Thе appeal here is from the grant of a temporary injunction after the introduction of evidence and argument of counsel for both sides. Appellee has filed in this court a motion to dismiss based on the contention that such a judgment is not an appealable one in the absence of a certificate of immediate review. No such certificate was filed. Appellee’s contention is based on these circumstances: The legislature, in amending Section 1 of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965 by the Act aрproved April 8, 1968 (Ga. L. 1968, p. 1072) inserted a semicolon at the end of subparagraph 2 of paragraph (a) of that section. Ga. L. 1968, p. 1072
(Code Ann.
§ 6-701 (a) (2)). Section 1 (a) of the Appellate Prаctice Act of 1965 defines and enumerates judgments appealable under the provisions of that Act. As originally enacted in 1965 Sec. 1 (a) contained three subparagraphs. Subрaragraph 1 permitted an appeal from a final judgment. Subparagraph 2 permitted an appeal from a judgment which would have been final had it been rendered as contended by the appellant. Subparagraph 3 enumerated 11 separate categories of judgments appealable notwithstanding such judgments are not final, including the granting оr refusing of an application for an interlocutory injunction. All of the matters contained in the three subparagraphs as originally enacted were clearly intended by the legislature to be equal and coordinate subjects, neither of the subparagraphs being dependent one upon the other but dependent on subsection (a), which reads: "Apрeals may be taken to the Supreme Court ... in the following instances”: As originally enacted a semicolon followed subparagraph 1 and a period followed subparagrаph 2 and subparagraph 3. The 1968 Act struck original subparagraph 2 relating to the appealability of judgments which would have been final and substituted therefor a provision permitting an аppeal from any judgment certified within 10 days of its entry by the trial judge for immediate review. As re-enacted, a semi
Disregarding the fact that as enacted by the legislature the three subdivisions of Section 1 (a) of the Appellate Practice Act which we have heretofore referred to as "Sub-paragraphs” are set up in the Acts as separate paragraphs, this contention presents for our consideration the quеstion as to what is the effect of the legislature separating the matter contained in subparagraph 2 and the matter contained in subparagraph 3 by a semicolon. The semicolon is normally employed in marking off a series of sentences or clauses of coordinate value, that is, to separate consecutive phrases or clаuses which are independent of each other grammatically, but dependent alike on some word preceding or following. 79 CJS 1038. McLeod v. Nagle, 48 F2d 189, 191 (CCA9, 1931); In Re Jones’ Estate (Cal. S. Ct., 1961)
The facts upon which the injunction in this case was granted are substantially these: Defendant owned and operated an existing mobile home park located in an area which, subsequent to the establishment of such park, had been zoned for single-family residences, a zoning category excluding mobile home parks. The existing park was lo
The court erred in granting the tеmporary injunction. In the view which we take of this matter, the issues in this case are absolutely controlled by the doctrine of stale demands or laches. The plaintiff had notice of the proposed extension of defendant’s mobile home park on May 27, 1971, when through appropriate employees and officials of the county it issued to the defendаnt a building permit for the purpose of developing such extension. In reliance upon the validity of that permit the defendant proceeded with the construction. The plaintiffs hаd further notice that the defendant was in violation of the ordinance and that the defendant was actively engaged in the development of such extension in the middle of July, but waited another 45 days before taking any action to compel the defendant to stop its work. In the meantime, the record shows, the defendant had substantially, if not wholly, completed the instаllation of streets, underground utilities and other facilities for the development of its land into a mobile home park. The mere informal advice to the defendant by the chairman of the zoning commission on or about the 18th or 19th of July that the defendant was in violation of the zoning ordinance and should make application to have the property rezoned before proceeding was not sufficient to relieve the plaintiff of the consequences of its laches or acquiescence when, as the record shows, the defеndant, through its attorney, gave to the chairman of the planning commission unequivocal notice that it deemed itself to be operating within the law, and had no intention of desisting from its purрose merely because of such advice.
Holt v. Parsons,
Since injunction is the only relief sought by the plaintiff, and since it is plain under the principles announced above and the facts shown by the record, that the plaintiff cannot have that relief, it follows that the trial court erred in granting the temporary injunction.
Judgment reversed.