Springer v. CommissionerSpringer v. Commissioner
JEROME A. HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Lindsey K. Springer appeals from an order of the Tax Court that dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, his petition seeking a collection due process (CDP) hearing under
The Tax Court‘s decision sets out the procedural history in full, and we repeat only the most salient facts here. By at least 1996, the IRS began its attempts to collect unpaid taxes for tax years 1990-1996 from Mr. Springer. Extensive proceedings have been held, including, but not limited to, a CDP hearing, a Tax Court proceeding, and an appeal to this court, which were all resolved in the Commissioner‘s favor. See Springer v. Comm‘r, 580 F.3d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1907, 176 L.Ed.2d 383 (2010). In August 2008, the IRS mailed another notice of federal tax lien for tax years 1990-1996 to Mr. Springer. In September 2008, Mr. Springer made another request to the IRS‘s Office of Appeals for a CDP hearing for tax years 1990-1996, which was denied as untimely. Because no hearing was held, the Office of Appeals did not issue a notice of determination under
We review the Tax Court‘s factual findings for clear error, but we review its legal conclusions de novo. Estate of Holl v. Comm‘r, 967 F.2d 1437, 1438 (10th Cir. 1992). Whether the Tax Court correctly dismissed a petition for lack of jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact. Anderson v. Comm‘r, 62 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir.1995).
Mr. Springer frames the following four issues in his opening brief on appeal: (1) whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction over his petition; (2) that the Secretary of the Treasury had no lien as a matter of law; (3) that he never received any notice under
“‘The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.‘” Richards v. Comm‘r, 37 F.3d 587, 588 n. 4 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Comm‘r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7, 108 S.Ct. 217, 98 L.Ed.2d 2 (1987)). When a taxpayer seeks a hearing under
Mr. Springer does not dispute that his September 2008 request for a CDP hearing was denied and that no notice of determination was issued. Instead, he argues that the IRS did not mail the August 2008 notice of federal tax lien to his “last known address,” relying on three cases in which the issue was whether the IRS mailed a notice to the taxpayer‘s “last known address.” These cases are inapposite, however, because none of them addressed the jurisdictional issue presented in this appeal. See Armstrong v. Comm‘r, 15 F.3d 970, 973-76 (10th Cir.1994) (affirming Tax Court‘s dismissal of taxpayer‘s petition as untimely because time to file petition ran from mailing of the notice of deficiency and taxpayer failed to show that the Tax Court‘s determination that the address the IRS had used as his last known address for mailing the notice of deficiency was clearly erroneous or that the IRS failed to exercise reasonable diligence in determining taxpayer‘s last known address); Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 663-66 (10th Cir.1985) (reversing grant of summary judgment to IRS in action for injunctive relief by taxpayer and remanding to district court because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the IRS sent a notice of deficiency to his last known address); Benson v. United States, No. CIV. 99-0056 LH/KBM, 2000 WL 506784, at *2-*3 (D.N.M. Mar.20, 2000) (granting IRS‘s motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment in taxpayer‘s federal action seeking injunctive relief against tax collection because taxpayer failed to produce evidence that she provided clear and concise notice of a different address than the IRS used to mail the notice of deficiency). We find no error in the Tax Court‘s decision to dismiss Mr. Springer‘s petition based on the absence of a valid notice of determination.
It is unnecessary to address Mr. Springer‘s other arguments, none of which go to the Tax Court‘s jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.