Spunaugle v. State

Appellant, Delpha Jo SPUNAUGLE Appellee. STATE

No. F-95-308. Appeals of

Court of Criminal Oklahoma.

Sept. Box, City, for Defendant

Chris Oklahoma at trial. Attorney Maey,

Robert H. District Smith, Attorney, District Fern Assistant Office, Attorney’s led into the bedroom. County District She Woodward Oklahoma sleeping with his head at the foot Dennis was City, for the State at trial. Woodward hit him with a base- bed. Pybas, Appellate Defense Coun- D. James bat1, partially severing his ear and ball Division, sel, Appeals Okla. Capital Direct knocking struggle him off the bed. A ensued Norman, System, Ap- Indigent Defense repeatedly. Dennis and Woodward stabbed appeal. pellant on get upper appeared Dennis the When hand, Delpha hit the As Jo him with bat. Edmondson, Attorney General W.A. Drew dead, neared and Dennis still was not dawn Howard, Attorney D. Assistant and Sandra rope coiled it Delpha got Jo a and Woodward General, City, Appellee ap- on for Oklahoma Delpha around Dennis’ neck. Woodward and peal. rope pulled each one end of the until Jo Dennis died. OPINION days maggot and Five later the infested LANE, Judge. Spu- partially body of Dennis skeletonized naugle by passing a truck driver was found by jury Delpha Spunaugle was tried Jo dry in a creek near the intersection of bed in guilty of Murder the First and found County Line Road in Okla- 164th Street and Conspiracy Degree to Commit First Degree, County Delpha homa where Jo and Wood- Murder, First and Solicitation Commit the ward had left it. Woodward confessed to (21 O.S.1991, 701.7, 421, §§ Degree Murder crime and asserted he would not have com- 701.16) County District Court Oklahoma it, Delpha manipulation mitted but for Jo’s jury No. CRF-93-5206. The recom- Case Delpha also confess- and his intoxication. Jo murder, of death for the mended a sentence murder, participation but ed her solicitation, imprisonment for the and ten life asserted she did so under duress. She told conspiracy to years imprisonment for the during police “possessed” the Woodward was judge imposed commit murder. The the attack and threatened to harm her or her judg- recommended sentences. We reverse help children if she not kill Dennis. She did sentence, and remand for a new ment and worshipper also them he was a devil who told trial. knife, licked Dennis’ blood from his by saying her his followers would threatened FACTS reported Spunau- hurt her she the crime. jointly Delpha Spunaugle gle for at least two were tried Jo tried and Woodward husband, years to someone to kill her convicted.2 find evening August Dennis. On AVAILABILITY OF DURESS AS she asked her friend David Woodward to A DEFENSE TO MALICE with her when Dennis come over and be MURDER Spu- night drinking. home from a came naugle Dennis would not abuse her believed attempted Spunaugle to raise a du present, verbally if Woodward were and had charge of first ress defense him other for this invited over on occasions rec malice murder. Duress has never been Spunaugle Dennis came home and reason. ognized in to that Oklahoma as a defense wife, exchange crime; fact, after some verbal with his suggested this Court dicta Tully later by went to bed. Some time Woodward is barred common law. Spunaugle’s into the motor home climbed 1209-10 1986). parked driveway went Interestingly, validity which was of the de sleep. Delpha Spunaugle prosecutor awakened challenged Jo fense was not August early morning Attorney ques him in the hours of We raise the General. 15th, announcing, sponte, tion sua for if duress is not a valid “It’s time.” Woodward was sentenced to life without 1. Woodward testified he did not remember David murder, bat, perfected sepa- Delpha gave parole or whether and has whether Jo him the picked up. appeal rate to this Court. he it murder, argu- Spunaugle’s guage expansion and the recent of the defense to malice de- fense. concerning inconsistent defenses ments

