*1 188
however, ambiguity no with re- in this
sрect rights SPURLOCK, Pouloses Nyles W. district (Plaintiff), I am not sure that instance. ambiguity, but if it did really found v. fully by this finding is reviewable Everson, ELY, Fleming, Mary Fran Jean “[wjhether ambiguity exists court because Garvin, Foster, Daryl Connie Frederick Foods, Inc. Redding question is a of law. Harrison, Kathy Harvey, Bruce J. Tex.Civ.App., 467 Berry, v. 361 S.W.2d McCracken, Morehouse, Mary Juana Coble, 14 Bosler v. (1962); Wyo. 84 P. I, II, Morse, Appellees Doe Doe Compa- Amoco Production (1906).” 895 (Defendаnts), Company Wy- ny v. Chemical Stauffer Wyo., 612 P.2d 465 oming, Wren, Anna Mae Adams and Lois (Defendants). the two dis instance contracts clearly that re close Kinderknechts No. 83-260. according to the Pouloses mained liable Supreme Wyoming. Court of original their contract. Kinderknechts however, option specific seek have 17, 1985. Oct. performance rescind the contract with Valley to respect any failure on Platte
perform the terms second contract. proposition cannot discern how second respect ambiguity with to the first.
creates writing is in and the
For me the contract
language unambiguous, is clear and parties Poulos- intention enjoy rights
es continue unequivocal.
under the 1978 contract Holst, Wyo., Guynn v.
See
(1985); Corpora
Company v. Federal Resources
tion, (1985); Salt River Wyo., 694 Heiner,
Enterprises, Inc. v. Wyo., 663 P.2d Development, Busch Inc. v. (1983);
518 City Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d Company Amoco Production v.
(1982); Company Wyo Chemical
Stauffer ming, Wyo., Wyo (1980);
ming Company Trust v. Bank and Holla (1980);
Waugh,
Wyo.,
baugh Wyo., 604 P.2d Hamm,
(1980); Pilcher v. Goe, Fuchs
1«9 *2 plaints against appellant board trustees of that district. Harrison is the attorney represented who thе rest of the appellees bringing complaints to the attention of the board.
Acting group’s as the attorney, Harrison 2, wrote to the school September board on 1981, concerning allegations the against ap- 11, pellant. 1981, On December the board appellees notified the hearing that a con- cerning appellant’s fitness to function as a principal hearing would be held. That be- Moller, Aron and Sid L. Aron & C.M. 29, 1982, gan on March hearing before offi- Laramie, Hennig, appellant. cer Ford T. Bussart and continued for five Phelan, McKellar, Q. days. upon Bernard William M. Based his findings of fact and Uchner, Walton, Lathrop conclusions of & William Bussart recommended appellees. they to the board that Cheyenne, appellant. terminate alia, Inter Bussart many found of the alle- THOMAS,* C.J., ROSE, Before gations against appellant harmless or in- ROONEY,** CARDINE, BROWN and JJ. substantial; others, However, unfounded. he found two serious to ROONEY, Justice.1 board, however, justify termination. The rejected Bussart’s recommendation and did Nyles Spurlock, prin- W. a former school appellant. discharge cipal, brought against appellees an action for intentional interference with contractu- Meanwhile was involved al relations and for intentional infliction of 5,May altercation with two teachers on The district fully 1982. The details of this incident are granted summary judgment in favor Trustees, Spurlock v. Board of set forth in parents appellees, employees former 1, County School District No. Carbon students, holding former that as a matter separate A of law the information furnished to the proceeding before board based on this persоns school board those did not cause 27, May A incident was initiated on 1982. discharge principal the school board to hearing in matter held June 23 holding the claim for intentional 24, 12, 1982, August 1982. On distress, being de- findings issued of fact and conclu- recovery pendent upon on the claim for supporting sions of law its determination principal’s malicious interference with the May on the discharge contract, Spurlock сhallenges must fail. incident. rulings. We affirm. both INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH Appellant principal the former of Mor- CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS School, high in Baggs, Wyo- row school A ming, employed by County and was Carbon “ * * * shall be rendered forthwith if the School District No. 1. All the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter- parents, save Harrison are individual stu- file, rogatories, and admissions on to- dents and teachers who addressed com- * opinion being forthcoming, reassigned Januаry it was Became Chief Justice on 1985. July Rooney Justice on 1985. Justice Roo- ** argument. Chief Justice at time of oral ney proffered opinion to the court distributed August on 1985. Justice Rose distributed his originally assigned opinion 1. This to Chief dissenting opinion the court on October 29,May Justice Thomas on 1984 for the render- ing proffered majority opinion. of a No such affidavits, support of their motion for sum any, show
