666 N.E.2d 1180 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1995
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *681 Defendant, The Corinthian, Inc., appeals the award of punitive damages and attorney fees. Corinthian raises four assignments of error:
"I. The trial court erred in failing to grant [Corinthian's] motion for a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages.
"II. The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to plaintiff-appellee.
"III. The trial court erred in failing to rule that the Ohio Nursing Home Residents' Bill of Rights are administrative statutory provisions which do not create private causes of action for personal injury or wrongful death.
"IV. The trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence testimony as to the condition of Corinthian Nursing Center which evidence was extremely prejudicial to Corinthian and had little or no probative value." *682
Plaintiff, Therese Sprosty, administrator of the estate of Margaret Sprosty, deceased, appeals the award of punitive damages. Sprosty raises two assignments of error:
"I. The trial court erred in not allowing the jury to determine the amount of punitive damages.
"II. The trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the right to award punitive damages if actual malice is found."
We find that Corinthian's assignments of error lack merit and that Sprosty's first assignment of error has merit. We further find it unnecessary to address Sprosty's second assignment of error. Consequently, we affirm the judgment in part, reverse the award of punitive damages, and remand for further proceedings for Sprosty's claim for punitive damages.
A jury awarded Sprosty $350,000 for personal injuries and $50,000 for the wrongful death, and found her entitled to punitive damages. The trial court later awarded $100,000 in punitive damages and $158,218 in attorney fees.
R.C.
"Any resident whose rights under sections
Corinthian argues that R.C.
"(D) This section does not apply * * * to the extent that another section of the Revised Code expressly provides any of the following:
"(1) Punitive * * * damages are recoverable from a defendant in question in a tort action on a basis other than that the actions or omissions of that defendant demonstrate malice, aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression, or insult * * *."
In Slagle v. Parkview Manor, Inc. (Oct. 7, 1983), Stark App. No. CA-6155, unreported, 1983 WL 7079, a case decided before the enactment of R.C.
"In our view, the statute would have been pointless and unnecessary to enact if it merely restated the common law. We find R.C.
Reviewing R.C.
Corinthian also argues that, if R.C.
Corinthian goes on to argue that R.C.
Accordingly, Corinthian's first assignment of error is not well taken. *684
Corinthian argues that the issue of attorney fees should have been submitted to the jury. Corinthian also argues that Sprosty waived her right to attorney fees by failing to request the submission of this issue to the jury. Corinthian, however, agreed to have the trial court determine the issue of attorney fees during the following exchange:
"MS. SIMON-SACKS: I don't want to belabor this, but I didn't hear any objection to the procedure that the court wants to follow with respect to, if there was a — if the jury finds punitive damages, then the attorneys' fees issue can be submitted to the Court.
"Is there any objection to that procedure or —
"* * *
"MS. HOVIS SUKEL: I don't think there is an objection to a hearing at a later date. That's fine.
"THE COURT: You will have it."
Corinthian further argues that attorney fees were improper because there was no showing of malice. Corinthian's argument rests on the principle that attorney fees are available only in conjunction with punitive damages and that punitive damages, in turn, require malice. This syllogism fails. The attorney fees allowed by R.C.
Accordingly, Corinthian's second assignment of error is not well taken.
Corinthian waived its right to maintain this issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the trial court. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous.Auth. v. Younger (1994),
Even if we were to address this issue we would find no error. Corinthian cites Welch v. Brown's Nursing Home (1984),
Accordingly, Corinthian's third assignment of error is not well taken.
We review the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.Illinois Controls, Inc. v. Langham (1994),
Corinthian argues that evidence concerning the condition at the nursing home should have been excluded under Evid.R. 402 and 403(A). Evid.R. 402 precludes the admission of irrelevant evidence. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Evid.R. 401. Evid.R. 403(A) precludes the admission of evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury."
Corinthian objects to the admission of state reports concerning Corinthian's treatment of other residents, testimony that employees had left because of Corinthian's low standard of care for its residents, testimony that residents were not properly cared for, and testimony that Corinthian was understaffed.
The admission of this evidence does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion. The trial court's conclusion that this evidence was relevant and that its probative value was not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury" falls short of demonstrating an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.
Accordingly, Corinthian's fourth assignment of error is not well taken. *686
Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co. (1994),
Accordingly, Sprosty's first assignment of error is well taken.
Our resolution of Corinthian's first assignment of error renders it unnecessary for us to address this assignment of error.
The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded for further proceedings on Sprosty's claim for punitive damages.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded.
PATTON, C.J., and O'DONNELL, J., concur.