163 A. 608 | Conn. | 1933
Harriet E. Cable presented a claim against the estate of Frederick T. Gladding, late of Danbury, deceased, alleging that she had rendered services to him from September 1st, 1925, to June 1st, 1929, the date of his death, upon a mutual understanding and agreement that he would give her by will the life use and income of his entire property. She further claims that the services, which included board, laundry and nursing, were of the reasonable value of $1900, but she did not receive the promised gift by will.
The matter was first heard by commissioners appointed by the Court of Probate, who allowed the claim in part, and from their action an appeal was taken by Nellie Spurr and George Spurr, Jr., next of kin of the deceased, and legatees and devisees under his will, who alleged in the Superior Court, among other things, that the claimant did receive by will a gift which exceeded the reasonable value of her claimed services. The jury returned a verdict for the claimant which the court, upon motion, set aside, and the claimant appealed.
From the evidence, the jury might reasonably have found that, in 1925, Frederick T. Gladding, the deceased, *110 proposed to the claimant, Harriet E. Cable, who was a niece of his deceased wife, that if she would come to live with and take care of him as long as he lived, he would give her the life use of his property, No. 45 Stevens Street, in Danbury; that, thereafter, she went to his home, October 21st, 1925, and rendered services to him there until his death, June 1st, 1929. The parties conceded that $10 a week was a reasonable sum for such work as had been done by her. He left a will, dated February 15th, 1929, wherein he bequeathed a life use of one third of all his property to the claimant with remainder over to Nellie Spurr and Arthur M. Day, respectively. The first provision of the will directed the payment of his just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, but added: "I hereby state that at the time of the making of this, my last, will I am not indebted to any person whatsoever, in any amount whatsoever, except to Arthur M. Day, of Danbury, Connecticut." There was no evidence adduced at the trial as to the intention of the deceased in making the provision for the claimant in his will other than such as the law will presume from the will itself. The parties conceded at the trial that the value of Mrs. Cable's life interest in the property was worth more than the value of her services.
the problem in this case may be stated in this way: Services were performed by the claimant under an agreement that the deceased would leave her by will the life use of his real estate. The will, without explanation, gave to her a life use of one third of his estate, being a lesser amount than that promised, but a greater amount than the value of the services actually performed. The theory of the trial court in setting aside the verdict was that as the claimant had received by will property of greater value than the services rendered, she had been fully paid and she *111
could not maintain an action for the value of her services in addition. The cases of Reynolds v. Robinson,
The record indicates that the proceedings which took place after the jury returned their first verdict were not in any degree the basis of the granting of the motion to set the verdict aside. They would not in any event have afforded a sound reason for granting it.
There is error; the cause is remanded to the Superior Court with direction to render judgment upon the verdict.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.