Sprint Nextel Corp. v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n (In Re Terrestar Networks, Inc.)Sprint Nextel Corp. v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n (In Re Terrestar Networks, Inc.)
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Bеfore the Court are cross motions for partial summary judgment in the above-captioned adversary proceeding filed by Sprint Nextel (“Sprint”) in the Chapter 11 case of TerreStar Networks, Inc. (“Ter- *257 reStar”) and the jointly administered debtors, Case No. 10-15446 (collectively, the “Debtors”). Debtor TerreStar is a mobile satellite services provider whose business requires a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) license to use 20 MHz of a 2 GHz S-Band spectrum (the “S-Band License”). Pursuant to certain FCC declaratory rulings, Plaintiff Sprint filed claims against the Debtors in the amount of $104 million for the Debtors’ alleged share of Sprint’s costs to clear the bandwidth that TerreStar now uses. To satisfy its admittedly unsecured obligation, Sprint asserts that a lien on TerreStar’s license assets held by the 15% senior secured noteholders (the “Noteholders”) — facially superior in priority to Sprint’s claim— should either be (a) declared invalid; or (b) subordinated to Sprint’s claim. The pending summary judgment motions all relate to the validity of the Noteholders’ lien in relation to Sprint’s claim.
Sprint’s complaint has four counts, each alleging a different theory for its position. In Count I, Sprint maintains that the Noteholders’ lien cannot attach to the S-Band License itself, and the lien is, therefore, invalid. Count II argues that even if the Noteholders’ lien might be permissible as to the economic value associated with the license, the lien is not effective because (a) it could not attach under Article 9 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code (the “NYUCC”) until after a sale of the license assets occurred; and (b) such lien is not permitted under Bankruptcy Code Section 552, which prohibits liens on property acquired after the bankruptcy filing. Count III of Sprint’s complaint argues that, assuming there is a valid lien on the S-Band License, the lien should be invalidated or subordinated to Sprint’s claim for reimbursement under the equities of the case provision of Bankruptcy Code Section 552(b)(1). Finally, Count IV contends that the Noteholders’ lien should be subordinated to Sprint’s claim pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a)(1) and Article 9 of the NYUCC because the FCC conditioned TerreStar’s license upon reimbursement to Sprint for clearing the bandwidth that Ter-reStar now uses.
Sprint seeks summary judgment on Counts I, II, and IV. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed in the Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases (the “Committee”) supports Sprint’s motion on Counts I and II, but maintains that the remaining counts are not ripe for summary judgment because discovery is incomplete. Defendant U.S. Bank, National Association (“U.S. Bank”), the indenture trustee and collateral agent for the Noteholdеrs, opposes Sprint’s motion and has cross moved for summary judgment on all four counts. An ad hoc committee representing the Noteholders in the Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases joins U.S. Bank’s motion on Counts I and II.
U.S. Bank and the Noteholders acknowledge the case law holding that a security interest may not be granted in an FCC license itself but argue that it is nonetheless well established that a lien may exist on the economic value of an FCC license. They maintain that the security agreement here grants a security interest in all economic value relating to TerreStar’s S-Band License and that such a lien is not barred by Article 9 of the NYUCC or Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendants U.S. Bank and the Noteholders have a valid lien on the economic value of the S-Band License, and nothing in Article 9 of the NYUCC or Section 552 invalidates this lien. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to U.S. Bank and the Noteholders on Counts I and II, and denies summary judgment to Sprint and the Committee. As for Count III, the Court concludes that this equitable claim is fact *258 dependent and not ripe for summary judgment until after the completion of discovery. Finally, the Court declines to grant Sprint priority over the Noteholders’ lien based on relevant FCC rulings and, therefore, denies Sprint’s mоtion on Count IV while granting the motion of U.S. Bank.
BACKGROUND
The Debtors are providers of mobile satellite services (“MSS”), which require various licenses and authorizations from the FCC. Starting in the late 1990’s, the FCC began assigning certain portions of spectrum (or “band”) for the use of MSS operators and their anticipated MSS systems. In June 2004, the FCC transferred a license to use 20 MHz of a 1990-2025 MHz spectrum, the S-Band License, to TerreStar.
On February 14, 2008, TerreStar issued $500,000,000 in 15% Notes with a maturity date of 2014. Wholly-owned subsidiaries TerreStar National Services Inc. and Ter-reStar License Inc. served as guarantors of the 15% Notes. As noted above, the collateral agent and indenture trustee for the 15% Noteholders was U.S. Bank.
The Security Agreement for these 15% Notes was governed by the laws of New York and secured by:
[A]ll FCC License Rights ... including all FCC Licenses, including, without limitation, the right to receive monies, proceeds, or other consideration in connection with the sale, assignment, transfer, or other disposition of any FCC Licenses, the proceeds from the sale of any FCC Licenses or any goodwill or other intangible rights or benefits associated therewith, including without limitation all right of each Grantor to (A) transfer, assign or otherwise dispose of its rights, title and interests, if any, under or in respect of such FCC Licenses, (B) exercise any rights, demands and remedies agаinst the lessor, licensor or other parties thereto, and (C) all rights of such Grantor to receive proceeds of any insurance, indemnities, warranties, guaranties or claims for damages in connection therewith....