would become moot. approach duress con- sharply trasts with the common law which The defense of duress Oklahoma is has hostile to been the defense. One nine- creature of statute. Title writer, noted, century Stephen, teenth J. 152(7), statutes, defining the first of three “Compulsion ought threats in no ease un- provides person who commits a crime whatever be admitted as an excuse for incapable der duress is deemed of commit- History crime.” A Law in Criminal ting the crime: (1883). England 108 While the common law persons capable committing All are defense, recognize applica- does it limits crimes, belonging except those to the fol- considerably by tion of the duress defense lowing classes: grounding it in the so-called “choice of evils” philosophy justification. moral of Under this 7) act, or Persons who committed the philosophy, morally justified one is not charged, make the omission while under greater commit a harm to a avoid lesser one. involuntary subjection power of to the Thus, unavoidable, may where harm is one superiors. equal greater not choose to commit an or Hall, harm harm to avoid himself. J. Gener- O.S.1991, § Title 21 155 reinforces the le- (2d Principles al Law 422 Criminal defense, gal person basis for the and deems a of Ed.1947). fully who commits a crime under duress ex- onerated of the crime: theory applied When this is to malice mur- der, precluded, defense duress is for subjection involuntary power

The to the harm, by person “ought threatened a when superior person a which exonerates a escape by than rather die himself the murder charged a criminal act or omission with of an innocent.” Blackstone’s Commen- W. therefor, punishment arises from du- U theory This taries 30. is carried forward ress. n the Model Penal Code. See Model Penal § Supp.1992, expanded Title 21 O.S. Commentary § Code and 3.02 and commen- recognize put people can be under duress tary at 9-22. follow States which this ratio- child, by spouse completes threats their or application nale limit the of the duress de- the definition: See, e.g. Ky. fense to certain Rev. crimes. person A a is entitled to assert duress as 508.080; § § 563.026. Stat. Mo. Rev.Stat. person if prohib- committed a legal Justification is but one of two theo- act or ited omission because of a reason- supporting ries the defense of duress. The danger belief that able there imminent foundation, wholly separate other and dis- great bodily of death or harm from anoth- justification, theory is the tinct from (sic) oneself, upon spouse er ones or ones is at doctrine of excuse. This doctrine 367- (sic) child. 387; Finkelstein, Philosophical Duress: A To the extent limit of determine Law, 37 Ariz. Account Defense defense, statutory begin this we with the (1995). L.Rev. 251-283 If language of the statute itself. the lan doctrine, legal person may this a be Under self-explanatory, guage go is we need no crime, committing a even mur- excused greatly further. In this case we are aided in der, ordinary firmness” would “men by this effort clear and consistent way acted in the same to save their own have language. legal § 2.09. The lives. Model Penal Code First, Tully recognized, theory on the actor and as the Oklahoma of excuse focuses “represents legal conclusion that the con- legislature did not limit the crimes to which liability wrong, duct ... but that criminal the defense of duress can be asserted. 730 is policy inappropriate this is a because characteristics P.2d 1208. We believe some society’s punish it is of the actor vitiates desire choice and not an omission because Robinson, A supported by defining him.” Law the rest of the lan- Criminal Defenses: degree malice charged with the crime of first Analysis, L.Rev. Systematic 83 Colum. (1982). acknowledge murder.3 La Fave and Scott codes take this majority of the modern Duress is an affirmative defense. significant number of and that a approach, present the burden to The defendant bears make the du- statutory schemes the modern to raise the de or elicit sufficient evidence charge “whatever the available ress defense fense, and if the defendant meets bur LaFave & A. against the defendant.” W. den, the burden then shifts to the State 1986). (2d Scott, Law 437 ed. Criminal beyond disprove it a reasonable doubt. Simply put, if the defense of duress is exceptionally stat defense is well defined theory legal on the of excuse Okla- based ute, inherently important limits. includes homa, charge it is available to answer murder; danger of The threatened death degree malice if it is based first justification, great bodily To harm must be imminent. legal theory of it is not. be underpinning Supp.1992, O.S. 156. The defendant’s which theoretical determine Oklahoma, great bodily harm is immi lief that death or supports the defense of duress must be reasonable. Id. Because du again plain language to the of nent we look once person to a defining ress is a valid defense under statutes. subjection power involuntary of a 152(7) actor, on the defin- Section focuses superior, may the defense defeated capable ing person under duress as not voluntarily showing that the defendant or committing a crime. Section 155 focuses placed position in negligently himself to be actor, him if he acts and exonerates subjected power superior. to the of See 1992, in under duress. Section amended 152(7); Likewise, §§ a show 155. person person if that entitles a to the defense of ing that a defendant failed to avail himself a result of a reasonable belief “there acted as escape from opportunity an to the situation great danger imminent of death or bodi- was subjecting negate him to duress would himself, ly spouse, harm” to his or his child. involuntary subjection element defeat defining statutory language All of the focuses the defense. actor, on the while none of it focuses on the Having found duress is available to a de- act, justification or of the act. charged degree malice