| Ark. | Dec 2, 1899
(after stating the facts.) As the contract of purchase was made by only two directors, and not at a regular meeting, nor at a special meeting upon notice to the third director, it is not binding. School District v. Bennett, 52 Ark. 511" date_filed="1889-11-15" court="Ark." case_name="School District v. Bennett">52 Ark. 511. Likewise the warrants were also invalid. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, the school district was not in an attitude, at the time of filing its complaint, to repudiate the contract and refuse to pay for the desks. The proof shows that the district accepted the desks, and used twenty six of them for about one year, and did not offer to recind the contract and to return the desks until the bringing of this suit. The director Johnson testified that he “never knew anything about a contract having been made for about a week after it ivas done.” The contract was entered upon June 23, 1896. The suit was brought June 30, 1897. The testimony of Johnson shows that he knew the desks had been received, and that a portion of them were being used in the schoolhouse. It is shown, therefore, that all the directors knew of the contract, and that the desks had been received, and were being used, yet no action was had by the board to annul the contract and cancel the warrants for more than a year. Such conduct must be taken as an acquiescence by the school district in the unauthorized contract made by two of its directors; for, all the directors having notice, the district is bound in the same manner and under the same rules as an individual would be bound. The contract was not ultra vires. Johnson, the only director not notified in the beginning, after having notice of what was done, took no steps, so far as this record discloses, to have the board rescind or repudiate the unauthorized act of the other two directors. “If a party calls upon a court of chancery to put forth its extraordinary powers, and grant him purely equitable relief, he may, with propriety, be required to submit to the operation of a rule which always applies in such cases, and do equity in order to get equity.” Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 253.
The school district can not insist upon the relief sought. It has not even proposed to make compensation for the use of the property while in its possession. Nor did the chancellor impose any terms whatever as a condition for granting the relief prayed.
The decree is therefore reversed, and the complaint is dismissed here for want of equity.