Security Agreement [Dkt. No. 52, Exhibit C] § 3(f) (emphasis added).
The Security Agreement was, however, careful to carve out the FCC license itself from the lien:
[SJuch security interest does not include at any time any FCC License to the extent (but only to the extent) that at such time the Collateral Agent may not validly possess a security interest directly in the FCC License pursuant to applicable federal law, including the Communications Act of 1931, as amended, and the rules, regulations and policies promulgated thereunder, as in effect at such time, but such security interest does include at all times all proceeds of the FCC Licenses, and the right to receive all monies, consideration and proceeds derived from or in connection with the sale, assignment, transfer, or other disposition of the FCC Licenses....
Security Agreement [Dkt. No. 52, Exhibit C] § 3(f) (emphasis added). The Security Agreement also pledged as collateral all “General Intangibles,” as defined by Article 9 of the NYUCC. Id. at §§ 1.02, 3(a).
Consistent with the Security Agreement, the Offering Memorandum for the 15% Notes recognized that the lien does not cover the S-Bаnd License itself because the FCC retains the authority to determine who may hold a license:
The ability of the collateral agent to foreclose on certain of the collateral securing the notes may be limited by U.S. ... laws and certain agreements. Current FCC policy prohibits the grant of a security interest in an FCC radio frequency license or authorization.... As a result, even after we obtain our FCC *259 ... licenses, authorizations or approvals in principle, holders of the notes will not have a direct security interest in these licenses and authorizations. [An investor’s] ability to foreclose on, or to exercise certain rights or remedies with respect to, certain of the collateral requires prior approval from the FCC to the extent it would result in an assignment or transfer of control of our FCC authorizations (whether as a matter of law or fact).
TerreStar Networks Inc. $500,000,000 15% Senior Secured PIK Notes due 2014, Offering Memorandum [Dkt. No. 52, Exhibit A], at 42 (emphasis added). U.S. Bank perfected its security interest by filing a Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement with the Delaware Secretary of State and the relevant agreements with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The spectrum for which TerreStar holds the S-Band License was previously used for other purposes and was made available to TerreStar only after that bandwidth was clеared by Sprint, a wireless telecommunications carrier. Sprint relinquished its license to the 800 MHz spectrum in exchange for thé license to the 1990-1995 MHz spectrum pursuant to an agreement with the FCC. See Improving Public Safety Communication in the 800 MHz Band, 19 FCC Red. 14969 ¶¶ 11-12 (2004) (the “800 MHz Order”). Before Sprint could operate in the 1990-1995 MHz spectrum, however, the FCC required Sprint to move the Broadcast Auxiliary Service (“BAS”) incumbents already occupying the 1950-2025 MHz spectrum. According to the FCC, Sprint’s new license to the 1990-1995 MHz spectrum was worth $2.801 billion more than the license to the 800 MHz spectrum. See Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band, 25 FCC Red. 13874 ¶ 7 n. 13 (2010) (citing 800 MHz Order ¶ 297; Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band, 19 FCC Red. 25120 ¶31 (2004)) (“The Commission valued the 1.9 GHz spectrum that Sprint is receiving as worth $4.86 billion, and the spectrum Sprint is giving as worth $2.059 billion.... [t]he difference [of which is] $2.801 billion.... ”). In the 800 MHz Order, the FCC recognized that Sprint could either (a) credit move costs against Sprint’s $2.801 billion windfall; or (b) seek pro rata reimbursements from other MSS licensees who would subsequently occupy the cleared 1995-2025 MHz spectrum. See 800 MHz Order ¶¶261, 329-330. The FCC emphasized that Sprint was not entitled to “double dip” by receiving compensation from both MSS licensees and the FCC. Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band, 25 FCC Red. 13874 ¶ 6 (citing 800 MHz Order ¶¶261, 329-330). If Sprint failed to obtain reimbursement from the relevant MSS licensees, however, Sprint will be entitled to credit from the FCC against any windfall.
Relatеdly, the FCC issued an “Emerging Technologies” policy designed to prevent later licensees from receiving a free ride on prior spectrum clearing done by other licensees. That policy provided that “[a]ll MSS licensees who benefit from relocation of BAS are responsible for contributing, as a condition of their licenses.” Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum at 2 GHz for Use by the Mobile-Satellite Service, 15 FCC Red. 12315 ¶ 69 (2000) (the “2000 Ruling”). In the 2000 Ruling, the FCC used the term “condition” but did not address whether an MSS licensee would be stripped of its license if a licensee failed to honor its reimbursement obligations. See id. Motient Corporation, the predecessor company to TerreStar’s parent company, recognized in its 2005 annual report that, as an MSS licensee, it could “have obligations to reimburse [Sprint] Nextel for certain of its band clearing costs.... [in a] range from $0 to in excess of $100 million.” Motient Corporation Form 10-K: For the *260 Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2005 [Dkt. No. 40, Exhibit M], at 16. 1
With reimbursement obligations to Sprint remaining unpaid, Sprint filed suit against TerreStar and other MSS licensees in June 2008 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking pro rata reimbursement of BAS relocation costs. Sprint Nextel Corporation v. ICO Satellite Service G.P., et al., Civil Action No. 1:08-cv-651 (E.D. Va. 2008). At the MSS licensees’ request, the district court held the case in abeyance and asked the FCC to clarify the BAS relocation cost sharing rules, including providing guidance on when an operator is considered to have entered the band and triggered a reimbursement obligation to Sprint. Id. at Dkt. No. 33.
