorists Insurance coverage from your policy. However, if you remove the coverage, you will not be able to add the covеrage to your policy at a later date. Once Uninsured Motorists Insurance coverage is removed from the policy, it is no longer available.
{¶ 22} "If you have any questions or concerns regarding Uninsured Motorists Insurance coverage, or to chаnge your existing coverage, please contact your agent."
{¶ 23} St. Clair argued that this notice merely confirmed the existence of UM/UIM coverage. Allstate was required to notify the St. Clairs that any UM/UIM coverage previously implied by law was removed from the renewal policy.
{¶ 24} We cannot agree that the notice actually confirmed UM/UIM coverage, where St. Clair did not produce any evidence that he or his wife actually knew that they had coverage under the prior policy by opеration of law; where UM/UIM coverage was not listed on the declarations page of the policy renewed in July 2002; and where, as conceded by St. Clair, none of the previous policies listed UM/UIM coverage on the declarations page.
{¶ 25} Rather, the evidence undisputedly demonstrates that the policy did not contain UIM coverage. The July 2002 renewal policy stated that a new policy period began on July 29, 2002. The law in effect at the time of the last renewal, S.B. No. 97, did not require Allstate to offer UM/UIM coverage, and the St. Clairs did not actually have that coverage in the policy prior to the renewal apart from the legal fiction. We decline to recognize the implication of coverage where the legislature hаs clearly spoken on this issue.18 Accordingly, Allstate was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Sundermann, P.J., Hendon and Winkler, JJ.
Ralph Winkler, retired, from the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment.