153 N.W. 416 | N.D. | 1915
This is an appeal from an order of the district court of Kolette county granting defendant’s motion for a new trial. The action was brought to recover a balance' due for lumber sold by plaintiff to the village of St. John. The theory upon which defendant is sought to be held liable to the plaintiff in this action is that the contract between plaintiff and such village was void by reason of the fact that such indebtedness exceeded the debt limit authorized by the Constitution and statutes of this state, and that under § 1603, Kev. Codes 1905, § 2218, Comp. Laws 1913, this defendant, who was at the time president of the village board, and who participated in the purchase of such lumber, is individually liable for the performance of such contract. It also appears that plaintiff’s agent, one Bolstad, who negotiated such sale, was also a member of the village board.
Notwithstanding the fact that the action was one properly triable to a jury, counsel, at the commencement of the trial in the court below, entered into a stipulation not only waiving a jury, but consenting that the case be tried under what is known .as the Newman law, and it was by the consent of the court, as well as by the parties, so tried, all evidence offered being received, no rulings made or exceptions saved. This procedure was manifestly irregular, but neither party is in a position to predicate error thereon.
The case, not coming within the provisions of the so-called Newman law, cannot be tried de novo in this court, but can only come here for a review of alleged errors of law. Parties cannot by stipulation change the methods prescribed by law to be pursued on appeals to this court. But even though this were a case properly triable under the Newman-law, we could not try it de novo in this court on this appeal, for the obvious reason that it is not here for trial de novo of the entire case, but, as before stated, is here on an appeal merely from an order granting
In determining the correctness of such order, it is well settled that if any of the grounds urged on the motion for a new trial are tenable, such order will not be disturbed. Such is the holding of this court. Davis v. Jacobson, 13 N. D. 430, 101 N. W. 314. It is also well settled that in reviewing such order the usual rule that the same will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion in making such order does not obtain here, for the judge who granted such order had nothing to do with the trial of the case, he being merely the successor in office of the trial judge. As was said by Chief Justice Corliss in Braithwaite v. Aiken, 2 N. D. 57, 49 N. W. 419: “But this rule (the rule which makes the exercise of the discretion of the trial court binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a palpable abuse, although the latter court would have reached a different conclusion had it been called upon to exercise its own discretion in the first instance) should have but little weight in this case, for the reason that the judge by whom the new trial was granted was not the judge before whom the case was tried, and therefore was no better qualified by reason of having been present at the trial properly to exercise discretion in the matter than this court. “The discretion vested in the trial court to grant or refuse a new trial is neither an arbitrary nor a general discretion. It is based on the theory that the judge who tries a case, having the parties, their witnesses and counsel, before him, with opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct during the trial, and to note all incidents occurring during its progress likely to affect the result thereof, is better qualified to judge whether a fair trial has been had and substantial justice done than the appellate tribunal.’ To the judge who granted this new trial the record was as cold and lifeless as it is to us.
This brings us to a consideration of the merits.
The statutory grounds urged on the motion for a new trial were (1) alleged errors of law occurring at the trial, and (2) alleged insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision of the court.
Many specifications of errors of law are contained in the settled statement upon which such motion was based, but for reasons hereafter stated it will not be necessary to notice them all.
Certain contentions claimed to be decisive of this appeal are made in respondent’s brief, and while we deem but one of them controlling, some of the others are worthy of notice, as they involve important practice questions which may frequently arise.
First, it is argued that because the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment of the trial judge were not filed until the day after he was succeeded in office by Judge Buttz, the judgment entered pursuant thereto was a nullity, and therefore such fact alone furnished ample justification for the order vacating the same and granting a new trial. A sufficient answer to this contention is the fact that no such ground for the order complained of was suggested to or acted upon by the lower court in making the order. Furthermore, such judgment was not a nullity, but at the most one irregularly entered, and voidable only when properly challenged by direct attack. See opinion on motion to dismiss this appeal, 149 N. W. 355. No such attack has ever been made in the court below, so far as we are advised, and clearly it cannot be
Second, it is asserted that because the action was not properly triable under the so-called Newman law, and cannot therefore be tried de novo in this court, there was of necessity a mistrial. Sixteen pages of respondent’s brief are devoted to this point, but we deem such contention wholly without merit. It occurs to us that it would be a most novel doctrine to announce that a mistrial would of necessity result merely because the parties in a law case have by consent pursued a mode of trial in the district court adopted only to an equity suit triable under the Newman law. Upon what plausible theory or legal reasoning can such contention be upheld ? True, upon an appeal from the judgment a trial de novo cannot be had in this court, but this the parties were bound to know when they selected by stipulation the method of trial. Even if the consequences to the defeated party of such denial of a right to a trial de novo in this court were destructive of important rights, he must be held to be the author of his own injury. Having made his bed he must lie in it. But, happily, no serious consequences necessarily follow from such stipulation. In the first place, as we have heretofore observed, the appeal being from the order granting a new trial, we are not concerned with the Newman law at all, and, second, we fail to perceive any obstacle in the way of the defeated party, after a trial conducted as this was conducted, from having the errors, if any, reviewed and corrected in precisely the same manner and under the same procedure that must have controlled in the absence of such stipulation, or in the absence of the Newman law. Manifestly, the stipulation did not and could not transpose the case from an action at law to a suit in equity, and most certainly not so as to control the statutory method of review of the judgment in this court. We think the above is a sufficient answer to this contention.