In response to the district court’s request, the FCC issued an order and report entitled Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band, 24 FCC Red. 7904 (2009) (the “2009 Ruling”). In the 2009 Ruling, the FCC “tentatively con-elud[ed] that MSS operators ... will have an obligation to share, on a pro rata basis, in the costs associated with the relocation of BAS incumbents if they ‘enter the band’ prior to the BAS sunset date of December 9, 2013.” Id. ¶2 (emphasis in original). Notably, the 2009 Ruling used the term “obligation” rather than “condition” to describe the requirement of other MSS licensees to reimburse Sprint. Id.
On September 29, 2010, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling to provide additional guidance on FCC policy as to the Sprint reimbursement obligation. Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band, 25 FCC Red. 13874 ¶ 1 (2010) (the “2010 Declaratory Ruling”). In the 2010 Declaratory Ruling, the FCC found that MSS licensees have a reimbursement obligation to Sprint. Id. ¶ 6. More specifically, the FCC concluded that if an MSS licensee certifies that its satellite is operational before the sunset date of December 9, 2013, the MSS licensee beсomes obligated to reimburse Sprint for its pro rata share of the relocation costs based on the amount of spectrum used. Id. ¶ 42. In so ruling, the FCC rejected the argument of TerreStar and fellow MSS licensee, New DBSD Satellite Services G.P. (“DBSD”), that Sprint’s delay in BAS relocation eliminated them reimbursement obligations. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. The FCC also responded to Sprint’s claim that an MSS licensee’s use of the license was conditioned on reimbursement:
Sprint Nextel argues that failure of an MSS entrant to pay its [BAS relocation] cost sharing obligation in a timely fashion should automatically result in the suspension of its right to operate and suspension of its license if the failure to pay continues.... We will adopt no specific policies or procedures as to how we should proceed if later new entrants fail to reimburse an earlier entrant for the cost of relocating BAS incumbents as required. Instead, we will address complaints regarding failure to make required payments that are filed before the Commission through our existing enforcement mechanisms.
Id.
¶ 73. As for liability between corporate affiliates, the FCC articulated its view that the reimbursement obligation should be viewed as going to the enterprise as a whole rather than only to the specified licensee.
Id.
¶¶ 33-34 (citing,
inter alia, Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. United States,
Although scheduled to complete the BAS relocation by May 2007, Sprint actually did not complete the task until July 2010. Costs incurred for the relocation were submitted to a “Transition Administrator” to review for reasonableness, a process that remains ongoing.
TerreStar and its affiliates filed for Chapter 11 on October 19, 2010. Sprint filed proofs of claims for $104 million against each of the Debtors for reimbursement costs relating to the BAS relocation. The Committee, comprised of six of Ter-reStar’s largest unsecured creditors, was appointed on October 29, 2010. Sprint commenced this adversary proceeding against U.S. Bank on December 17, 2010.
On July 7, 2011, TerreStar sold substantially all of its assets — including the S-Band License — to Gamma Acquisition L.L.C., an affiliate of Dish Network Corporation, for $1.375 billion pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under the applicable sales agreement, TerreS-tar’s license transfer was subject to FCC approval. Under the Security Agreement, there is a $1.5 billion obligation under the 15% Notes in principal, interest, and make-whole premiums.
DISCUSSION
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted where the movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56;
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
B. A VALID SECURITY INTEREST EXISTS IN THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF AN FCC LICENSE
The Federal Communications Act of 1934, which governs licenses, originally contemplated only radio broadcasting but it now covers television and other modern forms of mobile personal communication.
See
47 U.S.C. § 151
et seq.; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
To understand the arguments presented by the parties, it is necessary to briefly summarize the evolution of the law regarding whether, and to what extent, a lien may be placed on an FCC license or any value associated with it. 3 The case law makes clear that, while a lien cannot exist on the license itself, a security interest may attach to the economic value of an FCC license.
Prior to 1992, the FCC took the position that a lien could not be placed on an FCC license in any manner:
[A] broadcast license, as distinguished from the station’s plant or physical assets, is not an owned asset or vested property interest so as to be subject to a mortgage, lien, pledge, attachment, seizure, or similar property right.... [S]uch hypothecation endangers the independence of the licensee whо is and who should be at all times responsible for and accountable to the Commission in the exercise of the broadcasting trust.
In re Ridgely Communications, Inc.,
In 1992, the question of whether a lien could be placed on an FCC license arose in two federal court cases that reached opposite conclusions. The first of these cases was
Ridgely Communications.
In
Ridgely,
the debtor, who owned and operated two commercial radio stations, granted its secured lender a first priority lien on all of its tangible and intangible property.
Ridgely,
The second case was
In re Tak Commc’ns, Inc.,
To resolve the direct conflict between these two decisions, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling in 1994 that adopted Ridgely and rejected Tak. In re Cheskey, 9 FCC Red. 986, 987 ¶ 9 n.8 (1994). In Cheskey, the FCC expressly embraced the public and private distinction articulated in Ridgely: “If a security interest holder were to foreclose on the collateral license, by operation of law, the license could transfer hands without the prior approval of the Commission. In contrast, giving a security interest in the proceeds of the sale of a license does not raise the same concerns.” Id. at 987 ¶ 8. Citing Ridgely, the FCC also referred to proceeds of a sale as the “licensee’s propriety rights in the license vis-a-vis private third parties.” Id. at 987 ¶ 9 n.7. Noting the Tak court’s deference to FCC policy, the FCC in Ches-key explicitly concluded that “the court erred in Tak_The court’s ruling cannot bind the Commission to a policy which it does not have.” Id. at 987 ¶ 9 n.8.
*264
Since the FCC’s issuance of
Cheskey,
it appears to be settled law that a creditor may perfect a lien in the private economic value of an FCC license to the extent that such lien does not violate the FCC’s public right to regulate license transfers.
MLQ Investors, L.P. v. Pacific Quadracasting,
Judge Peck of this Court addressed this topic in
Ion Media.
In that case, the plan of reorganization called for senior secured noteholders to exchange their notes — secured by the value of the debtors’ FCC licenses — for equity in the reorganized entity.
See Ion Media,
Applying the reasoning of all these cases to the current dispute, this Court concludes that the Noteholders have a valid lien on the economic value associated with TerreStar’s S-Band License, even if they cannot hold a lien on the FCC license itself. The Security Agreement here gives the broadest grant possible over the right to receive economic value from an FCC License: “the right to receive monies, proceeds, or other consideration in connection with the sale, assignment, transfer, or other disposition of any FCC Licenses, the proceeds from the sale of any FCC Licenses or any goodwill or other intangible rights or benefits associated therewith....” Security Agreement [Dkt. No. 52, Exhibit C] § 3(f).
7
Despite this broad grant on the economic value of the license, the lien in this Security Agreement is consistent with the FCC’s public regulatory role recognized in
Cheskey
and its progeny because it “does not include at any time any FCC License to the extent (but only to the extent) that at such time the Collateral Agent may not validly possess a security interest directly in the FCC License pursuant to applicable federal law....”
Id.
§ 3(f);
see also Ion Media,
Sprint relies upon the Offering Memorandum circulated to potential investors in *266 the Senior Secured Notes as evidence that U.S. Bank and the Noteholders knew they did not have a security interest in the S-Band License. However, Sprint overlooks the fact that the Offering Memorandum limits the lien to the economic value of the license and explicitly carves out any lien on the license itself:
[HJolders of the notes will not have a direct security interest in these licenses and authorizations. [An investor’s] ability to foreclose on, or exercise certain rights or remedies with respect to, certain of the collateral requires prior approval from the FCC to the extent it would result in an assignment or transfer of control of our FCC authorizations (whether as a matter of law or fact).
Offering Memorandum [Dkt. No. 52, Exhibit A], at 42. Thus, the language of the Offering Memorandum simply mirrors the position taken by U.S. Bank and the Note-holders in the current dispute before this Court, namely, that the Security Agreement created a valid lien on the economic value of TerrеStar’s S-Band License but not on the license itself.
C. THE LIEN ON THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF AN FCC LICENSE ATTACHED PREPETITION AND IS NOT BARRED BY SECTION 552 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Relying heavily on a decision from the bankruptcy court in Colorado,
Spectrum Scan LLC v. Valley Bank & Trust Co. (In re Tracy Broad. Corp.),
Other than the decision in
Tracy,
courts have uniformly recognized that an FCC license is a general intangible and that a lien on such an intangible may be perfected prepetition before any proceeds or other consideration is generated and prior to any transfer, sale, or other disposition of the license.
MLQ,
In
MLQ,
a lender secured by the proceeds of аn FCC license filed suit against a defaulting debtor and guarantor to seek sale of the license and to obtain the resulting proceeds.
MLQ,
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It held that a lender may perfect a security interest in the proceeds of an FCC license and that such interest may be perfected prior to sale of the license.
Id.
Invoking
Ridgely,
the
MLQ
court relied upon the distinction between the private right to grant liens on the economic value of an FCC license and the public right to regulate the license itself.
Id.
The
MLQ
court also
*267
found that under the UCC, government licenses are “general intangibles” or “personal property interests in which security interests may be perfected,”
id.
(citing
Ridgely,
[There is] no reason why the proceeds should not be considered ‘general intangiblеs,’ therefore subject to perfection prior to sale. Indeed, a contrary outcome would mean that the distinction between private and public interests in FCC license proceeds, outlined in In re Ridgely and In re Cheskey, would have no meaning, and the private interests would be devoid of value. A security interest in proceeds that could not be perfected until after foreclosure and sale of the license would, in almost every circumstance, be primed by IRS liens and claims of other creditors. The fact that in the present case the actual dollar proceeds from the sale of the licenses were generated only after the sale-and thus after the tax lien filing, as well-is immaterial. ‘[N]early all forms of security must be reduced to cash before they pay off the debt secured thereby.’
Id. at 749 (citing Peter F. Coogan, Tax Liens and the UCC, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1385 (1968)). The court in MLQ considered and rejected the Tak decision, noting that it was based upon the FCC’s prior position that liens on broadcast licenses were impermissible, a view that the FCC had subsequently and explicitly rejected. Id. at 748.
In
Urban Communicators,
the Southern District of New York followed
MLQ
in concluding that liens on FCC licenses attach and may be perfected prepetition.
to the extent the Holding Company may be prohibited from granting a seсurity interest in the FCC Licenses pursuant to the Communications Act or the rules and regulations of the FCC this security interest shall not encumber the FCC Licenses as opposed to the proceeds that may be derived therefrom.
Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted). Like MLQ, the debtor argued that the lien was on sale proceeds from the licenses and could attach only after the license yielded proceeds. Id. at 334. The district court in Urban Communicators rejected this argument and adopted the MLQ public-private distinction to validate the lien on proceeds — or economic value— of the license. Id. at 334-35. It echoed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MLQ that “a creditor may perfect a security interest in a borrower’s FCC broadcasting license to the extent that the creditor seeks to protect its interest in the proceeds of the borrower’s license.” Id. at 334. Also fol *268 lowing MLQ, the court found the lien on proceeds from the FCC license to be on a “general intangible” and that it attached when the security interest was created. 9 See id. at 334-35 (acknowledging the MLQ court’s conclusion .that “the licensee’s rights in the license proceeds includ[e] a limited right to pledge those proceeds as collateral”). 10
Similarly, the
Media Properties
court held that a prepetition security interest in an FCC license validly extended to all attributes of the license not specifically reserved to the FCC.
In re Media Properties, Inc.,
It seems clear that since [Tak,] the FCC and the courts considering the issue have found the glass to be at least half full. A creditor can ... take a security interest in all rights of the licensee against third parties, which is more than just proceeds of a sale. After those prerogatives exclusive to the FCC are carved out, there remains an interest in the license which may be subjected to a security interest which could continue in proceeds of those interests by operation of law. UCC Section 9 — 203(g). Thus, when the license is sold, the existing security is liquidated. Such a security interest avoids the effects of 11 U.S.C. § 552.
Id. at 249-50. Thus, the court reasoned that although there were no proceeds when the lien was granted, the proceeds were generated from sale of a general intangible in which the creditor had a pre-petition interest. 11
*269
Against the backdrop of this authority, Sprint relies upon
Tracy Broadcasting,
The
Tracy
decision is, however, problematic. As a threshold matter, the
Tracy
court reached its conclusion based on the faulty assumption that “there has been no definitive ruling from the FCC itself, and there are Circuit Court cases which seem to reject any security interest in any aspect of an FCC License.”
Id.
at 328. For this proposition, the court in
Tracy
cites
Tak,
which
Cheskey
explicitly rejected as inconsistent with FCC policy and which the Ninth Circuit rejected in
MLQ.
The other case relied upon by the
Tracy
court is a 1933 decision from the Ninth Circuit,
see id.
at 330 (citing
Sims v. Jamison,
Thus, the Tracy decision is fundamentally at odds with the case law set forth above that permits liens on the economic value of an FCC license. It ignores the sound reasoning of the court in Ridgely, which recognized the distinction between the public and private rights associated with an FCC license. By ignoring that distinction, the reasoning in Tracy would place two problematic conditions on the attachment of a lien against the economic value of a broadcast license — a sale and FCC approval — that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for such a lien to survive the filing of a bankruptcy, notwithstanding the wealth of authority that such liens are permissible and the FCC’s conclusion that such liens are desirable. 13 As recognized in the decisions in MLQ, Urban Communicators, Media Properties and others, the arguments made by Sprint, if accepted, would unsettle expectations by invalidating such liens in the bankruptcy context or permitting all other creditors to *270 come before the liens, thus severely diminishing or eliminating their value. 14
D. REMAINING COUNTS OF THE COMPLAINT
Counts III and IV of Sprint’s cоmplaint offer two additional legal theories to challenge the priority of the Noteholders’ lien. U.S. Bank seeks summary judgment on both counts, whereas Sprint seeks summary judgment only on Count IV.
In Count III, Sprint asserts that the FCC could not have issued the S-Band License to TerreStar but for Sprint’s relocation of the BAS incumbents pursuant to the 800 MHz Order. Given that Sprint conferred the benefit upon TerreStar before the Noteholders secured their lien on TerreStar’s S-Band License, Sprint claims that the lien should be invalidated or subordinated to Sprint’s reimbursement claim under Section 552(b)(l)’s “equities of the case” doctrine. Section 552(b)(1) provides that:
[I]f the debtor ... entered into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the security interest ... extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds, products, offspring, or profits of such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, products, offspring, or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case ..., except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.
11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (emphasis added). As a general mattеr, the “equities of the case provision is intended to prevent secured creditors from receiving windfalls and to allow bankruptcy courts broad discretion in balancing the interests of secured creditors against the general policy of the Bankruptcy Code, which favors giving debtors a fresh start.”