gether with any mary judgment, appellees issue as to is no moving party fact and material memorandum and a number affidavits a matter of entitled which bore the causa ”* * * 56(c), Rule W.R.C.P. law. tion J. issue. The affidavits Frederick Harrison, Ely, parent, T. Jean Ford argues determination Bussart, officer, hearing indicated that employ- discharge from *3 accept the board had refused to Bussart’s precludes fact which issue of ment is an materi- affida is a recommendation of dismissal. The judgment. Causation summary inter- Golden, for intentional attorney of the al in a vits T. Michael element If the relations. district, contractual Scoggin, ference with the school and William E. fact. is an issue of disputed, cause is trustees, indi a member of the board of 766, Torts, (Second) com- of Restatement § ruled of cated that the board had in favor genu- if there is no But of сourse ment o. appellant hearing had on the Bussart but causation, summary judg- ine issue as to separate May inci terminated him for a 5 thereby precluded. ment is not dent. also ex The cerpts depositions from taken in another recognized an action has This court involving parties. the suit some of same interference with contractu for intentional partial Hull, deposition v. The of Clark Wartеnsleben al is allowable. relations 613, member, P.2d 614 415 Willey, board stated was Restatement, Torts, 766, p. 49 4 citing hearing for the Bussart al terminated Kvenild, v. Taylor, Also see legations May rather because of the 5 but (1979); Board Trustees of depositions incident. The Sue Williams of of 1 District No. v. County School Weston Morehead, members, and Katherine 1009, Holso, Wyo., 584 reh. denied kept the two incidents were indicated that (1978). The defendаnt can be Harvey, separate. deposition The Bruce however, only if liable, he causes the held incident, describing May 5 included the was Keeton, 129, Torts, p. loss. Prosser & appellees also presented The record. 1984); (5th Ethyl Corporation 989 v. ed. findings of fact conclu as exhibits the 1220, Balter, Fla.App., 386 So.2d de cert. hearing officer T. sions of Ford law 955, 3099, 101 69 452 U.S. S.Ct. nied Bussart, findings the of fact and as well as Sales, (1981); Seaway 965 Yacht L.Ed.2d the board of trustees conclusions of law of Corporation, Fla.App., Inc. Brunswick August dated wherein was Lingard 242 See also So.2d May 5 incident. terminated (1959) Fla.App., 110 So.2d Kiraly, opposition appellant filed to all of this by (plaintiff must establish evidence authorities, points and a memorandum of employment the was terminated because counter-affidavits, no nor ex- but filed acts). agree We the the defendant’s with cerpts the of board mem- from analogy: Pennsylvania Court’s “ * * * bers, might supported have his belief with action interference An rely part in fact on the they did is, analogous way, in a another’s contract him. appellees had levied action for of affec- the old alienation creating potential issue which, course, tions, no there was fact to the causе of dis- with reference affections, lost, though liability if the charge deposition, it is appellant's the tort- alienated were not Strous, the record whether that was unclear from 344 Pa. feasor.” v. Wahl judge.2 the trial Nonetheless even before A.2d prior Spurlock deposition judgment the the order hearing summary mo- on the At the granting summary judgment, deposition attorney depo- the plaintiffs tion indicated that thе until three yet did reach this court some filed because it had not been sition was not signed. appeal yet record on was signed months after the main it is not before this In fact entry filed. court docket shows no court. The district raising reveals facts issue of material perusal a careful termination, pertinence: fact as to the cause following possible only the thing claim, lead- this whole on intention- “I dismissed for was relations, on ing up this conclusion al interference it.” He bases with contractual proper. and the fact nature” “human fired He claims he was is human.” “Board INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF bald “technicality.” He makes the
