Springs v. . ScottSprings v. . Scott
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Connor
“1. That it appearing from the plaintiff‘s complaint, and particularly from the will of said Julia B. Springs, that the interest therein devised to Alva C. Springs is for his life only, and that after the death of Alva C. Springs there is a limitation over to his children until they are of age, and if no children or heirs of his body, to his brothers and sisters or their heirs, and it cannot now be known who the heirs are who will be entitled to take upon the death of said Alva C. Springs.
“2. That the heirs of said Alva C. Springs are not made parties to this action, and that the said heirs are necessary parties.
“3. That this court has no jurisdiction to order a sale of the land described in the complaint.”
The court overruled the demurrer and directed a sale of the land. The defendant appealed to the judge, who affirmed the judgment of the clerk
The only question, therefore, is whether, in the absence of any child of the said Alva to represent those next in remainder after his death, the court has the power to order the sale of the land. This would, under the decisions of this Court, present a very serious if not
In Williams v. Hassell, 74 N.C. 434, Reade, J., in discussing the power of the court in such cases, cites Watson v. Watson, supra. He makes no reference to Ex parte Dodd, supra. He notices the dictum in Watson v. Watson, and then draws a distinction between a case in which the remainder is to all the children of the life tenant and one in which the remainder is to such children of his or her as may be living at his death, in which case, in which case, as it cannot be known who will be in the class when the life estate falls in, there can be no one to represent the class. Ex Parte Miller, 90 N.C. 625; Young v. Young, 97 N.C. 132; Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N.C. 570. It will be observed that the petition in that case was for a sale, there being no suggestion of
In Aydlett v. Pendleton, 111 N.C. 28, 32 Am. St., 776, the decision was based upon the ground that some of the parties interested objected to the sale. Shepherd, J., says: “Thus it will be seen that, even according to this construction of a deed, there are future contingent
Without discussing the case of Lipscombe v. Hodges, 128 N.C. 57, it is sufficient to say that the syllabus, “The courts will not decree a sale of land when it is limited in remainder to persons not in esse.” is misleading. That was not the real ground upon which the case was decided. There was no trustee before the court in that case.
In Justice v. Guion, 76 N.C. 442, the land was conveyed to a trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff for life, with remainder to her children who should survive her, to be equally divided between them, with a provision that if either of the children should die before the mother, leaving a child or children, they should represent their
In Smith v. Smith, 118 N.C. 735, it is impossible to tell what the limitations were. It is simply stated that the lands were conveyed to certain persons “in trust for certain individuals therein mentioned, with limitations and contingent interests to numerous other persons therein named.” It does not appear whether the trustees were parties or whether there was any one in esse to represent those first in remainder. The opinion is equally indefinite and does not cite Ex parte Dodd, but does cite Watson v. Watson and Justice v. Guion. The Court overlooked the decision in Overman v. Tate. It must be conceded that these cases are in conflict with the current of authority in this State. It is unfortunate that a question of so great practical interest, involving the security of title to valuable real estate, should be in even apparent conflict.
In Finch v. Finch, 2 Vesey, 491, Lord Hardwicke says: “It is admitted to be necessary to bring the first person in entitled to the remainder and inheritance of the estate, if such is in being. . . . If there is no first son in being, the court must take the facts as they stand. It would be a very good decree, and no son born afterwards could dispute it unless he could show fraud, collusion, or misbehavior in the performance of these trusts.”
We have not discussed these cases for the purpose of overruling them, but to classify and distinguish them, and to show that the language — used in Ex parte Dodd, in respect to the power of the court to
For the same purpose we desire to cite some well-considered cases from other States: In Meade v. Mitchell, 17 N.Y. 210, 72 Am. Dec., 455, the Court says: “In the English Court of Chancery the general rule is that in actions affecting the title of land it is sufficient to bring before the court the person entitled to the first estate of inheritance, with those claiming prior interest, omitting those who might claim in remainder or reversion after such vested estate of inheritance. A decree against the person having the first estate of inheritance would bind those in remainder or reversion although the estate might afterwards vest in possession. . . . I think, therefore, that under the general principles of equity practice, independent of our statute, a decree for partition in this case would be binding as well upon those who are parties
In Baylor v. Dejarnette, 54 Va. 152, the power of the court to order a sale in cases where property was thus fettered with limitations underwent a most exhaustive investigation, and in an able opinion the power was sustained. This case presented the exact question which we have before us.