In re Patio & Porch Sys. Inc.,
U.S. Bank concedes that the factual record is incomplete on Count III.
See
U.S. Bank’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 55], at 25 (“Plaintiffs have not moved for summary judgment on [Count III] because questions of equity are fact intensive and the parties are in the early stages of discovery in this case.”). U.S. Bank nonetheless seeks summary judgment based on a narrow legal argument, namely that the equities of the case doctrine applies only where a secured creditor’s collateral has appreciated in value through the use of unencumbered assets from the debtors’ estates.
Id.
(citing,
inter alia, In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc.,
“The bankruptcy court is a court of equity. ‘Equity’ has been defined as the spirit and habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing that should regulate the affairs of individuals.”
Jaecksch v. GMAC (In re Jaecksch),
The equities of the case doctrine is intended to ensure that secured creditors do not receive a windfall benefit when a trustee uses assets of the estate, for example, to finish uncompleted inventory, and it is also used to adjust recovery by a secured creditor in situations where there is an improvement or decline in the post-petition collateral, especially in situations where the change in value is brought about by a party in the bankruptcy.
In re Barbara K Enters.,
Other courts have similarly described the narrow contours of the equities of the case doctrine.
See In re Cross Baking Co.,
Notwithstanding the narrow circumstances described by these decisions, some cases have observed that the doctrine
might
have broader application.
In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.,
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court refuses to limit the doctrine, as a matter of law, as requested by U.S. Bank. To be sure, the facts as described in these motions do not appear to fall within the contours of the doctrine as most commonly understood.
15
But the Court is mindful that the factual record in this case is not yet fully developed and
*273
that the plain language of Section 552(b) is not limited to the specific factual scenario set forth by U.S. Bank. Accordingly, the Court denies U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment on Count III as premature.
See Indergit v. Rite Aid Corp.,
In seeking summary judgment on Count IV, Sprint asserts that the Note-holders’ lien should be subordinated to Sprint’s reimbursement claim by virtue of Articlе 9 of the NYUCC and Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. At first blush, neither section appears to provide for the remedy that Sprint seeks. The NYUCC allows secured parties no greater interest in collateral than the debtor itself holds. See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-203(b)(2). Similarly, Section 506 provides only that “a secured claim [is secured] to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property....” 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). Both sections address the extent to which an interest is secured, and neither mentions the subordination of liens.
Rather than rely on the text of these two provisions, Sprint’s argument instead depends upon Sprint’s contention that the Debtors’ interest in the license — the collateral for the Noteholders’ lien — was created subject to Sprint’s reimbursement claim. Citing relevant FCC rulings, Sprint asserts that the S-Band License’s existence is a prerequisite to any encumbrance on the value of such license. Most notably, Sprint cites the 2000 Ruling, which provides that use of the S-Band License is expressly conditioned on reimbursement to Sprint for clearing the bandwidth; “Subsequently entering MSS licensees ... will, as a condition of their licenses, compensate the first entrant on a pro rata basis, according to the amount of spectrum the subsequently entering licensees are authorized to use.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Sprint Nextel Corporation’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 39], at 33 n.12 (citing 2000 Ruling, ¶ 71). 16
*274 Sprint’s argument is, however, defective in at least two ways. First, the 2000 Ruling used the term “conditional” but has never explicitly conditioned use of the S-Band License on payment of full pro rata reimbursement to Sprint. Indeed, the FCC’s subsequent 2009 Ruling stated that MSS licensees, including TerreStar, have a reimbursement “obligation” to Sprint, not that use of the S-Band License was conditioned on full pro rata reimbursement to Sprint. See 2009 Ruling, ¶ 2. When revisiting the issue again in its 2010 Declaratory Ruling, the FCC refused Sprint’s request to make full reimbursement a condition for use of the license:
Sprint Nextel argues that failure of an MSS entrant to pay its [BAS] cost sharing obligation in a timely fashion should automatically result in the suspension of its right to operate and suspension of its license if the failure to pay continues .... We will adopt no specific policies or procedures as to how we should proceed if later new entrants fail to reimburse an earlier entrant for the cost of relocating BAS incumbents as required. Instead, we will address complaints regarding failure to make required payments that are filed before the Commission through our existing enforcement mechanisms.
2010 Declaratory Ruling, ¶ 73. If the FCC wished to expressly condition TerreStar’s use of thе license on full reimbursement, the FCC had several opportunities to do so. It did not.
Second, Sprint’s argument ignores that it is the role of the Bankruptcy Court, not the FCC, to determine the priority of Sprint’s claim vis-á-vis other parties’ claims. As the FCC specifically stated in the 2010 Declaratory Ruling: “the actions we take here are not an adjudication of the claims that Sprint Nextel, DBSD, and TerreStar have raised in that court proceeding.” Id. ¶ 82. The FCC recognized, instead, that Sprint’s recovery for any reimbursement obligation “will be governed by the proceedings in the bankruptcy court, rather than by this Commission or in the district court case initiated by Sprint Nextel.” Id. ¶ 29. The FCC further explained that “any proceedings by Sprint Nextel on a claim for monetary recovery against a debtor in [a bankruptcy proceeding] ... is a matter for the Bankruptcy Court and is not addressed in this Report and Order and Declaratory Ruling.” Id. at ¶ 79. 17 Indeed, the FCC noted that it is “not seeking] to determine the pecuniary interest of any individual debtor or creditor.” Id. There can be no dispute then that the FCC did not intend to determine the priority of Sprint’s reimbursement claim in this bankruptcy.
