OPINION
This is аn appeal from an order of the district court dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint alleging that the defendant nеgligently failed to obtain liability insurance covering a motor vehicle belonging to him on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
We summarize the complaint. In June, 1961, the appellee orally аgreed to obtain liability insurance covering the vehicle in question. Thereafter, on December 3, 1962, the аppellant’s vehicle was involved in an accident with a vehicle owned by Virginia and O. R. Price, and the appellant immediately notified appellee of the accident. On December 7, 1962, appellee advised appellant that there was no insurance coverage on his vehicle.
On July 9, 1964, the Prices brоught an action for damages against the appellant. On July 21, 1964, the appellant made demand upon the appellee to defend the suit against him, which appellee refused. Subsequently appellant settled with the Prices and, on June 8, 1967, instituted this action against appellee for damages for its negligent failure to obtain the policy. Appellee pleaded contributory negligence and the statute of limitatiоns as a defense.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable statutes, §§ 23-1-1 and 23-1-4, N.M.S.A. 1953, read:
“23-1-1. The following suits or actions may be brought within the time hereinafter limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially provided.”
“23-1-4. * * * all other actions not herein оtherwise provided for and specified within four [4] years.”
The accrual date of the cause of action is the decisive question to be determined. The trial court found that “the alleged oral contract of insurance or the alleged negligence of defendant to obtain insurance for the plaintiff, which is the bаsis of plaintiff’s action occurred in June, 1961,” and concluded that the cause of action having accrued more than four years prior to the commencement of the action, the complaint should bе dismissed. It is thus not clear whether the trial court treated the action as one for breach of contract, or an action for negligence sounding in tort. However, since the parties briefed the question as thоugh the action was based on negligence, we will so treat it.
Appellant contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he was sued by the Prices on June 9, 1964. He argues that appellee’s negligent failure to obtain the insurance policy did not give rise to an action for damages until injury was sustained as a result of such negligent act. In other words, he contends that until the suit, which charged him with liability, was filed, no cause of action existed. Aрpellee on the other hand contends that the statute of limitations began to run in June, 1961, the date of the аccident, or, at the very latest, on December 7, 1962, when appellant was advised that there was no insurance coverage on the automobile.
We agree with appellant. Liability insurance does not purport to provide compensation for injuries, but only to protect the insured against legal liability. While the statute of limitations began to run when the cause of action accrued, there was no cause of action for negligence until there had been a resulting injury. Jensen v. Allen,
Appelleе raises a jurisdictional question claiming that the appeal was from the decision of the court, not frоm an order or a judgment. The decision of the court was entered May 31, 1968. The order dismissing the action was entеred June 21, 1968. The notice of appeal was filed June 26, 1968. While the notice of appeal was from the decision of the court, it gave appellee reasonable notice of appellаnt’s intention to appeal, and appellee was not in any manner misled. Baker v. Sojka,
We conclude that the cause of aсtion is not barred. The issues raised by the complaint are yet to be determined. The order should be reversed with direction to the trial court to reinstate the case upon its docket and proceed in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.