fendant with first light In of this clear and consistent statuto- murder, Spunaugle’s sub- we now examine ry not language, we conclude Oklahoma did claims. stantive justifica- adopt theory “choice of evils” of tion. Rather our defense of duress is based TRIAL COURT DENIAL OF Therefore, legal theory excuse. on the of MOTION TO SEVER justi- Tully discussion of “choice of evils” and fication, trial Spunaugle for states which filed a motion to sever her while accurate those justification support from that of co-defendant David Woodward. use to the defense duress, opposed vigorously application no the motion has Woodward is while the State remained neutral. The Oklahoma. We find the defense duress sever, Spu- to a court denied the motion to available Oklahoma defendant Lumpkin’s theory Judge Lumpkin’s might pass construction 3. as a ser- J. dissent any the existence of defense to mon. He decries the de- seems to be that because Oklahoma has inapplicable He first murder. cites statu- justifiable fenses of homicide and excusable tory "authority”, imposes finding and he his own homicide, it must not have the defense of duress proper testing or of fact without the assertion O.S.1991, §§ to homicide. See 21 731 and 733. opinions are those facts at trial. The stated not argu- about as much sense to me as This makes case, grounded the law of and so I must ing that as a result of sections 731 and respond. recognize does not the defense of self- portion condemns the That dissent which implicit explicit There no limita- defense. duress defense as an invidious incursion of situa- duress, or tion of the defense of self-defense values, ethics, is, an of moral tional erosion matter, cited in the dissent. sections equally any suited to of the defenses to first is degree murder, including self-defense. proposi- portions allowed to introduce those of her in her first and third naugle claims herself, exculpated in- this was error. confession which but tions culpated procedure Woodward. While this to sever the trial of co- The decision rule, squares prejudice with the Plantz re- is left to the sound discretion defendants sulted nevertheless. subject statutory guidance: the trial court appears the n Woodward filed a motion in limine to bar granted shall be if it severance prejudiced by join- or the State is defendant Spunaugle’s all of confessional statements re- O.S.1991, § 439. The statute does der. garding alleged worship Woodward’s devil not or limit the circumstances under define kill and his threats to her or her children arise, prejudice might and the circum which kill help Spunaugle. she did not Dennis This present this case a novel facet of stances of Spunaugle support was the evidence had to problem. By granting her defense of duress. Wood- motion, gutted Spunau- ward’s the trial court Perhaps example of the best known gle’s present a right to defense.5 This result prejudice requiring severance is that standard, prejudice satisfies the O.S. mutually arises when co-defendants assert 1991, § e.g., antagonistic defenses. See Lafevers (Otl.Cr.1991); 819 P.2d 1364-65 prejudice compounded by This the fact Neill v. 887-88 the trial court the State to allowed introduce 1992). Mutually antagonistic defenses occur inculpating Spunaugle all of the statements attempts exculpate when each defendant confession, prohibiting made her while inculpate the himself and co-defendant. Spunaugle introducing any of the excul- (Okl. Hammon v. pating during statements she made the same Cr.1995). This Court has defined defenses glaring prompted confession. This error antagonistic when “to believe one is prosecutor argue vigorously that all of Neill, at disbelieve the other.” Spunaugle’s confession should be admitted Spunaugle fit The defenses of and Woodward agree. trial. We Where the State intro- definition, such this and as could be consid statements, inculpatory duces confessional However, mutually antagonistic. ered the confessor shall be allowed to introduce mutually Court has not found defenses to be in exculpating statements made the same complete each antagonistic unless is de State, confession. See Williams 915 P.2d Lafevers, at guilt. fense to 371, (Okl.Cr.1996); State, 414 380 Brewer v. Duress, by Spunaugle, complete raised is a (Okl.Cr.1966). 559, P.2d 560 Once the trial guilt. Voluntary defense to intoxication4 and Spunaugle’s court realized confession con- influence, by Woodward, raised are not. tained evidence which it believed should not mutually asymmetric defenses are not These jury determining be before the which was antagonistic and do not mandate severance. guilt, Woodward’s severance should have required Severance is also when . granted. evidentiary These circum- been of a non- the State introduces confession require stances reversal. inculpates testifying co-defendant which an ruling today interpreted not be Our should State, co-defendant. Plantz v. 876 other credibility as a comment on the de- denied, 268, (Okl.Cr.1994), P.2d 273 cert. 513 Spunaugle right present had the fense. 1130, 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 1091 U.S. presented (1995). a defense is testified; defense. After Spunaugle Woodward duty trial court has the to determine whether The was allowed to introduce didn’t. State instruction, adequately it is raised to warrant portions Spunaugle’s confession those so, her, if of fact then must inculpated Spunaugle which but was not the finder deter- Spunaugle’s argues appeal trial counsel was able to elicit testimo- 4. Woodward in his that the ny Spunaugle participated that stated she in the by denying court erred an instruction on involun- murder under duress. This bland summation intoxication, guilt. tary complete defense to being present place does not take the able to appeal. We address this issue in the Woodward jury of the defense for the to consider. details 252 Spunaugle argues error this error worthy of be- osition of is