The FCC’s views on this subject are consistent with the Supreme Court’s view that the FCC’s role as regulator of the telecommunications industry is distinct
*275
from the bankruptcy court’s role as arbiter оf claims disputes in bankruptcy.
See FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc’ns,
Under the Bankruptcy Code, ‘debt’ means ‘liability on a claim,’ ... and ‘claim,’ in turn, includes any ‘right to payment,’.... We have said that ‘claim’ has ‘the broadest available definition,’ ... and have held that the ‘plain meaning of a ‘right to payment’ is nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation, regardless of the objectives the State seeks to serve in imposing the obligation,’.... In short, a debt is a debt, even when the obligation to pay it is also a regulatory condition.
NextWave,
Relatedly, Sprint asserts that public policy favors granting its motion on Count IV because recognizing the Noteholders’ lien would interfere with regulation of FCC licenses. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Sprint Nextel Corporation’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 39], at 33 (citing
MLQ,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court (1) denies Sprint’s request for summary judgment on Counts I, II and IV; (2) denies the Committee’s request for summary judgment on Counts I and II; (3) *276 grants the Noteholders’ request for summary judgment on Counts I and II; (4) grants the request of U.S. Bank for summary judgment on Counts I, II and IV; and (5) finds that Count III is not yet ripe for summary judgment. Defendants should settle an order on three days’ notice.
Notes
. TerreStar's parent company, TerreStar Corporation, is the successor company to Motient Corporation.
. The FCC’s comments about enterprise liability were directed to DBSD and its affiliated companies, which had filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The ques *261 tion of enterprise liability as applied to Ter-reStar and its affiliates is the subject of sepa-rale motions in this сase.
. It is unclear whether Sprint maintains that no lien of any kind is permissible on the value associated with an FCC license, or simply that the lien here is impermissible under the circumstances presented in this case:
THE COURT: Well, do you — are you telling me that the FCC policy is different than what I understand it to be, that you can have a lien on the economic value of the license?
MR. LADDIN: I don’t think the FCC has — I don't believe that the FCC itself has actually decided that you can't have that language. THE COURT: So you're saying the FCC policy is essentially open to debate, and I don't know what it is?
MR. LADDIN: At best. I mean, that’s correct. ...
Transcript of Oral Argument, April 21, 2011 [Dkt. No. 68], at 71-72. There has been similar confusion regarding the scope of relief requested in Count I. The Court does not understand U.S. Bank or the Noteholders to seek to enforce the lien against the license itself. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Reply at 3 ("[N]o party can take an interest in an FCC license superior to the ‘public’ right held by the FCC itself.”) Accordingly, this Court construes Count I as seeking a declaration that U.S. Bank and the Noteholders are not entitled to obtain any value based upon the lien in the Security Agreement.
. In its decision, the
Ridgely
court took note of an FCC decision in
In re Bill Welch,
3 FCC Red. 6502 (1988), which recognized a licensee’s proprietary interest, however limited, in its license.
Ridgely,
. Notably, Sprint characterizes Ridgely, MLQ, and the decisions in this District that rely upon them — Urban Communicators and Ion Media — as “outmoded and largely inapplicable.” Combined Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff Sprint Nextel Corporation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 58], at 2. This Court disagrees.
. Sprint’s motion papers distinguish between a reorganization and a sale, arguing there would be no proceeds generated for which a purported lien could attach if a reorganization occurred. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Sprint Nextel Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 39], at 21-22. This Court explicitly rejected such a distinction in Ion Media. In any event, such a distinction is now irrelevant given that, subsequent to the filing of Sprint’s motion papers, the debtors conducted a Section 363 sale of their assets which yielded proceeds of $1.375 billion. See Order (A) Approving Asset Purchase Agreement and Authorizing the Sale of Assets of Debtor Outside the Ordinary Course of Business; (B) Authorizing the Sale of Assets Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Interests and Encumbrances; (C) Authorizing the Assumption and Sale and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (D) Granting Related Relief, Case No. 10-15446-SHL, dated July 7, 2011 [Dkt. No. 668], at 1, 9-10.
. The Security Agreement here is notably similar to the agreement in Ion Media:
The plain language of the Transaction Documents specifies that the First Lien Lenders and the Second Lien Lenders expressly contracted in the Transaction Documents for separate security interests in all economic value of the FCC Licenses and in all non-monetary aspects of the FCC Licenses themselves to the extent allowed by law. See Security Agreement at § 2.1(f) (including FCC Licenses in definition of 'Collateral'); § 5.7 (clarifying that the grant of security interest in the FCC Licenses is 'to the extent that a security interest in such licenses is permitted under applicable law’). This grant of a security interest in the economic value of the FCC Licenses is further confirmed by the utilization of special purpose subsidiaries to hold the FCC Licenses, the concomitant pledges of the equity interests in each FCC License Subsidiary by the Debtors to the Secured Parties, and the Intercreditor Agreement’s restrictions on Second Lien Lender actions.