In Falkner v. Davis, 59 Va. 651, 98 Am. Dec., 698, after a full examination and review of the authorities, both English and American, Moncure, P., says: “It seems to me, therefore, that the case of Baylor v. Dejarnette is a direct, binding authority in favor of the doctrine of representation before referred to and of its application to such a case as this.”
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 40 L.R.A., 776, quoting from Voris v. Sloan, 68 Ill. 588, says: “Exigencies often arise not contemplated by the party creating the trust, and which, had they been anticipated, would undoubtedly have been provided for, when the aid of the court of chancery must be invoked to grant relief imperatively required; and in such cases the court must, as far as may be, occupy the place of the party creating the trust and do with the fund what he would have dictated had he anticipated the emergency. . . . From very necessity, a power must exist somewhere in the community to grant relief in such cases of absolute necessity, and under our system of jurisprudence that power is vested in the court of chancery. . . . The question remaining to be determined is
In Bofile v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. (S.C.), 1, 55 Am. Dec., 627, the same question was before the Court. The Chancellor says: “It is necessary to the best interest of society, as I have before intimated, that there should be power lodged in some judicial tribunal authorized in certain exigencies to unfetter the titles of estates; otherwise, they might be shackled to an inconvenient extent. In England the tenant for life, by suffering fine and recovery in which he alone is a party, may cut off all contingent limitations and remainders. In that county, courts of equity are in the habit under certain contingencies of doing the same thing in respect to the title, but with a more just regard to the rights of the remaindermen; for when that court by a sale divests the title of the contingent remaindermen in the property it preserves them for the fund.” The power of the court of chancery in the State was sustained.
In Ridley v. Holloday, 106 Tenn. 607, 53 L.R.A., 477, 82 Am. St., 902, Beard, J., reviewed the English and American cases upon the subject, and says: “A chancery court has inherently, without the aid and in the absence of any inhibition of statute, jurisdiction and power to bind and conclude by its decree, converting realty into personalty, the rights and interests, whether legal or equitable, vested or contingent, of all persons, whether in esse or in posse and whether sui juris or under disability, who are before the court, either by service of process or by `virtual representation‘; but it must satisfactorily appear that such conversion is for the best interests of all the parties, and the decree must award the several parties the same interests in its proceeds which they enjoyed in the realty, and provide for the protection of the same.” He further says: “We have examined the cases from North Carolina
We might, but for the length of this opinion, cite authorities from almost every State in the Union and from the English Reports showing a uniform current of the best considered judicial opinions upon this very important question. This is important as bearing upon the constitutional question raised by the demurrer in regard to the validity of the act of 1903, the first section of which is as follows: “That in all cases where there is a vested interest in real estate, and a contingent remainder over to persons who are not in being, or when the contingency has not yet happened which will determine who the remaindermen are, there may be a sale of the property by a proceeding in the Superior Court at term-time, which proceeding shall be conducted in the manner pointed out in this act:Provided, that this provision shall
“Where property has been settled by will or deed for life, with limitations over to persons not in being, who are incompetent to exercise a legal judgment, the Legislature may authorize a sale and the reinvestment of the proceeds for the same uses, if such a course will be for the benefit of all concerned or beneficial to some of them and not injurious to the rest.” Hare‘s Am. Const. Law, 816. “Such a sale simply turns the property into another form where it may bear fruit for the first taker, who would otherwise have a barren inheritance and be postponed as regards real and substantial benefits to persons yet unborn. It cannot, however, be properly exercised unless the proceeds can be placed in trust and held securely for the executory devisee or remainderman.” Ibid., 817.