mine whether defense requires reversal. lief.6 pro has a criminal defendant due A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES peremptory chal right to the number of cess law, right by allowed state and that is lenges trial, though Spunaugle’s at defense impaired when the criminal defen denied or court, was hampered by the trial wrongly state law does not receive that which dant in of her participated the murder she Oklahoma, provides. Ross v. 487 U.S. of death to duress of threat husband under (1988). 2273, 2279, 80 101 L.Ed.2d 108 S.Ct. complete Duress is a herself or her children. granted Spunaugle nine Because state law guilt. vol defense to Woodward’s the trial separate peremptory challenges, but influence untary and undue intoxication these, Spunaugle’s pro withheld three of due complete Delpha Spunaugle is not a de Jo im right peremptory challenges cess only lessen the guilt and would fense may error paired. This constitutional crime, punish mitigate error, is, an harmless if it is a trial found complete Spunaugle ment. Because tried to presentation during error which occurred ly guilt herself of at Woodward’s exonerate jury, may it not be of the case to the but expense, the defenses of the co-defendants harmless if it is a structural defect found Plantz, inconsistent. See were Bartell v. 881 the trial mechanism. (Okl.Cr.1994), 276; 240, 250 Bryson v. (Okl.Cr.1994). P.2d t. cer peremptory challenges of three denial (1995). 752, 130 L.Ed.2d 651 5.Ct. jury process an selection error pervaded trial. This error the entire provides Title waived, prove was not and facts sufficient who assert inconsistent that co-defendants record, prejudice are contained perempto each entitled to nine defenses are a record of those venireman he counsel made ry Spunaugle re challenges. and Woodward correct number would remove he had the quested peremptory challenges each un nine peremptory challenges. Salazar v. statutory authority, der this and the (Okl.Cr.1996). 1120,1128-29 One P.2d correctly granted the motion. See court who, sleeping juror as dis- these was the Bryson, 876 P.2d at 250. after below, erroneously replaced was not cussed prosecutor, sharp challenge the trial brought her slumber was to the atten- when part court reversed itself and ruled analysis tion of the trial court. Under the not each receive nine chal defendants would Bartell, per- of three set forth the denial statute, lenges provided by but would each as challenges which is not emptory is error accepted six. counsel receive Woodward’s subject analysis. error This er- to harmless compromise this unauthorized when the ror warrants reversal. Spunau- State threatened to sever the trial. gle’s objected, perfected further counsel and A FAILURE TO REMOVE appeal by stating the issue for on the record SLEEPING JUROR two veniremen if he would remove additional first-stage closing argu given proper the number of Before he had been prop- joined in a motion to peremptory challenges. In her second ment defense counsel fact, Lumpkin attempted years Imposing findings to hire someone to murder his own J. appellant clear he does not believe the argument proves up makes the wis- her husband. This argues killed duress. These when she she under judicial system appel- which removes dom of our fully facts were not asserted at trial to the trier of judges Our late role, from the role of trier of fact. fact, they fully a result were not tested at and as properly developed, the record is to when is speculation Consequently, the trial. dissent's the of fact is determine if the decision of trier question about the is irrelevant. The to this facts supported by But the defendant the record. here appeal Court on is whether the accused was developing prohibited fully de- her was right present de- denied the constitutional retrial, upon asserted fense. If the is fense. whether it is to be trier of fact will determine Lumpkin attempts prove finding his of fact is believed. appellant by making correct much of the fact the outweigh probative juror slept during parts of the did not its value. Where replace a who made, minimal, timely probative photo This motion was and value is trial. and the objection fully perfected. Ran graph vividly is thus most the handiwork of shows 90, defendant, dleman v. nature and not admission 1976). proven by Juror misconduct must be should be denied. Mann v. evidence, convincing and in this (Okl.Cr.), clear and cert. (1988). was. case See 109 S.Ct. 102 L.Ed.2d 163 Wofford (Okl.Cr.1972). on judge The trial stated State’s Exhibit No. 5 was cumulative of juror during parts

