616 N.E.2d 983 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
This case involves appeals from judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing both of appellant's R.C.
"The court below erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Ohio Revised Code Section
Appellant, Springfield City School Support Personnel ("SCSSP"), an employee organization seeking to represent certain Springfield City Schools public employees in collective bargaining matters, filed an R.C.
On August 22, 1991, the Teamsters wrote a letter to SERB requesting dismissal of SCSSP's petition because the petition did not comply with Ohio Adm. Code
Nevertheless, SERB construed the Teamster's letter as a motion to dismiss and granted the motion in a "directive" on January 23, 1991. The directive, which was signed by Chairman Owens, Vice Chairman Pottenger, and Board Member Sheehan found that SCSSP's original petition violated Ohio Adm. Code
"You are hereby notified that an appeal may be perfected, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section
On the same day, SERB dismissed SCSSP's second petition for the reason that it was not filed within the "window period" of R.C.
SCSSP filed two notices of appeal to the common pleas court. The first notice of appeal challenged the dismissal of the original petition. It has been assigned appeal number 92AP-739 for purposes of this appeal. The second notice of appeal challenged the dismissal of the second petition. It has been assigned appeal number 92AP-740. We shall decide both appeals in this opinion.
The common pleas court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the foregoing R.C.
SCSSP argues that the common pleas court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the foregoing appeals. First, SCSSP argues that SERB waived the jurisdiction argument by including language in its decisions indicating that there was a right to appeal under R.C.
We reject SCSSP's waiver argument. It is fundamental that subject matter jurisdiction addresses the power of a court to decide an issue. Such power is conferred by the Constitution and legislature, not by individual action. Plainly, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Shawnee Twp. v. Allen *298 Cty. Budget Comm. (1991),
SCSSP's second argument is that the SERB's dismissals here were quasi-judicial acts that could be appealed under R.C.
SERB is an "agency" whose adjudications are subject to R.C.
R.C.
The cases relied upon by the common pleas court which relate to SERB's dismissal of unfair labor practice charges for lack of probable cause hinge on the absence of a determination of a private right for purposes of R.C.
The elections proceedings of R.C.
Given this statutory scheme, it is difficult to understand any argument that SERB has some kind of unfettered discretion to disregard the wishes of the public employees seeking to oust the incumbent union. If SERB had such unfettered discretion, then the R.C.
Having determined that SERB decides private rights in these election matters, we turn next to the issue of whether the decision to dismiss a petition for a representation election on procedural grounds is ministerial in nature.
As this court said in In re Seltzer, supra, at 5, a ministerial act is an act done under a given state of facts in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and which is to be performed without the exercise of individual judgment or discretion. In the present case, SERB's own rules provided that it had discretion to waive technical defects in documents filed with the agency if no undue prejudice resulted. In effect, SERB was applying its construction of its legally binding rules to the petitions at hand and found against SCSSP. SERB dismissed SCSSP's petition just as a court would dismiss a complaint for failure to state a *301 claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). One would hardly characterize a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal of a lawsuit as merely a "ministerial" act and SERB's similar action to like effect should not be viewed in that manner either.6
Moreover, the fact that the dismissal of the original petition was entered without prejudice does not render it any less reviewable under R.C.
SCSSP's assignment of error is well taken. Since the judgments below were rendered on purely jurisdictional grounds, we remand these cases to the trial court for a determination of the merits, if any, of SCSSP's R.C.
For the foregoing reasons, SCSSP's assignment of error is sustained with respect to appeal numbers 92AP-739 and 92AP-740. The judgments of the common pleas court are reversed and the causes are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and in accordance with the law.
Judgments reversedand causes remanded.
JOHN C. YOUNG, P.J., and TYACK, J., concur.
"(A) When a petition is filed, in accordance with rules prescribed by the state employment relations board:
"(1) By any employee or group of employees, or any individual or employee organization acting in their behalf, alleging that at least thirty per cent of the employees in an appropriate unit wish to be represented for collective bargaining by an exclusive representative, or asserting that the designated representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the unit, the board shall investigate the petition, and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice to the parties.
"(2) * * *
"If the board finds upon the record of a hearing that a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election and certify the results thereof."