The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in awarding unemployment benefits to plaintiffs who, though originally laid off for lack of work, subsequently took part in strike-related activities directed against their former еmployer. We affirm.
This action was originally brought by thirty-four former employees of the defendant Eltra Corрoration, doing business as the Converse Rubber Company, Granite State Division (Converse), at a plant located in Berlin, New Hampshire. According to the agreed statement of facts, Converse laid off eаch of the plaintiffs due to lack of work between June 5 and July 6, 1978. After the New Hampshire Department of Emрloyment Security (department) determined that all of the plaintiffs were eligible for unemployment cоmpensation benefits, they began to receive them.
At the time these plaintiffs were laid off, there wаs a collective bargaining agreement in effect between Converse and the United Paperwоrkers International Union, Local #75 (union). By virtue of a union security provision contained therein, each of the plaintiffs had been required to join the union. By its terms, the agreement expired on July 1, 1978. Following a ten-dаy extension, on July 10, 1978, the union began a strike.
On August 1, 1978, the department determined that each of the plaintiffs was nо longer entitled to benefits because there was an
Subsequent to the docketing of this appeal, the department withdrew its appeal as to seven of the plaintiffs. It appears that none of the seven took part in any union activities prior to, or during the pendency of, the strike at the Converse plant. Thе agreed statement of facts, however, indicates that each of the other plaintiffs either attended the union meeting that resulted in the strike vote or took part in the picketing of the Converse facility. The department contends that such activity amounts to participation by these plaintiffs in a labor dispute, rendering them ineligible for benefits under the New Hampshire unemployment compensation lаw, RSA ch. 282. The department rélies on RSA 282:4, which provides that:
“[a]n individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
F. For any week with respect to which the commissionеr finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because оf a labor dispute at the factory ... at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shаll not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner that . . . [h]e is not participating ... in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work ....”
The trial court ruled, however, that RSA 282:4 F was inappliсable to a claimant who had first been laid off due to lack of work, particularly in the absence of any evidence that during the labor dispute he was notified of the renewal of work opportunities. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of RSA 282:4 F.
“The underlying purpose of the unemployment compensation statute is ‘to insure in limited measure against unemployment of individuals regularly attached to the labor market which is not occasioned with their consent or by their
We further note that the trial court’s resolution of this issue accords with the weight of authority. See 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 247 (1977) and cases cited therein. We hold that absent evidence of the availability of work, communicated to the plaintiffs, and of their refusal thereof, the cause of their unemployment remains а lack of work. In the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintiffs’ subsequent participation in strike-related activities was irrelevant.
The department lastly urges that we find that the picketing of the plant by certain of the plaintiffs constitutes prima facie evidence that they were not аvailable for work, as required by RSA 282:3 D (Supp. 1979). See, e.g., Philbrook v. Adams,
Affirmed.