the record the had “dozed photos State’s Exhibit No. 8. Both showed trial”, paid and attention “for the of the had decomposition, but the relative distance part.” judge most The trial then denied the from which Exhibit No. 8 was taken removes replace dozing juror motion to with prejudicial photo- much of the that value of available alternate. graph. The corroborative value of Exhibit jury capital In a case in which the murder 5 is No. weakened the fact it corroborates death, guilt punishment and set found irrelevant, barely po- relevant facts. The participation juror during of a who “dosed Spunaugle’s sition of tennis shoes has no parts unacceptable degra- trial” is an of the relevance whatsoever in this trial. The cor- process requires rever- dation due roboration of confession is most Woodward’s sal.7 vividly by. body realized the fact the found where he said it The would be found. PHOTOGRAPH GRUESOME Spunaugle underpants fact his is not close-up State’s Exhibit No. 5 is well corroborated Exhibit No. 5 due to photo maggot of the infested remains of color layer maggots obscuring the thick Spunaugle. photo vividly Dennis dis very probative detail. Given the weak value repulsive, plays grainy maggots blanket of great prejudicial photo- and the value of this Spunau- efficiently consuming the remains. graph, the trial court should have denied objected gle’s counsel to the admission of this admission of Exhibit No. 5. We need State’s photograph grounds it was cumulative on the not, question not reach the whether and do probative greatly its value was out and photograph the admission of this would war- weighed by prejudicial its effect. 12 O.S. reversal, rant it been the had error. argued photo § 2404. The State graph corroborated the medical examiner’s DECISION testimony body stage was in a wounds, decay it which effaced soft tissue Judgment on each count is and sentence testimony corroborated Woodward’s REMANDED tri- REVERSED and for new underwear, Spunaugle Dennis died in his al. Spunaugle’s it showed the location of Dennis

