Senate Republican Campaign Committee v. Public Disclosure CommissionSenate Republican Campaign Committee v. Public Disclosure Commission
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Alexander (en banc)
The central issue presented by this appeal is whether
In 1972, the voters of this state passed Initiative 276 (Laws of 1973, ch. 1, § 1), which, among other things, regulated the financing of political campaigns. The measure, later codified as
In 1992, Washington‘s voters approved Initiative 134, commonly referred to as the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Laws of 1993, ch. 2, §§ 1-36. This had the effect of amending
During the 1995 regular legislative session, the SRCC prepared and mailed two letters to potential campaign donors, asking for contributions to the SRCC. The SRCC is a political committee duly registered with the PDC and subject to the direction and control of the Senate Republican Caucus. The Senate Republican Caucus is comprised entirely of incumbent Republican State Senators. The SRCC‘s solicitation letters were both signed by State Senator Dan McDonald, the Republican Leader of the Washington State Senate and chair of the SRCC. In the first letter,
I need your help to win a majority in the Senate.
. . . .
Your support is essential, if we are to continue.
. . . .
Your contribution of $100, $75, $39—or whatever you can afford—will make a tremendous difference. Every dollar goes directly to support Republican candidates for the State Senate.
. . . .
Your 1995 membership of at least $39 will be used to defend Republican seats in 1995 and secure a Republican majority by 1996!
Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 181-82. Two months later, Senator McDonald signed a second letter which was almost identical to his earlier letter.
Another letter, which was written on the letterhead of Senate Republican Leadership Council1 and signed by its chair, W.H. Meadowcroft, was also sent to potential donors. Although the Council is an organization separate from the SRCC, the SRCC concedes that it “sponsored” this letter. The letter, dated January 31, 1995, stated in pertinent part:
Our opportunities to win the Majority in the State Senate in 1996 are outstanding. The Democrats have several seats up for election that are traditionally Republican Districts. This is our opportunity to win back these vulnerable districts and regain the Majority in the State Senate.
CP at 178. According to the PDC, the SRCC received over $70,000 in contributions in response to the aforementioned letters and its other fundraising activities conducted during the legislative session freeze period.2
On March 10, 1995, the PDC began an investigation to determine whether the SRCC‘s solicitation of funds during the 1995 legislative session constituted a violation of
The superior court denied the SRCC‘s motion for preliminary injunction. Consequently, the PDC proceeded with the scheduled enforcement hearing, at the conclusion of which it determined that the SRCC had violated
Thereafter, the SRCC moved for summary judgment. In support of that motion, the SRCC filed a declaration of Sandy Olsen. In it, she asserted that the monies collected by the SRCC from the letter writing effort and other fundraising activities were to be used for three purposes: (1) to “defray the costs of fund-raising itself“; (2) for “office administration“; and (3) “for ultimate use by new senatorial candidates, that is, individuals who will in the future become candidates for senatorial seats not held by incumbent Republican senators.” CP at 650-51. She also stated:
It is true that all funds raised as a result of that letter, net of expenses, were intended
for ultimate use by new senatorial candidates, that is, individuals who will in the future become candidates for senatorial seats not held by incumbent Republican senators. We did not know then—we still do not know—who those candidates will be. Since we were trying to build a fund for future campaigns and were not soliciting on behalf of any actual, present, identified candidate....
CP at 650-51. In a later filed declaration, Olsen stated that contributions to the SRCC do not and cannot influence any sitting Republican senator because “none of them directly benefit from the monies obtained.” CP at 587.
The PDC responded by filing a counterclaim for “penalty and equitable relief.” CP at 170. It also moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim and for dismissal of the SRCC‘s declaratory judgment action. After a hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment, the superior court concluded that “during the 1995 legislative freeze period, the SRCC accepted contributions in violation of
Following denial of its motion for reconsideration, the SRCC appealed to Division Two of the Court of Appeals. That court certified the appeal to this court. We granted review.