Ion Media,
.
See also Ridgely,
. The Committee asserts that Urban Communicators addressed only "when” a lien may attach to the FCC license, not "whether” a lien may attach. See Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenor-Plaintiff, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of TerreS-tar Networks, Inc., et al. and in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 60], at 9. However, the decision in Urban Communicators addressed "when” a lien may attach by discussing "whether” a lien may attach when an FCC license is pledged as collateral pre-petition.
. Notably, Section 9-408 of the NYUCC "makes ineffective any attempt to restrict the assignment of a general intangible ... in a rule of law, including a statute or governmental rule or regulation.” See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-408, cmt.2.
.Sprint and the Committee argue that the lien must attach to prepetition proceeds and cannot be effective here because no such proceeds exist. See Combined Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff Sprint Nextel Corporation’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motions [Dkt. No. 58], at 13-14; see also Memorandum of Law in Further support of the Motion for Summary Judgment of In-tervenor-Plaintiff, the Official Committee оf Unsecured Creditors of TerreStar Networks, Inc., et al. and in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 60], at 11-12. Their position ignores that the Security Agreement here includes a broad grant in the economic interest of the S-Band License and general intangibles, not simply to proceeds. See Security Agreement § 3.
. Sprint argues that “this is an unusual case, in which an unsecured creditor (Sprint Nex-tel) ... has a direct claim against the special purpose subsidiary [TSL] ... that holds the Debtors' FCC Licenses.... Following Tracy Broadcasting in this case thus should have no chilling effect whatsoever on the financing of FCC licensees as a general matter." Combined Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff Sprint Nextel Corporation’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motions [Dkt. No. 58], at 23. However, the reasoning of Tracy would invalidate liens on FCC licenses generally and not merely those where a special purpose subsidiary has been used.
. At oral argument, Sprint’s counsel asserted the holding of Tracy still allows a debtor to proceed with a prepackage reorganization where — before filing — the parties in interest first agree to transfer the license and then the debtor receives FCC approval for this arrangement. The narrow nature of this hypothetical demonstrates, however, the sеvere limitations on financing that would be imposed if the holding of Tracy were applied to all FCC license holders.
. As the discussion above makes clear, these three decisions are flatly inconsistent with Sprint’s contention that a lien on the value of an FCC license is an impermissible lien on after-acquired property under Section 552(a). But even assuming that Section 552(a)’s prohibition regarding liens on after-acquired property applied, which it does not, the lien would still be valid because it falls within the exception set forth in Section 552(b). Section 552(b) provides that a valid prepetition lien in property can extend to value generated by such property post-petition when expressly provided for in the security agreement. Consistent with this exception, Section 3 of the Security Agreement in this case gives a broad grant in the economic value of the FCC licenses beyond the proceeds to everything except the license itself and, therefore, the lien here is akin to the one found enforceable in
Media Properties. See
Security Agreement § 3;
Media Properties,
. Sprint's obligation to clear the bandwidth existed before the Security Agreement, and Sprint cleared the bandwidth before the Debtors' bankruptcy was filed. Plaintiff Sprint Nextel Corporation’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue to Be Tried [Dkt. No. 40], at ¶¶ 13-14 (Security Agreement dаted February 14, 2007);
Id.
at V 23 (FCC obligated Sprint to relocate BAS incumbents in 2004 Public Safety Order);
Id.
at ¶ 41 (BAS relocation completed on July 15, 2010);
Id.
at ¶ 46 (Debtor filed under Chapter 11 on October 19, 2010). Thus, the factual record here is far different than in the handful of reported cases where parties have successfully invoked the equities of the case doctrine to alter the rights of a secured creditor.
See Toso,
. U.S. Bank argues that Count IV is “nothing more than an equitable subordination claim based upon [Sprint’s] alleged efforts in clearing the bandwidth,” and thus is an equitable claim that is "inappropriate for summary judgment prior to the completion of discovery.” U.S. Bank’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 55], at 29 (citing, inter alia, 11 U.S.C. *274 § 510(c) (providing for equitable subordination)). In response, Sprint categorically denies that Count IV lies in equity: "In fact, and on its face, Count IV ... is an entirely legal cause of action based on a set of facts that is not disputed, and on established principles of UCC and bankruptcy law.” Combined Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff Sprint Nextel Corporation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 58], at 24 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-203(b)(2)). Given Sprint's position, the Court declines to consider Count IV as an equitable subordination claim and construes it as a legal argument premised upon NYUCC Article 9 and Code Section 506.
. As the DBSD Chapter 11 bankruptcy also was ongoing at the time of the 2010 Declaratory Ruling, this Court also presumes that the FCC was aware that the priority of prepetition claims, such as Sprint's reimbursement claim, was the subject of possible dispute. See 2010 Declaratory Ruling, ¶ 29.