delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the trial of petitioner John Henry Squire in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on charges of assault with intent to murder and unlawful use of a hаndgun, the trial judge, without objection, instructed the jury that:
*134
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals, exercising thе discretion it possesses under Maryland Rule 756 g, declined to take cognizance of error in this instruction; accordingly, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
Squire v. State,
*133 The burden of proof of proving self-defense is on the Defendant, not upon the State, although this burden by the Defendant may be fulfilled by a preponderance of the credible evidеnce; in other words, the Defendant is not obligated to prove a valid self-defense beyond a reasonable dоubt.
*134 Usually, of course, this Court will not consider claims of error which have not been presented and decided by the trial сourt. Md. Rule 885. Moreover, as expressed in Rule 756 g, the same is true specifically with respect to jury instructions in criminal Causеs. That rule in full reads:
Upon appeal a party assigning error in the instructions may not assign as of right an error unless (1) the pаrticular portion of the instructions given or the particular omission therefrom or the particular failure to instruct was distinctly objected to before the jury retired to consider its verdict and (2) the grounds of objection were stated at thаt time. Ordinarily no other error will be considered by the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals, but thе appellate court, either of its own *135 motion or upon the suggestions of a party may take cognizance of and correct any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the accused even though such error was not objected to as provided by section f of this Rule.
Therefore, absent the existence of compelling circumstances, the failure of a defendant to register an objection to a jury instruction pursuant to Rule 756 f bars our cоnsideration of the matter. However, as Judge Eldridge stated for this Court in
Dempsey v. State,
We observe exceptional circumstances present here which warrant our utilizing the aрpropriate provision of Rule 756 g to reverse the judgment entered in the trial court. Initially, we note that each party makes a pivotal concession in this Court — the State admits that under
Mullaney
and
Evans
the jury instruction was prejudicially erroneous, and Squire concedes that he made no objection to it. It should also be borne in mind that the petitioner was tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on June 13,1975, only four days after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mullaney.
Considering that the Supreme Court’s opinion dealt only with a Maine statute requiring a defendant to prove he acted in the heat of passion to reduce an unlawful homicide from murder to manslaughter, and that it was the well established law of this State (until our
jEvans
decision on July 15,1976) that the burden of proving self-defense was on the defendant,
see, e.g., Davis v. State,
Having very carefully reviewed the record in this case, we are well satisfied that the failure to object did not result from trial tactics or inadvertence, but from a belief of counsel (not unfounded we think) that the instruction was in accord with Maryland and federal law. Therefore, in view of the unique factors present in this case, we think it appropriate that Squire be awarded a new trial.
Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed and case remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Criminal Court of Baltimore and remand the case to that latter court for a new trial.
Cоsts to be paid by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
Notes
. Although not of controlling significance, we note that it is unlikely, through no fault on the part of counsel or the court¡ that either was cognizant of Mullaney. The case was not mentioned in any Baltimore newspaper between June 9,1975, the date of the decision, and June 13,1975, the date of Squire’s trial. Moreover, even United States Law Week, the only reporter which published the opinion quickly enough to be of use at Squire’s trial, probably was not even available in Baltimore until June 11 or 12.