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Springs v. . Doll
148 S.E. 251
N.C.
1929
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Brogden, J.

Does the principle of res ipsa loquitur аpply to the skidding of an automobile resulting in injury to a passenger?

The principle of res ipsa loquitur has been frequently stated in various decisions of this Court and of other courts, and therefore requires no restatement or elaboration. There are, however, certain well estab- *242 lisbed exceptions or limitations to the application of the rule. The most important of these exceptions or limitations may be classified as follows:

(1) The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instances no injurious operation is to be exрected, unless from a careless construction, inspection or .user; (2) both inspеction and user must ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍have been, at the time of the injury, in the control of the party chаrged; (3) the injurious occurrences must have happened irrespective of аny voluntary action at the time by the party injured. Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 N. C., 60, 50 S. E., 562.

The principle does not apply: (1) when all the facts causing the accident are known and testified to by the witnesses аt the trial, Baldwin v. Smitherman, 171 N. C., 772, 88 S. E., 854; Orr v. Rumbough, 172 N. C., 754, 90 S. E., 911; Enloe v. R. R., 179 N. C., 83, 101 S. E., 556; (2) where more than one inference can he drawn from the evidence as to the cause of the injury, Lamb v. Boyles, 192 N. C., 542, 135 S. E., 464; (3) where the existence of negligent default is not the mоre reasonable probability, and where the proof of the occurrenсe, without more, leaves the matter resting only in conjecture, Dail v. Taylor, 151 N. C., 284, 66 S. E., 135; (4) where it appears that the accident was due to a cause beyond the control of the ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍defendant, such as the act of God or the wrongful or tortious act of a stranger, Heffter v. Northern States Power Co., 217 N. W., 102, 25 A. L. R., 713, note 2; (5) when the instrumentality causing the injury is not under the exclusive control or management of thе defendant, Saunders v. R. R., 185 N. C., 289, 117 S. E., 4; (6) where the injury results from accident as defined and contemplated by law.

In the case at bar it does not appear that there was any defect in the automobile or that it was operated at an excessive rate of spеed or in any other negligent or careless manner. Therefore, the mere skidding of thе automobile, causing it to run upon the embankment and turn over, is the sole basis of the сlaim of the plaintiff.

The general rule is stated in Huddy on Automobiles (7 ed.), sec. 373, as follows: “The mere fact of the skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” This proрosition of law is amply supported by the authorities cited. Thus in Linden v. Miller, 177 N. W., 909, the Court said: “Skidding may occur without fault, and when it does occur it may likewise continue without fault for a considerаble space and time. It means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not really implying negligence. Hence plаintiff’s claim that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present situation is not well foundеd. In order to make the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply, it must be held that skidding itsélf implies negligence. This it dоes not *243 do. It is a well known physical fact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads without fault ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍either on account of the manner of handling the car or on account of its being there.” Williams v. Holbrook, 103 N. E., 633, 5 A. L. R., 1240; 12 A. L. R., 688; Bartlett v. Town Taxi Co., 160 N. E., 797.

It cannot be reasonably contended that the loss of сontrol of an automobile by the driver thereof is, under all circumstances, sufficient evidence of negligence to carry the case to the jury. His control is limited by the сondition of the pavement and by the negligence and unexpected acts and conduct of other drivers of vehicles. Moreover, all the facts are known and testified to by the witnesses, and all sources of information were as accessiblе to the plaintiff as to the defendant.

Indeed, some courts have held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to be used sparingly and to be invoked only when thе facts and the demands of justice make its application essential. Heffter v. Nоrthern States Power Co., supra; Riggsby v. Tritton, 129 S. E., 493.

We do not hold that the principle of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to any given state of facts involving injuries flowing from the use of automobiles, but we do hold that the principle is not applicable to the facts disclosed by this record. Upon admitted or proven fаcts the question ‍‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‍as to whether the principle applies is a question of law for the court in the first instance; but, if upon such facts, the principle is applicablе, the reasonableness of the explanation made by the defendant is for the jury.

No error.

Case Details

Case Name: Springs v. . Doll
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: May 22, 1929
Citation: 148 S.E. 251
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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