We are called upon to determine whether the superior court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the PDC. A summary judgment motion should be granted if the submissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
To resolve the issue before us, it is necessary to examine
During the period beginning on the thirtieth day before the date a regular legislative session convenes and continuing thirty days past the date of final adjournment, and during the period beginning on the date a special legislative session convenes and continuing through the date that session adjourns, no state official or a person employed by or acting on behalf of a state official or state legislator may solicit or accept contributions to a public office fund, to a candidate or authorized committee, or to retire a campaign debt.
The SRCC acknowledges that it is a political committee and, consequently, a “person”
The remaining issue, and the one that prompted our direct review of the trial court‘s ruling, is whether the SRCC violated
As we have observed above, the provisions of
At the time the SRCC engaged in the allegedly unlawful solicitation of campaign funds, the Fair Campaign Practices Act contained two definitions of the term candidate. One definition appeared in the general definitions section of the Act, former
“Candidate” means any individual who seeks election to public office. An individual shall be deemed to seek election when he first:
(a) Receives contributions or makes expenditures or reserves space or facilities with the intent to promote his candidacy for office; or
(b) Announces publicly or files for office.
The other definition of candidate was found in former
an individual seeking nomination for election or seeking election to a state office. An individual is deemed to be seeking nomination for election or seeking election when the individual first:
(a) Announces publicly or files for the office;
(b) Purchases commercial advertising space or broadcast time to promote his or her candidacy;
(c) Receives contributions or makes expenditures for facilities with intent to promote his or her candidacy for the office; or
(d) Gives his or her consent to another person to take on behalf of the individual any of the actions in (b) or (c) of this subsection.
We note, first, that the definition contained in former
The SRCC contends that its solicitation of funds for the benefit of individual Republicans, then unknown to the SRCC, who would ultimately seek election to the State Senate is not violative of
Although the PDC conceded at oral argument that a technical reading of the statute supports the SRCC‘s assertion that
The PDC makes the point that it previously determined that
In our view, the prior determination of the PDC is of no moment here. First, we have some doubt about the certainty of that determination. The record shows that the determination was contrary to an earlier determination of the PDC6 and was merely memorialized in a memorandum to “Legislative Caucus Campaign Committees” from a PDC staff member. The memo went on to state that “the members [of the PDC] will clarify their position through the formal rule making process, affording everyone concerned an opportunity to comment on this matter.” CP at 112. Furthermore, resolution of the issue before us is controlled by our determination of the meaning of the term candidate within the context of
The PDC asserts, additionally, that an interpretation of the term candidate which does not include unknown future candidates is contrary to the intent of the voters in enacting
Looking at the plain language of
In our view, the term candidate, as it is used in
We are not unmindful of the dissent‘s assertion that the term candidate is ambiguous, i.e., susceptible to more than one meaning. The dissenter suggests that the term could include an individual who takes the steps set forth in
Even if it was unclear whether unidentified future senatorial candidates were included within the definition of candidate, we are unpersuaded that a liberal interpretation of that term effectuates the voters’ intent in enacting the statute. Although the PDC is correct in observing that
Furthermore, we cannot agree that a strict interpretation of the term candidate runs counter to the intent of the voters in passing the initiative. The intent of the voters was set forth in
We are also concerned that the liberal interpretation of the term candidate urged on us by the PDC runs counter to the requirement that statutes regulating political speech must be narrowly tailored. Although limitations on campaign contributions have been held to be less restrictive of political speech than limitations on campaign expenditures, they do impinge on protected associational freedoms. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 635-38, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). As such, “statutory classifications impinging upon that right [to engage in political expression] must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990) (citing Police Dep‘t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)). In our view, adoption of the liberal interpretation of
Finally, the dissent contends that what it describes as “[t]he majority‘s narrow interpretation” of
In sum, for the SRCC to have violated
DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, MADSEN and SANDERS, JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, Justice (dissenting).
