27 S.E. 39 | N.C. | 1897
This is an action by Mrs. Sarah F. Spruill against the Northwestern Life Insurance Co. to recover the amount of a policy of *98 insurance issued to her as beneficiary upon the life of her husband, William T. Spruill. The policy issued on 2 October, 1894, provided that if, within two years from the date thereof, "the said assured shall, whethersane or insane, die by his own hand, then this policy shall be null and void." The assured died on 24 July, 1895, from the effects of a "pistol shot in his own hands," as stated in the proof of loss furnished to the defendant by the plaintiff, as required by the terms of the policy. The complaint, among other material allegations, alleged: "That on 24 July, 1895, at and in the county of Nash, the said William T. Spruill died," without stating in any manner the cause of his death. The answer (143) of defendant company set up, as a complete defense against any recovery, the date and terms of the policy, and the date and manner of death of the assured, as above set forth. The Court held that the burden of proof rested upon the defendant.
During the progress of the trial the plaintiff proposed to ask one W. T. Clark, her own witness, as to the mental condition of the assured at the time of the killing. The defendant objected, the objection was sustained and the plaintiff excepted. There is no error in the exclusion of such testimony, as in our view of the law, as applicable to policies like the one in suit, the mental condition of the assured at the time of the killing is entirely immaterial. It is well settled that under the old forms of life insurance policies, in which it was provided that the insurer should not be liable if the assured "committed suicide" or "died by his own hand," the policy was not vitiated when the assured was insane at the time of suicide.Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Mann. and Gr., 668; Insurance Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall., 580; Bigelow v. Berkshire Ins. Co.,
In view of these decisions the insurance companies began to insert the words used in this policy, or words equivalent thereto. As the expressions "committed suicide" and "died by his own hands" were held synonymous, the words added thereto, "sane or insane," or "feloniously or otherwise," are regarded as equally synonymous and intended to protect the insurer from all liability where the assured committed suicide, whether sane or insane, and regardless of the degree of insanity.
After careful consideration, we are of opinion that such is the legal effect of the provisions of this policy. A policy of insurance is a contract and should be construed like all other contracts in such a way as (144) to carry out the manifest intention of the parties, unless some of its provisions, conditions or limitations are contrary to law or to public policy. It was clearly the intention of the policy of insurance in this case to protect the insurer from all liability for any form ofsuicide, and we do not see how such protective conditions are in any *99 way in violation of law or of any settled rule of public policy. Nor is the liability of the insurer affected by the degree of insanity, the word "insane" implying every degree of unsoundness of mind.
The distinction drawn by some eminent authorities in cases of self-killing by an insane person, "whether his unsoundness of mind is such as to prevent him from understanding the physical nature and consequences of his act or only such as to prevent him, while foreseeing and premeditating its physical consequences, from understanding its moral nature and aspect," does not commend itself to our better judgment. It seems to belong rather to the domain of speculative psychology than to the practical administration of the law.
The determination of that shadowy line between mental twilight and night, where the last faint rays of reason, resting for a moment on the horizon of the mind, fade away into utter darkness, is practically beyond the power of finite understanding, and, to the jury, would necessarily be a matter of mere speculation, depending more upon their sympathy than their judgment. Of course the above rule does not include death by accident or mistake, such as the accidental discharge of a pistol in the hands of the assured, or poison, or an overdose of medicine taken by mistake. There must be at least physically some suicidal intent, no matter how far removed from a responsible mental operation. We believe this rule to be in accordance with the better line of decisions prevailing in the majority of courts. In the leading and well considered case (145) of De Gogorza v. Insurance Co.,
After reviewing some of the leading cases the Court concludes: "We prefer to place our decision upon the ground that the words of the proviso in the policy before us, by plain rules of interpretation, exempt the insurer from liability. That this language, in view of previous (146) decisions, was inserted for such a purpose, can not be doubted and that it was agreed to by both the insured and the insurer is not questioned, and that it is a provision allowed by law no one denies. We are to say from these words what the parties must have intended, and we cannot properly say that additional words having no meaning were inserted in the contract, and if they mean anything it is just what the words commonly import, and that is, if death ensues from any physical movement of the hand or body of the assured, proceeding from a partial or total eclipse of the mind, the insurer goes free."
In Scarth v. Life Society,
In Ins. Co. v. Akens, supra, the Court, while affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, distinctly recognized the principle herein (147) adopted by the following distinction (p. 475): "The clause (then under construction) contains no such significant and decisive words as `die by suicide, sane or insane' as in Bigelow v. Berkshire, etc.,supra, or `by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane' as inInsurance Co. v. McConkey,
In the case before us any possible hardship arising from the exclusion of all liability for death from suicide is met by the termination of this condition after the lapse of two years from the date of the policy, which *101 then becomes incontestible. The question of the possible waiver of such a condition by the acceptance of premiums after the insured was wholly or partially insane, or threatened with insanity, is not before us.
The only exception remaining for us to consider is that of the plaintiff to the action of the trial judge in directing the jury to answer the issue in the affirmative. The only issue was as follows: "Did William T. Spruill die by his own hand within two years from the date of the policy sued on?" The force of this exception depends upon the consideration of several important principles. The action of the Judge can be sustained only under the doctrine, firmly established in this State, that where there is no evidence, or a mere scintilla of evidence, or the evidence is not sufficient, in a just and reasonable view of it, to warrant an inference of any fact in issue, the Court should not leave the issue to be passed upon by the jury, but should direct a verdict against the party uponwhom the burden of proof rests. Covington v. Newberger,
His Honor had already ruled that the burden of proof rested upon the defendant, and we think properly so. The presumption is always against suicide, as it is contrary to the general conduct of mankind. Mallory v.Ins. Co.,
It is further held that where the words of a policy do not clearly indicate the intention of the parties, the courts should lean to that interpretation which is most favorable to the assured. McConkey's case,supra, citing a large number of cases.
If the verdict of a jury is, in the opinion of the Court, against the weight of evidence, it can be set aside, and to the proper exercise of this discretion there can be no objection. But to permit the Judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to rebut a legal presumption without submission to the jury would infringe upon the exclusive powers of the jury. Hardison v. R. R., post 492. The determination of the necessary character and legal effect of that evidence belongs to the Court as a question of law, but its weight must be left with the jury as a matter of fact. Wittkowsky v. Wasson, supra; Best v. Frederick,
These principles are "fundamental," and "a frequent recurrence" thereto is of constitutional obligation.
The issuing of the policy and the death of the assured, alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer, made a prima facie case for the plaintiff. The onus was thus shifted by the pleadings to the defendant, and was assumed by it. After the conclusion of its oral testimony, the defendant read in evidence the proof of claim sent on to the defendant by the plaintiff, in which it was stated that the cause of death of the assured was "pistol shot from his own hand." This statement, unexplained, was an admission of suicide, and at once shifted the burden of proof upon the plaintiff. Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall., 32;Insurance Co. v. Higginbotham,
No error.
Cited: Edwards v. Phifer, post 406; Hodges v. R. R., post 556; Collinsv. Swanson,