53 Ark. 215 | Ark. | 1890
All errors assigned upon this appeal relate to the charging of the jury; but the appellee contends that the questions argued by counsel for appellant are not presented by the record, because the charge was not preserved in the bill of exceptions. If that contention is correct, its decision relieves the necessity of considering any other question.
A “skeleton bill of exceptions” was prepared, signed and filed, and is brought before us by certiorari. After setting out all the evidence in the cause, it continues: “And thereupon the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: (clerk will here copy plaintiff’s instructions as asked, leaving off the amendments of the court.)” It then recites that the court refused the first prayer of plaintiff in the form submitted, but gave it after adding a clause which is set out; it also recites that the court refused the third prayer as submitted by plaintiff, but gave it after adding a clause which is set out. The transcript contains what purports to be the prayer for a charge as presented by plaintiff, but the appellee contends that it is not identified by the call in the bill of exceptions. It is indorsed, “Instructions for plaintiff,” and is divided into paragraphs, entitled instructions one, two, three and four; it shows that amendments «were made to the instructions as asked, which accord with the recitals in the skeleton bill.
In the case of Keith v. Herschberg Optical Co., 48 Ark., 138, the bill of exceptions was as follows: “The defendant, to maintain the issues on his part, introduced in evidence the agreed statement of F. Moore, which is in words and figures as follows, to wit: (Here copy Moore’s statement.)” The statement had not been signed by counsel or marked filed, but was endorsed, “F. Moore’s statement,” and in this answered the call; the court held it was sufficiently identified.
The instructions asked by the defendant were brought upon the bill of exceptions by the same call as those for the plaintiff; there is the same means of identification except that they were not amended by the judge; but, under the decision above cited, we are constrained to hold the identification sufficient. If it were charged that the transcript did not in fact contain the instructions passed upon by the circuit court, we would find much difficulty in reaching this conclusion; but, as there is no denial of identity, marks of identification are less rigidly scrutinized.
The instructions asked by the plaintiff and those given on behalf of the defendant relate to two alleged breaches of warranty on the part of plaintiff; the first, that the diagram of the premises insured, as set out in the application, was correct, whereas it was in fact incorrect; the second, that plaintiff agreed to keep his books of account and the last inventory of his stock in a fire-proof safe at night, or in some secure place not exposed to fire which would destroy the house insured, whereas he kept them in the part of the house insured occupied by him as a dwelling, and not in a safe of the character indicated. We will consider the instructions in that order.
The first instruction asked by the plaintiff should therefore have been given without the amendment, and the first, seventh and fourteenth instructions asked by the defendant should have been refused.
As to that, inquiry by us would involve a useless consumption of time, which we may properly give to other causes pressing upon our attention.
For the errors indicated, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.