The people enacted Initiative 134, the Fair Campaign Practices Act (Act), to control the political fundraising of legislators during the time they are engaged in lawmaking in order to prevent campaign contributions from influencing or appearing to influence the legislative process. The majority, by narrowly interpreting the statute, failing to follow the Act‘s liberal construction mandate, and ignoring the intent and purpose of the statute, frustrates this purpose and allows the conduct the statute was designed to prohibit. The majority allows the Senate Republican Campaign Committee (SRCC) to fundraise for candidates, so long as candidates are unknown or undeclared, but remands for trial the issue of whether the SRCC solicited or accepted contributions for known candidates or incumbent Republican senators. The letters at issue contain the following phrases: ”help to win a majority in the Senate“; ”assure a Senate Republican majority by 1996“; ”will be used to defend Republican seats ...“; and ”goes directly to support Republican candidates....” Clerk‘s Papers at 181-82 (Ex. 2) (emphasis added). The majority concludes these do not, on their face, violate the statute. I disagree and would hold the statute prohibits a legislative caucus from fundraising for present or future candidates during the legislative freeze period and affirm the trial court‘s decision finding the SRCC solicited and accepted contributions in violation of
The sole issue for the majority is whether the SRCC solicited from or accepted contributions to a candidate. To answer this question, the majority looks to
I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the term “candidate” is unambiguous. A statute susceptible to more than one meaning is ambiguous. In re Sehome Park Care Ctr., Inc., 127 Wash.2d 774, 778, 903 P.2d 443 (1995). The former preamble to the definitions section of former
The question then becomes which definition to apply. The statute provides the answer. As stated previously,
The intent of the people in enacting Initiative 134, which we must effectuate, is found in the statute itself. The relevant portion of the stated intent is as follows:
The people of the state of Washington find and declare that:
(1) The financial strength of certain individuals or organizations should not permit them to exercise a disproportionate or controlling influence on the election of candidates.
(2) Rapidly increasing political campaign costs have led many candidates to raise larger percentages of money from special interests with a specific financial stake in matters before state government. This has caused the public perception that decisions of elected officials are being improperly influenced by monetary contributions.
By limiting campaign contributions, the people intend to:
(1) Ensure that individuals and interest groups have fair and equal opportunity to influence elective and governmental processes;
(2) Reduce the influence of large organizational contributors; and
(3) Restore public trust in governmental institutions and the electoral process.
RCW 42.17.620 .
To effectuate the polices and purposes of the Act, and to determine whether the context of the statute requires a definition other than that explicitly provided, we must look to the conduct proscribed.
Whether a contribution received during a legislative session is for a particular individual candidate or for a future, as yet unknown or undeclared, candidate does not affect the possibility that those contributions could coerce, pressure, or tempt legislators’ votes, or appear to do so. To allow the SRCC2 to raise money for candidates, so long as candidates are as yet unknown, will simply lead to candidates waiting to declare themselves until after the legislative freeze period is over, thus circumventing the statute.3 The majority‘s narrow interpretation thus renders the statute meaningless. Whether a person makes a contribution to a caucus during the legislative freeze period for a specific versus a generic candidate makes no difference as to the potential effects or perceived effects of that contribution.
The trial court stated:
[F]und raising solicitation efforts undertaken by partisan caucuses—aided or endorsed by incumbent legislators—for the purpose of raising money to elect future candidates runs afoul [of] the express purpose and intent of
RCW 42.17.610 through.710. Elimination of the public perception that the decisions of their elected legislators are being improperly influenced to favor those who make monetary contributions to the partisan caucuses of the party to whom the legislator belongs, can only be effectively achieved ifRCW 42.17.710 ‘s proscription applies whether or not suchsolicitations are for a declared or yet undeclared future candidate. If one could contribute money in response to a caucus solicitation for a yet-to-be-named candidate, he/she could as easily gain the favor of, or buy the influence of, the legislator or legislators in the party of the caucus soliciting such monetary contributions, just as much as he/she could obtain such influence by contributing directly to any such solicitation for a declared, though not an incumbent, candidate for the legislature.
Clerk‘s Papers at 693-94. I agree.
GUY, SMITH and TALMADGE, JJ., concur.