It is also argued that § 1603, Kev. Codes 1905, § 2218, Comp. Laws 1913, violates § 61 of the Constitution, which provides that “no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title” etc., and is therefore unconstitutional in so far as it imposes a penalty, forfeiture, or liability upon individuals. This statute had its origin in chapter 126, Laws of 1897, being § 101 thereof. This chapter embraces a general revenue and taxation measure, and its title is “An Act Pre
While we consider such question not free from doubt, our conclusion on the following points renders a decision thereof unnecessary, and we therefore refrain from expressing any opinion thereon. We mention it here merely for the purpose of dispelling any implication which might otherwise arise, that we deem respondent’s contention devoid of merit. Assuming, for the purposes of this case only, that such statute is constitutional, we approach what we deem to be the crucial and controlling point on this appeal.
It is contended that this action is barred by the statute of limitations (§ 6788, Eev. Codes 1905, § 7376, Comp. Laws 1913), which provides, among other things, that “an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, when the action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the state, .. . . ” must be commenced within three years. This contention rests upon the assumption that the statute imposing such liability upon officers of a municipality is penal, rather than remedial. Does such statute impose a penalty upon such officers, or does it merely establish a contract right? It reads: “And every contract made in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be utterly null and .void in regard to any obligation thereby imposed on the corporation on behalf of which such contract purports to be made; but every commissioner, officer, agent, supervisor, or member of any municipal corporation that makes or participates in making or authorizes the making of any such contract shall be held individually liable for its performance.” [Eev. Codes 1905, § 1603, Comp. Laws 1913, § 2218.]
This law, if constitutional, concededly creates a statutory liability of some kind, and the perplexing question is whether such liability can be regarded as contractual in any true sense of the term. If such liability is not contractual, then it must, we think, be treated as in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture. We have examined the authorities cited by
We admit that there is much force in the argument of appellant’s counsel, yet, we are constrained to hold that the statutory liability, imposed under said section is in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of § 6788, Eev. Codes 1905, § 7376, Comp. Laws 1913, which prescribes that an action under a statute for a penalty or forfeiture must be brought within three years. We reach this conclusion with some misgivings, but after careful consideration of the language of the statute, which upon its face evidently aims to shift upon municipal officers who violate its provisions the burden of performing the contract which they have attempted to make in behalf of such municipality. No authorities directly in point under the facts have been called to our attention, and we have found none, but the following reasons prompt us in arriving at this conclusion. In the first place, the authorities, even in cases involving the nature and legal effect of statutory provisions imposing similar liability upon officers and trustees of private corporations under analogous circumstances, are not by any means harmonious, and it is at least doubtful if the weight of authority, as well as the better reasoned cases under statutes similar to ours, do not support the doctrine contended for by respondent in the case at bar. Indeed, most of the eases cited and relied upon by the appellant will, on careful examination, be found to be easily differentiated from this case on the ground of statutory provisions differing from those in this state. Others ex
That the effect, and not the mere form, of the statute, is to be considered, see Diversey v. Smith, 103 Ill. 378, 42 Am. Rep. 14. Tested by such rule it seems obvious that our statute, even though remedial in a sense, is also penal within the meaning of our three-year-limitation statrite, for it most certainly penalizes the public officers who violate its provisions. Such is the inevitable effect of an enforcement thereof.
Another, and to our minds a quite controlling, reason why we should uphold respondent’s contention on this point, is the fact that it evidently was the legislative intent that § 6788, Rev. Codes 1905, § 7376 Comp. Laws 1913, should apply to cases like this, for it is expressly restricted to actions “upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, when the action is given to the party aggrieved,” etc., there being in the same act a separate limitation fixing one year for the commencement of an action on a statute to recover a penalty or forfeiture by persons not aggrieved, but who nevertheless are given the privilege of collecting and retaining such penalty in whole or in part. See § 6792, Rev. Codes 1905, § 7380, Comp. Laws 1913. Manifestly, therefore, the legislature has recognized a marked distinction in the nature of statutory penalties and forfeitures, there being one class for which a recovery can be had only by the aggrieved party, to which class the statute in question belongs. If this case does not involve the latter, it is difficult to imagine any case involving this class.
Our views on this point render a consideration of the other questions unnecessary.
The order appealed from is affirmed.