In New York the question has received a careful consideration. In Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N.Y. 245, 252, after declaring that courts of equity have the power to authorize the sale of lands belonging to infantsin esse, the Court proceeds to say: “Doubts were expressed in some of the cases whether this power extended to those not in being who might thereafter be entitled to some estate in the premises. The reason upon which the rule is based as to the former applies with equal force as to the latter. In both there is a want of capacity to manage and preserve
In Soheir v. Hospital, 3 Cush. (57 Mass.), 483, 497, the Court says: “The Legislature authorizes a sale, taking care that the proceeds shall go to the trustees duly appointed in pursuance of the will of Benja Joy, for the use and benefit of those having the life estate and of those having the remainder under the will. This is depriving no one of his property, but is merely changing real into personal estate for the benefit of all parties in interest. This part of the resolve, therefore, is within the scope of the power exercised from the earliest time and repeatedly adjudged to be rightfully exercised by the Legislature. . . It is deemed indispensable that there should be a power in the Legislature
In Pennsylvania, 14 S. and R., Estep v. Hutchman, 29 Pa., 435, Gibson being then Chief Justice, the Court says: “Even in England, an act of Parliament is sometimes necessary to assist the almost
Article XV, sec. 2, of the Constitution provides that, “The General Assembly shall regulate entails in such manner as to prevent perpetuities.” While it is not necessary to hold that this language gives to the Legislature the power to pass either general or special laws destroying entails created before the enactment of such statutes, it would seem that the power is conferred to enact general laws vesting in the courts the power to deal with and regulate the sale of property entailed, to the end that perpetuities may be prevented. This construction of the provision is not only consistent with, but it would seem necessary to effectuate, the policy of the law to prevent entails hampering the sale of property, thus preventing its free alienation and improvement. This has always been recognized and enforced as a fundamental principle of American law. We think, both upon principle and authority, the statute is constitutional and authorizes the sale of real estate conveyed or devised before its enactment.
The importance of this question and the apparently unsettled condition of the law in this State leading to the passage of the act of 1903, we think, justifies the length of this opinion and the citation of the authorities. The act carefully prescribes the procedure, and if the courts shall be diligent to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed with caution in making orders therein, the purpose of the Legislature will be accomplished without doing violence, but rather in accordance with the principles of our jurisprudence and the preservation and protection of
Upon a careful examination of the cases in our own Reports and those of other States, we are of the opinion:
1. That without regard to the act of 1903, the court has the power to order the sale of real estate limited to a tenant for life, with remainder to children or issue, upon failure thereof, over to persons, all or some of whom are not in esse, when one of the class being first in remainder after the expiration of the life estate is in esse and a party to the proceeding to represent the class, and that, upon decree passed, and sale and title made pursuant thereto, the purchaser acquires a perfect title as against all persons in esse or in posse.
2. That when the estate is vested in a trustee to preserve contingent remainders and limitations the court may, upon petition of the life tenant and the trustee, with such of the remaindermen as may be in esse, proceed to order the sale and bind all persons either in esse or in posse.
3. That since
4. That the act is constitutional and applies to estates created prior to its enactment.
Of course, in each of the classes named, the decree must provide for the investment of the fund in such way as the court may deem best for the protection of all persons who have or may have remote or contingent interests.
In the case before us the judgment must be so modified that the Judge of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, in term, shall
The plaintiffs will pay the costs of this Court, to be recovered by them from the commissioner upon the sale of the property in controversy.
Judgment modified and affirmed.
Cited: Hodges v. Lipscomb, 133 N.C. 202; Smith v. Gudger, ib., 627; Settle v. Settle, 141 N.C. 569; Card v. Finch, 142 N.C. 149; Anderson v. Wilkins, ib., 159, 160, 161; McAfee v. Green, 143 N.C. 417; Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 161; In re Herring, 152 N.C. 259;