27 So. 2d 358 | La. | 1946
The plaintiff, Rene A. Spring, has appealed from a judgment rejecting his demand for a divorce.
The plaintiff was married to the defendant, June E. Spring, in the State of New Jersey on August 15, 1931, and subsequently moved to the State of Maine where they resided as husband and wife until they separated on June 7, 1941. They have lived separately and apart since that time. The plaintiff entered the military service of the United States in the State of Maine on June 23, 1942, and has been stationed at Barksdale Field near Shreveport, Louisiana, since the month of May, 1943. Since he has been stationed at Barksdale Field, he has lived in a rooming house in Shreveport, Louisiana. The defendant has never lived in this State.
This suit was brought under the provisions of Section 1 of Act No.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the lower court failed to distinguish the difference between divorces granted under the provisions of the articles of the Civil Code, art. 138 et seq., and those under Act No.
Act No.
From a reading of the record, it appears that the plaintiff testified that he intends to make Shreveport his permanent home. He admits that he has performed no act to indicate such intention and that he did not come to Louisiana of his own free will but by reason of his service.
All of the authorities agree that a person inducted into the military service retains his residence in the state from which he was inducted until he has abandoned it and established a new residence elsewhere. The fact that one lives in a state under military compulsion in the absence of any act showing an intention to establish a residence cannot be held to satisfy the factual requirements for a residence of choice. The mere secret intention to establish a residence is not sufficient under the circumstances. We are not unaware of the fact that a voluntary living at a place is a circumstance tending to prove residence, but this rule would not apply with respect to a person in the armed services. There is nothing in the record to show the plaintiff expressed any intention, or did any act, indicating that he had abandoned his residence in Maine and had established one in this State, except his statement, on the trial of the cause, that he intended to make Shreveport his home. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff cannot be considered a bona fide resident *581
of Louisiana or domiciled therein. The jurisprudence of this State and various other states support this view. Stoker v. Leavenworth,
For the reasons assigned, the judgment is affirmed at appellant's cost.