tennis shoes. CHAPEL, P.J., STRUBHAR, V.P.J., weighing probative

The outcome of the concur. depends against prejudicial effect to a value LUMPKIN, JJ., dissent. JOHNSON great probative val extent ue. In Robedeaux v. LUMPKIN, dissenting: Judge, (Okl.Cr.1993), 424-25 cert. (1994) I to the in 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 57 the must dissent decision Court’s this, tragically in .it is flawed in two probative photograph value of the of dismem case that First, aspects. body parts great, very important the Court bered and so the unde develop- gruesome photograph completely disregards nature of the the historical niable change by ruling,, judge puzzled by trial I am the fact the dissent the fact that so the most ruled, definition, by juror accept did not cannot the One wonders also that this record. facts suggest pay clear and convinc- attention to all of the trial. To what evidence could be more guilt ing judge stating juror ques- to let one’s belief in the of the than the trial in otherwise is attention, part.” outweigh paid No accused the constitutional standards tion had "for the most appellate gloss thinking by jury. or can amount of wishful attempt mur- resisting any in to it enumerates When ment of the duress defense person, any felony der such or to commit by has not been devalued opinion, him, upon upon any dwelling in house or or therefore should be statutory enactment and is; or, person in which such analysis. Second and of our the cornerstone 2. When committed in the lawful de- disregards the important, the Court more person, of such or of his or her fense Legislature has limited fact child, master, husband, wife, parent, mis- statute, by choosing instead to the defense tress, servant, or when there is reason- by dwelling on the Mod- ignore our state law ground apprehend design to com- able to justify attempt in to el Penal Code a feeble felony, great personal to mit a or do some analysis. I that fuzzy shall address its own injury, danger and imminent of such de- first. or, accomplished; sign being opinion gives lip service to the inter- The necessarily in at- 3. When committed pretation “clear and consistent means, tempting, by ways lawful and attempt justify in the result language” its any any felony apprehend person for com- approach selective reached. its riot; mitted; lawfully suppressing any inor identify that “clear and consistent” lan- lawfully keeping preserving or totally disregards statutory pro- guage it peace. which control in this case. We need visions statutory provisions codify the These two stray foreign The Oklahoma not statutes. theory legal underpinnings of the of the du- application of le- Legislature has limited the appli- ress and determine the limited justification, which the gal excuse and Court justification or excuse to the crime cation of recognizes legal constitute the basis for the presented, of homicide.1 The evidence defense, by duress for the crime of homicide by sought presented to be as revealed by 21 statute. Excuse is limited appeal, in not record on this case does meet which reads: justification or requirements for either following Homicide is excusable by excuse as restricted these statutes. cases: important to Three other statutes are also by 1. When committed accident and analysis, they the correct to show do act, any doing misfortune in lawful law- 152(7) apply. not Section of Title reads caution, means, ordinary ful with usual and persons capable of commit- are “[a]all any intent. and without unlawful crimes, except ting ... Persons who commit- act, charged, ted the or make the omission 2. When committed accident and involuntary subjection while under passion, upon any misfortune heat power superiors.” Section 155 of Title provocation, upon sudden and sufficient involuntary subjection states that “[t]he provided a sudden combat that no undue power superior of a which exonerates a taken, advantage any dangerous nor person charged with a act or omis- criminal used, weapon killing is not therefor, punishment sion from arises from in a cruel or manner. done unusual 156 of Title 21 dictates that duress.” Section by stat- Justifiable homicide is controlled person duress which excuses a “[t]he ute, O.S.1991, § 733. That section punishment prohibited has who committed reads: compulsion act or omission must be an actual by use of or fear.” force justifiable commit-

Homicide is also when by any person following analysis of the ted either should be as follows: Sections 152(7), general 156 of Title 21 are cases: & Lozoya general legally vi- controls over a statute. See 1. These statutes eviscerate the Court’s ment (Okl.Cr.1996); encompassed justification 28-29 Craw sion that is not within (Okl.Cr.1994); concept Legislature's application v. 881 P.2d 92 our of the ford Stiles v. addition, (Okl.Cr.1992); to the crime of homicide. In 989 duress analysis disregarded points the Bowman v. 632 out Court has Woodward, 1990); statutory 570- the basic rule of construction that State (Okl.Cr.1987). special specific require- forth a statute sets crept appli- statutes and must be read as limitations on situation ethics has now into our liability in criminal statutes other than those cation of the Rule of Law. From a non-legal dealing standpoint, ruling denigrates with homicides. as the the cheap- and pertains homicides, to the Okla- ens the value of human life.3 Legislature adopted very spe- homa has two explanation There can be no other than defense, dealing cific statutes with the duress that the Court seeks to base its decision on result, justification 1.e. and excuse. As a the interpretation statutory an language in a Legislature has limited defenses to homicides vacuum, totally legal divorced from the histo- excuse, justification on the basis of or i.e. ry which fashioned the defense of duress and duress, requirements to those and no other. statutory the rules of construction. It would case, In this the evidence does the not meet baby be nice if we could be like ducks and 733; requirements of Sections either up every in a day, wake new world but therefore is no there error for failure to allow legally by prece- we cannot. We are bound analysis the additional This main- evidence.2 development judicial dent the princi- and application tains the of the Law Common- to ples. Through understanding legal an of the procedure criminal law legislative and absent metamorphosis we are then to able have a gives specific provi- action and force to the purpose developed vision of the societal sions of the statutes. the foundation in the established Ten Com- mandments4; place codes; That is what take through should our ancient into Instead, Law; analysis. engages this Court in a the Common now the fuzzy “weli-it-just-isn’t-fair” and ill-focused scope enactments which set out the of our analysis procedure to authorize a disregard which di- substantive criminal law. If we rectly underlying contradicts State law. This is the system Court basis for our of laws charged applying applicable engaging with rules of law then we are greatest one of the humankind, well-grounded opinions futility to ensure consistent perceiving acts of mere provide certainty application of knowledge as wisdom. substantive criminal law to the citizens of predicated Since the Court’s action is this State. The Court’s decision in this case interpretation the flawed of the scope disregards responsibility and seeks to duress, application of the defense of limited justify a result that is direct conflict with necessary propositions comment is on other legal precedent. state law and historical Turning peremptory of error. to the issue of tragedy.

