102 Ga. 447 | Ga. | 1897
In this State, receiving stolen goods, knowing the same to have been stolen, is indictable and punishable as an offense separate and distinct from the larceny itself, although the offender’s connection with the latter crime is recognized to be that of “ an accessory after the fact,” and it is provided that he “shall receive the same punishment as would be inflicted on the person convicted of having stolen or feloniously taken the property.” Penal Code, §§171, 172. “The gist of the offense is the felonious knowledge.” O’Connell v. State, 55 Ga. 191, 192. Accordingly, as was held in Minor’s case, supra, the receiver of stolen goods can not be indicted and punished for the offense of simple larceny, notwithstanding he thus aided and abetted the thief. Nor could the latter be indicted under the sections above cited; for the part he would play in the unlawful transaction thereby rendered penal, would be h> “dispose of”—not to “receive”—goods known to have been stolen.
“The authorities are not in accord as to whether an accessory after the fact is or is not an accomplice within the rule that the testimony of an accomplice should be corroborated.” 1 Am. & Eng. Ene. L. (2d ed.) 393. In Lowery v. State, 72 Ga. 649, and in Allen v. State, 74 Ga. 769, this court answered this question in the negative, expressing the view that even though a witness be accessory after the fact, he is not an accomplice within the meaning of our statute (Penal Code, §991) providing that no conviction can be had in any case of felony upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See also State v. Umble, 115 Mo. 452; People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah, 134; State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa, 11; Harris v. State, 7 Lea, 124. The latter case is peculiarly in point; for it was therein held that the receiver of stolen goods is guilty of a substantive offense, and is not the accomplice of the thief within the mean
Judgment affirmed.