304 Mass. 224 | Mass. | 1939
By his will dated January 23, 1933, Chauncey H. Pierce, after providing for the payment of his debts, funeral expenses, the furnishing of markers and lettering on monuments, and for the care of certain cemetery lots by means' of a specific bequest, made five bequests of specific sums and gave the residue of his estate to the petitioner in trust, however, to pay annuities upon certain express conditions to four designated persons. The only other provisions in the will, aside from the naming of the executor, are as follows: “The principal of my estate may be drawn upon
The Probate Court had jurisdiction in equity of the petition. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 215, § 6, as amended by St. 1937, c.. 257. Burroughs v. Wellington, 211 Mass. 494, 496. See School Committee of Winchendon v. Selectmen of Winchendon, 300 Mass. 266. It is a rule of equity practice that where, the evidence is not reported the only questions open upon the appeal are whether the final decree was within the scope of the bill and was supported by the facts found. The findings of fact made by the trial judge must be accepted as true unless the specific facts stated are necessarily inconsistent with the general conclusions reached. Marcus v. Richardson, 299 Mass. 11, 13, and cases cited. With respect to the crucial issue before the court the judge made a finding in the decree itself (see Maguire v. Bliss, ante, 12, 13) that “it was the intention of the testator, as evidenced by his will, that each year after payment of the annuities provided for therein the remaining surplus income should be paid to the Cooley Dickinson Hospital.” The only other finding that he made was as to the amount of surplus income not used for the payment of annuities that had accumulated since the death of the testator. In other words, the sole basis for the judge's determination as to the intention of the testator is to be discovered by an examination of his will. This being so, it is the duty of this court to examine this instrument and interpret it in accordance with its own judgment. As was said in Malden Trust Co. v. Brooks, 291 Mass. 273, at page 279, “And so far as the findings of the probate judge were based on written instruments ... we are in as favorable a position to reach conclusions as was the probate judge and we do so unaffected by his conclusions.” The parties have not
“There is no doubt of the power and duty of the court to decree the termination of a trust, where all its objects and purposes have been accomplished, where the interests under it have all vested, and where all parties beneficially interested desire its termination. Where property is given to certain persons for their benefit, and in such a manner that no other person has or can have any interest in it, they are in effect the absolute owners of it, and it is reasonable and just that they should have the control and disposal of it unless some good cause appears to the contrary.” Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 398. Weeks v. Pierce, 279 Mass. 108, 116. In accordance with this principle the court has terminated trusts where the trustees held upon a simple trust and the plaintiff was the absolute equitable owner of the fund and the income, Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 398; where the intention of the testator in regard to conditions “now existing” did not clearly appear and the trust was terminated in part, Williams v. Thacher, 186 Mass. 293, 300; where two thirds of the income of the trust fund were payable to a theological school, one third was payable to an individual for life and upon her death, on conditions which had been performed, the trustees were to pay the residue to the school, and where the school and the individual had agreed that the principal of the trust fund should be divided into three equal parts, two of which should be conveyed to the school and the other should continue to be held in trust for the individual’s benefit for life, and then go to the school, Welch v. Episcopal Theological School, 189 Mass. 108.
On the other hand, this court has steadfastly adhered to the rule that the intention of the creator of a trust should be respected: where “It was the intention of the testator
The respondent hospital points out that the English rule is different, citing the case of Harbin v. Masterman, [1896] 1 Ch. 351, 362, where it was held that although according to the strict language of the will in question, there was no doubt that there was no jurisdiction in the court to order the residuary estate to be distributed until after the death of the annuitant, nevertheless the court had power to “let the residuary legatees have what is theirs, subject to the setting aside of a sufficient sum for the payment of the annuities.” The court had ordered that a substantial sum in Consols be set apart to pay the annuity, and the court said: “But it is inconceivable that she will not be paid her annuity in full in any case, except the insolvency of the country — and that is a contingency which the Court never contemplates.” This decision was rendered in 1895. See Berry v. Geen, [1937] 1 Ch. 325, 334. In the case of Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, decided in 1841, it was held that wheré a legacy is directed to accumulate for a certain period, or where the payment is postponed, the legatee, if he has an absolute, indivisible interest in the legacy, is not bound to wait until the expiration of that period but may require payment the moment he is competent to give a valid discharge. In Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, the trust provided by the will in question contained a provision that a son should be paid certain sums when he arrived at the ages of twenty-one, twenty-five, and thirty years. When the son became twenty-one years of age he filed a bill to terminate the trust. Field, J., in the opinion referred to the English cases, including Saunders v. Vautier, and said at page 23: “The decision in Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, rests upon the doctrine that a testator has a right to dispose of his own property with such restrictions and limitations, not repugnant to law, as he sees fit, and that his intentions ought to be carried out unless they contravene some positive rule of law, or are against public policy. The rule contended for by the plaintiff in that case was founded upon the same considerations
It follows that the decree of the Probate Court is reversed, and the trustee is instructed that the surplus income, over and above the amount necessary to pay the
Ordered accordingly.