This is a legal challenges, provides From a stand- adolescent, point, sociological concept pertinent part: the jury always respected. It should be the noted in this case was must be For that reason we utilizing application punishment instructed on the defense of duress limit the the ultimate (O.R.291) OUJI-CR 717-718 and 719 to those instances where an individual defies that prove instructed it was the State's burden to the basic tenet of civilization. The distinction we see acting today scriptures defendant was not under duress. There- and common law were fore, only issue is the limitation both based on the foundation of moral absolutes presented required civilization, court of the evidence allowed to be to ensure the survival of an ordered support Regardless present society the defense. of the standard while our seems to case, applied helplessness engendered of review in this if the Court’s cultivate learned error, ruling through accountability it would be harmless. lack of individual and re- sponsibility. shifting bed It is from this possibly sand that one can come to conclusion Although figure legal analysis it did not into the justifiable legal it is for an individual to have the herein, personal opin- contained it is this writer’s authority to determine an life innocent can ion that the law has been formulated over merely protect snuffed out one’s own skin. provide ages plumb-line guidance of moral less, virtue, perspective civic of the much humanity, denigrate not to be utilized to life, imperative value of human once deemed society aspire. values to which should Whether Republic survival of our has now been dilut- (“Great- language scriptures isit from the of the point appear ed to the it does not to be even this, lay er love has no man than that a man microscopically present thought in our societal 15:13(RSV)), down his life or, his friends.” John process. law,."he opinion quotes as the the common ought escape by to die rather himself than innocent,” murder of an the value of life 4.Exodus 20: 1-17. human 256 duress for the to the defense of prosecution and entitled cases the In all criminal (Further, killing her husband. intentional of the fol- each entitled to are the defendant in the record the evidence revealed Provided, under challenges:

lowing peremptory entitled to the this Court she was not before tried more are that if two or defendants as the uneontradicted evi- defense of duress challenges; jointly they join in their shall prior con- showed that to Woodward dence more defen- that when two or provided, her, help Appellant had solicited senting to they defenses shall have inconsistent dants husband.)5 Any kill help her her others to challenges for each granted separate be by Appellant rely upon the de- attempt as hereinafter set forth. defendant goes merely to her level fense duress for first prosecutions First. In culpability. murder, jurors each. nine Likewise, reb- co-defendant Woodward’s 884, P.2d 891 In Neill v. 827 voluntary intoxication anee on the defense of 1992), we discussed inconsistent defenses culpability. 21 only to his level of Title went stated: O.S.1991, provides § 704 that “homicide com- de- analyzing In the law inconsistent design to effect death is not the mitted with cases, fenses, in some we have found that perpetrator in a because the less murder “inconsistency” goes to the level of anger voluntary intoxication.”6 state of “incon- culpability while in other cases the Therefore, voluntary intoxication cannot be sistency” guilt or innocence. goes to crime of as a defense or excuse used to the level of the issue is restricted Where co-defendant Wood- intentional murder and culpability, co-defen- each co-defendant’s only to goes reliance on this defense ward’s may perempto- required dants be to share fact that neither culpability. his Due to the omitted). (cites However, ry challenges, voluntary nor the intoxi- the duress defense “inconsistency” in the defenses where the upon to cation defense could have been relied innocence, directly guilt or co- relates guilt, the evi- absolve either defendant separate granted chal- defendants must only upon to could have been relied dence (cite omitted). lenges. culpability. Thus under lessen the level of 268, v. See also Plantz Neill, shared defendants should have 1163, 115 (Okl.Cr.1994),cert. 513 U.S. addition, peremptory challenges. In nine (1995). Here, 1130, 130 L.Ed.2d 1091 S.Ct. required. severance was not inconsistency any in the defenses went requiring in not The trial court’s error culpability, Appellant to the level of therefore Appellant Woodward to and co-defendant and her co-defendant should have shared challenges is peremptory share the nine sub- challenges. The result of peremptory nine analysis. ject error 20 O.S. harmless ruling granting each defen the trial court’s 1991, Appellant § her co- 3001.1. As peremptories six will be discussed later. dant peremptories, six defendant each received First, explain why I each defendant was will they they than have had if had more would separate peremptories. not entitled to 9 challenges, ruling trial court’s shared the above, miscarriage justice, of duress is As set out the defense not result in “a did applicable degree malice afore violation of a con- not to first a substantial constitute[s] also, Tully thought right.” v. stitutional or Id. See also murder. See (Okl.Cr.1986). Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 1208-1210 Ross v. (1988) (federal law, guaran- Therefore, Appellant was not L.Ed.2d under culpabilily. recognize excep Appellant paid we an August $500.00 a man In her to murder her husband but the man took so tion to this rule where the accused was intoxi Appel- money killing without the victim. totally left cated mental abilities were that his/her Holycross to murder lant then recruited Charles impossible for overcome and it therefore became Holycross several times the victim. She called to form criminal intent. him/her State, Crawford $1,000.00 kill the victim but and offered him Holycross (Okl.Cr.1992). refo The to commit the murder. refused re, voluntary may go intoxication while killing specific to another intent so as to reduce provides volun- 6. 22 153 also homicide, here. that is not the issue level tary to criminal intoxication is not a defense process requires tee of that a defen due peremptory challenges O.W.M., Jr., Alleged Delinquent

dant receive all the An law) Child, Appellant, by state and Fox v. allowed (Okl.Cr.1989), cert. P.2d (1990) 1060, 110 108 L.Ed.2d 777 S.Ct. Oklahoma, Appellee. STATE of (the state constitution likewise is satisfied peremptory when a defendant receives the No. J-96-1494. law).

challenges pursuant allowable state Appeals Court of Criminal of Oklahoma. disagree opinion’s finding I with the also Sept. juror proven by misconduct was clear As Corrected Oct. convincing Appellant evidence. has of- support juror fered no her claim that the question paying was not attention. Prior closing argument, stage

to first counsel for

co-defendant Woodward moved excuse the

juror “slept throughout because she had this presented

whole trial.” the record appeal any this Court is void of at-

tempts by Appellant or co-defendant Wood- bring alleged

ward to conduct to the trial

judge’s attention while the conduct was oc- Further,

curring. finding there was no juror actually sleeping been had or that portion

she missed a substantial of the trial. judge

The trial who sits in the courtroom jurors

and sees the is in a much first-hand position to

better determine the level of a

juror’s Appellant attentiveness. As has not

supported juror her claim of misconduct evidence, convincing

clear and I find no error replace the trial court’s refusal

juror.

I dissent the Court’s decision to reverse Any this case for a remand new trial. beyond

error was harmless a reasonable judgment

doubt and the and sentence should

be affirmed.

Case Details

Case Name: Spunaugle v. State

Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Date Published: Sep 3, 1997

Citation: 946 P.2d 246

Docket Number: F-95-308

Court Abbreviation: Okla. Crim. App.