OPINION
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiff-landlord commenced this action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(m) tо evict the defendant-tenant by summary dispossess proceedings. That statutory section, in substance, allows the summary dispossession of a tenant who wаs formerly employed by a landlord where the tenancy was conditioned upon and in consideration of the employment. Defendant had been employed as a building superintendent by plaintiff, but the employment was terminated. Defendant was served with the requisite notice to quit and to vacate pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.2.
Defendant has raised two defenses which are heretofore unreported in New Jersey. Those defenses are:
1) Defendant has contested the termination of his employment, and that matter is now proceeding with the National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.). He therefore suggests thаt this eviction action should be stayed until the resolution of his claim of wrongful termination. This defense is based on the
2) Defendant had been a tenant at another location (New York) owned or managed by plaintiff. Defendant moved to this apartment in connection with a promotion in his job. The compensation to defendant included this apartment, rent free. Further, thе uncontradicted testimony in behalf of defendant was that if his employment were terminated, he would be able to continue his tenancy, albeit in onе of the New York apartments, on a rent paying basis. He argues that his situation is within the considerations and rationale of Cruz v. Reatique, 212 N.J.Super. 195 (Law Div.Spec.Civ.Pt.1986), and that therefore the complaint should be dismissed.
This court rejects both defenses and will enter a judgment for possession.
Plaintiff emphasizes that the relief affоrded to landlords by way of summary actions for possession was intended to provide a speedy recovery of rental premises. Newark Housing Auth. v. West, 69 N.J. 293, 300 (1976); Fargo Realty, Inc. v. Harris, 173 N.J.Super. 262 (App.Div.1980). Defendant emphasizes the legislative purpose behind the eviction laws, as stated in N.J.S. A. 2A:18-61.1a(d), to wit,
... to maintain for citizens the broadest protections availаble under State eviction laws to avoid such displacement and resultant loss of affordable housing ...
This court finds that if a plaintiff has a right to possessiоn pursuant to any of the grounds stated in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, then the summary eviction process is proper. The protection of a tenant’s rights was never intended to bе a denial of a landlord’s rights as defined by the legislature. The “... State eviction laws [are] designated [sic ] to fairly balance and protect rights of tenants and landlords.” N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a(b).
N.J.S.A. 2A:18-60 and R. 1:13-4 provide for the transfer of actions in the discretion of the trial court in appropriate cirсumstances. However, I find that this is not an appropriate case for transfer, any more than for a stay, for the following reasons:
First, defendant’s оbjective is a delay in the determination of this action, rather than a transfer to resolve all issues in one action, where this court would otherwisе be without jurisdiction as to those other issues. R. 6:3-4. I am confident that the N.L.R.B. would not adjudicate the issue of possession, and defendant has elected tо pursue his remedy in the N.L.R.B., rather than in the state courts which have the jurisdiction to determine wrongful termination from employment, as well as this eviction aсtion. Cf. Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J.Super. 341 (App.Div.1986).
Second, I perceive the rationale for the transfer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-60 and R. 1:13-4 to be that where the reason for transfer relates essentially tо the relationship of landlord-tenant, all matters should be resolved in one action. Examples of those reasons include the determination of a proper rent (e.g., issues of reasonableness under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1i, or unconscionableness under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1f), relating to title, see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-52, or for the other reasons suggested in Morrocco v. Felton, 112 N.J.Super. 226, 235-236 (Law Div.1970). Here, the issues involved in the N.L.R.B. proceedings are not essentially related to the landlord-tenant relationship, although
The testimony in behalf of defendant was that he was promised an apartment managed by plaintiff in New York if his employment wеre terminated here. That testimony significantly distinguishes the instant case from Cruz v. Reatique, 212 N.J.Super. 195 (Law Div.Spec.Civ.Pt.1986), upon which defendant relies and upon which the second defense stated above was based. Defendant may have an enforceable right to housing from this plaintiff in New York, but that is beyond the jurisdiction of this court.
This court has the jurisdiction to exercise equitable powers as a matter of defense. One equitable consideration militating against equitable reliеf to defendant is that the legislature has provided tenants with a remedy where a landlord has caused a tenant to vacate premises wrongfully. Sеe N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.-6a et seq. which does not have a specific provision relating to the eviction of a former employee [see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1m], although it may be included in subsection d(3), or the remedy may be pursued at common law. I note further that N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.6 does not require a judgment for possession, or that a judgment for possession will constitute a defense to a later suit by a tenant for a wrongful eviction. I find that the consequence of these observations is that plaintiff is entitlеd to a judgment for possession by virtue of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1m, and that plaintiff may likewise be subject to a later action for damages if this eviction has been determinеd to have been wrongful. Further, I suggest, the judgment of possession now being entered herein will not constitute res adjudicata in that action. C.F. Seabrook Co. v. Beck, 174 N.J.Super. 577 (App.Div.1980).
I further find that to require plaintiff both to acceрt defendant as a tenant and to cooperate in having defendant certified for H.U.D. rental subsidies [without which defendant would not be able to affоrd the rent in this complex] would be to exercise
Judgment for possession is hereby entered. Defendant may apply for a statutory hardship stay, provided that all statutory requirements therefor have been, or will be, satisfied at the time of the application for such a stay (especially the payment of the market rent). Likewise, if defendant prevails in the N.L.R.B. proceedings before the actual eviction resulting from the judgment in this case, I will consider an application for temporary relief on equitable terms.
The money nоw on deposit as a consideration of the adjournment heretofore granted will be released to plaintiff for the use and occupation of the apartment by defendant.