on a EMOTIONAL DISTRESS succeeded that the defendants assertion did fired. He not believe getting him parties treated the court fired to be May 5 incident claim of emo intentional infliction of for; therefоre, the board he concluded that parasitic tional distress in this decision influenced in their must have been claim for intentional interference with allegations. other relations, thus, contractual when failed, host action claim for W.R.C.P., 56(e), provides perti- Rule failed. distress also part: nent *4 “ * * * In an argument connection with on mo motion When a tions, following (Mr. Aron is said pro- as supported is made and аttorney): appellant’s may party rule an adverse vided in this * * * “THE My COURT: concern is not rest the mere feeling I factual material. don’t have response, pleading, but his denials this, whether or there are still in by provided affidavits or otherwise to be And I’m factual issues resolved. [depositions], this rale must set forth willing say there aren’t. showing there is a specific facts “So, if I saying I’m decide its a factual genuine not so issue fоr trial. If he does matter, that there are factual issues to judgment, appropri- respond summary if resolved, talking be we’re about (Em- ate, entered him.” shall be if state- where it’s conceded issue added.) phasis Well, ruling by if the the board is ment— conclusive, deposition properly Even if the be- words, you if can’t in other judge when fore the trial he considered I ruling, then think look behind summary judgment, conclu- motion for a matter of if the Court becomes testimony sory nature of in that And we’re not holds direction. necessary specific falls short of the facts issue, and concerned with the fact even Ap- raise a issue material fact. going in isn’t all the evidence the world pellant have this court decide that make much difference. contrary to inferences the affidavits correct, I think that’s “MR. ARON: depositions of the defendants are sufficient fact, Honor. would dis- Your recognized in to raise an issue of fact. We very the entire So it’s pose case. Company, Blackmore v. Davis Oil clearly issue significant because though we that even than anything not have been other could light record most must consider the —Well, guess conceivably there could party opposing the motion favorable to the dis- be intentionаl him all give tress, did want to least re-eval- but we at from the inferences to be drawn favorable the Court’s uate the that were facts, any inferences drawn must be added.) (Emphasis holding.” in record. inference on facts “[A]n by misled testimony if the trial court was not contrary to direct is Even which is theo- gen- understanding into support finding appellant insufficient to inflic- exists,” ry claim intentional appellant’s fact uine of material issue MacNeel, parasite to emotional distress was a citing Company at Forbes tion of (1963). Therefore, of intentional interference with be- the claim 382 P.2d relations, facts specific the nature and any failed to contractual show “(a) of this case would make it one which it is The board of trustees each school unnecessary impractical to address the district shall: faсtors and ramifications of tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress “(xiii) every petition present- Consider independent as an action. ed to the board and at subscribed yet recognized We have not and set the (5) least five citizens of the school dis-
perimeters independent for an action of trict and take some action on such infliction of emotional distress petition (30) thirty days within after it negligent independent or for an action of * * is received plead- infliction of emotional distress.3 ings, affidavits and before the alleged nature of the acts to be representation fortify appellant’s “outrageous” were before the court. Re- of intentional infliction of (Second) Torts, statement reads adjunct emotional distress but pertinent part: broken); tion was to allow fist that a student was over chicken refused to allow a certain commencement could return to court could tracting settle which he administered excessive proper medical treatment punishment with a and speaker because he was black. accept occasions; uninvited sexual with the school district were tain a termination of seven school librarian and to a traсtual relations. The material before the court reflects that claim for intentional interference When 21-3-110(a), W.S.1977, provides questioned wrist personal separate differences; pocket incidents report in which he allowed and offered allegations subsequently piece to the school properly to students on four “outrageous,” knife to fights life and sexual which two female students about from a occasions school; pencil advances appellees’ efforts to in which he refused to find that the between students to he such as these are manipulating physician’s appellant’s position found to have been teacher; (ranging lead from an arm and in administered board, to students on especially premised upon to a female activities; presenta- with con- the trial assistant from ex- separate pox in which physical an arm perti- since im- ob- The Comment to ing: lead member his resentment ty. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an beyond acter, conduct has been so and to be tion which would entitle the punitive damages for another tort. Lia- bility utterly intolerable in a civilized communi- intended to inflict emotional tоrtious ized even that his conduct has been character- It has not been *5 The cases thus far decided have found ant has acted with an intent liability only where the defendant’s con- duct has been extreme and to another [4] Extreme and “d. “(1) him One who and so extreme in has been found ‘malice,’ all or causes severe emotional distress to even possible exclaim, regarded subject community or а against criminal, 46 contains the follow- intentionally * * outrageous bounds of ‘Outrageous!’ outrageous extreme degree liability that the defend- degree, atrocious, or that he has would arouse outrageous. distress, plaintiff where the actor, and out aggrava- conduct. which decency, for such as to average in char- recklessly go to is part: nent recognized injury negligent
3. We have mental undеr cer- 4. The Restatement addresses infliction compensable 312, 313, tain circumstances is under the of emotional distress in §§ 436 and statutory provisions Compensa- of the Worker’s 436 A. Drake, Freightways tion Act. Consolidated Wendy’s Baker v. Montana, Inc., Wyo., conduct, seeks although damages it would lant to recover for such oth- “g. The outrageous, may 46(1) pursuant extreme and erwise be conduct to of the Restate- circumstances. privileged under the be Law, ment of the Torts 2d That liable, example, is never The actor provides: section more than to insist he has done no where “(1) One out- who extreme and rights permissible legal in a upon his rageous intentionally reck- conduct though aware that way, even he is well lessly to causes severe emotional distress is to emo- insistence certain such subject liability another such * * * tional distress, if bodily harm to It is court jury. “h. Court it, bodily the other results from such instance, determine, in wheth- the first harm.” may defendant’s reason- er the affirming The majority, in regarded extreme out- ably be as so against recovery, appellant, or wheth- entered hold permit as to necessarily Where reasonable er it is so. that no jury persons of reasonable could differ, jury, subject may is for men aрpellees’ conclude ex- actions were court, to determine to the control outrageous. treme and case, whether, particular the con- evidence before court in the form sufficiently extreme and has been duct affidavits, exhibits, depositions, liability.” outrageous to result pleadings establishes here The matter before charges numerous con- school board summary judgment оf a consideration cerning teach- appellant’s interactions with it could in the first in- such that decide ers, Many staff of these and students. that the essential element “out- stance majority summarized in the are established, rage” reasonably be could by appel- opinion. brought Other privileged, and appellees’ actions were making lees include his parasitic in nature. claim was that the student; examining sexual overtures to proper. back of female student she was while holding in case must not be Our waist; ordering teachers unclad above the say independent claim for taken to students; strip-search committing as- infliction *6 spectator a battery on a at bas- sault Wyoming that it not exist can does game; violating hunting regula- ketball host claim for exist when there is no tions; embarrassing harassing and stu- dеcisions wait relief. Such will peri- alleged span a dents. These incidents issues encumbered which these are not years. of ten od as are facts and circumstances such case. com- Appellant, in his plaint, contends that
Affirmed. or false and were him were distorted ROSE, Justice, dissenting. board in an effort to the school his him and interfere with to embarrass majority agree I that cannot with the appеllees repeatedly says work. He ques- triable failed to structure a which the school raised accusations his respect tion of fact with and found to be previously infliction distress. had considered intentional of emotional complains He merit. trivial without complains he suffered se- numerous trivial accu- appellees publicized a result of the vere emotional distress as against him in оrder to create sations present- false and insubstantial Ap- impression improper conduct. false employer, the school by appellees ed to his by appel- pellant that these actions asserts district, humiliating purpose him him to suffer severe lees caused interfering ability perform with his high principal. Appel- his duties as school attempted recog- erroneous reasons and had jurisdictions have in other Courts through him the use of racial infliction to humiliate
nized claims
demeaning
on the defendants’
assignment
epithets and
allegations in
Chuy Philadelphia
Ea-
improper
comments
also
tasks. See
relationships.
Club,
employment
(3rd
Football
context
gles
Analyzing similar Johnson, Agarwal preme Court Cal.Rptr. Cal.3d finding upheld jury’s of out- There the defendants conduct. plaintiff’s recommended the dismissal
had