91 So. 793 | Ala. | 1921
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff (appellant) sued defendant in statutory ejectment for the recovery of 11.62 acres of land described by metes and bounds as follows:
"Beginning at a stake twenty-eight and forty-hundredths (28.40) chains north of the southeast corner of section thirty (30), township five (5) south, range one (1) west, on section line; thence south," etc.
Further the land was described in plaintiff's declaration as "being a strip of land off the north and of that certain tract of land conveyed to Mourning T. Hembee by deed of J. H. J. Williams," etc., wherein the land conveyed (by Williams) was described as "the upper one-half of the tract purchased of John M. Crowder," etc. Afterwards the plaintiff amended the complaint by striking out the words "the same being a strip of land off the north end," etc., and "the upper one-half of the tract purchased of John M. Crowder," etc. The court directed a verdict for defendant.
It was very clearly made to appear in the trial court, as the record here discloses, that the parties traced their paper titles back to a common source, viz.: J. H. J. Williams. In such case it is sufficient to prove a title derived from the common source without proving an anterior title, as neither party can deny such title. 5 Michie, Dig. p. 271, where cases from Pollard v. Cocke,
This case appears to have been tried by defendant in the trial court, and by the court, upon the theory that, if the land in suit was situated in the mathematical and geographical north half of the tract conveyed by J. H. J. Williams to Arthur Williams, from whom plaintiff derived paper title to the south half of the same tract, then *696
plaintiff could not recover. This theory of the case overlooks plaintiff's claim of title by adverse possession prior to the possession of defendant, which plaintiff offered to show in evidence. Furthermore, plaintiff offered to show that about the time of the execution of the deed from J. H. J. Williams to Arthur Williams and to Mrs. Hembee, under the latter of whom defendant claimed — these two conveyances were evidenced by one deed — and inferably with a view to the execution of the deed, or to mark the line by which the grantor's deed had already divided between Arthur Williams and Mrs. Hembee, his children, a surveyor located the line between the south half and the north half of the tract as being at an old road, and either the surveyor or Arthur Williams set up a stone to mark the location of the line so determined. Mrs. Hembee was not present at the location of this line, but the evidence afforded an inference that her husband, who was there, acted in her behalf, and that subsequently and for many years she, or her tenants on one hand, and plaintiff or his tenants and predecessors in title on the other, cultivated the land on their respective sides and exercised other acts of ownership up to the line so laid down. This state of the case required the admission of the evidence offered by plaintiff to show the interpretation put upon the deed by the parties in interest and to show a title to the land in suit by adverse possession in plaintiff. Brown v. Cockerell,
The docket shows a submission of this cause "on motion and on merits." There are two motions shown by a paper writing in the file: One, to dismiss the appeal for that the judgment appealed from was rendered more than six months before appeal taken (Acts 1919, p. 84); the other, to affirm for the reason that the transcript was not filed with the clerk of this court within 60 days after the signing of the bill of exceptions. Id. It does not appear, however, that either motion was filed with the clerk. Neither was spread upon the motion docket. Assuming, with reservation, that these motions are before the court, they are overruled. As to the first mentioned it may be noted that the appeal was taken more than six months after judgment on the verdict; but there was a motion for a new trial raising the same questions that had been raised at the trial (Florence Co. v. Field,
Reversed and remanded.
All the Justices concur, except ANDERSON, C. J., who dissents from the ruling on the motion to dismiss the appeal because not taken within six months of the ruling on the motion for a new trial.
Addendum
In their brief on rehearing attorneys for appellee contend that the last clause of section 2830 of the Code, viz., "Nor [shall this section be construed as applying] to cases involving a question as to boundaries between coterminous owners," was intended to mean that the preceding provisions of the section, viz., "adverse possession cannot confer or defeat title to land unless the party setting it up shall show that a deed or other color of title purporting to convey title to him has been duly recorded," etc., and several other alternatives therein mentioned — that the concluding clause, quoted above, was intended to apply where a "case" or "lawsuit" is being tried under section 3843 of the Code. In section 3843 of the Code it is provided that —
"The defendant may, * * * in an action in the nature of ejectment, disclaim possession of the premises sued for, in whole or in part. * * * The defendant in his disclaimer may suggest to the court that the suit arises over a disputed boundary line, and thereupon the court shall make up and * * * submit to the jury the question of the true location of the line," etc.
It is plain on this language of the Code that the defendant only may make the suggestion, and it would seem to be equally clear that, unless the defendant does elect to make the suggestion, the cause must be tried as causes in ejectment in general are tried, that is, upon the question of title. Also, it is held by this court that, when such disclaimer and suggestion are made, the issue between the parties is not one of title. Section 2830 prescribes how and on what conditions title may be acquired by adverse possession. It takes ten years in any circumstances to perfect a title by adverse possession, and the possession during the entire *697 time must be evidenced as prescribed except in the conditions prescribed. Appellee's contention then comes to this: Section 2830 prescribes the conditions in which title may be acquired by adverse possession, but whether title has been so acquired depends upon the defendant's election when an action to recover title comes on to be tried. Of course, the Legislature had no such intention, nor does the language used give the slightest intimation of such intention. Appellee's contention, to state its effect in different language, is that by the concluding clause of section 2830 of the Code evidence of adverse possession is to be excluded in cases in which a suggestion is made as provided in section 3843 of the Code, which suggestion comes to this, that the clause was intended to exclude evidence of title in cases in which title cannot be litigated. Of course, the Legislature did not so intend.
Counsel for appellee inquires what the court expects to do with the decisions in Jeffrys v. Jeffrys,
Application overruled.
All the Justices concur, except ANDERSON, C. J., and McCLELLAN, J., who dissent.
ANDERSON, C. J., and McCLELLAN, J. (dissenting on the merits) entertain the opinion that the application for rehearing should be granted and an order of affirmance should be entered.
The action is statutory ejectment, to recover 11.62 acres of land, and was instituted by the appellant against appellee. At the conclusion of plaintiff's (appellant's) evidence, the court practically directed a verdict for the defendant — an action entirely justified by the failure of the plaintiff (appellant) to discharge his burden to show, at least prima facie, a right to recover. In ejectment, a plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own right, as distinguished from the weakness of his adversary's. Carpenter v. Joiner,
The plaintiff (appellant) offered a deed from J. H. J. and Susan A. Williams purporting to convey several different acreages to their respective children and a grandchild. One of these was a son, J. Arthur Williams, back to whom plaintiff undertook to trace his title. On defendant's objection, the feature of the deed purporting to convey a separate tract or parcel to Mrs. Hembee was excluded, the plaintiff (appellant) stating, in response to inquiries, that he did not claim through Mrs. Hembee, but through J. Arthur Williams. To this ruling plaintiff (appellant) took no exception, and does not on this appeal question this ruling of the court. Hence it must be accepted, for the purposes of this review, that the Hembee feature of the deed, from J. H. J. and Susan A. Williams, was not in evidence. The pronouncement in the majority opinion that these parties were shown to trace or did trace "their paper titles back to a common source, viz., J. H. J. Williams," is not justified by this record. The defendant offered no evidence. There was no admission for defendant that he traced his paper title back to J. H. J. Williams as the common source of title. There was no evidence of the source or claim of source of defendant's title. To invoke, in a plaintiff's behalf, the rule of law consequent upon claim of title by both parties from a common source, either there must be an admission of that fact or the plaintiff must establish it by proof. Butt v. Mastin,
"Counsel for plaintiff then said at the commencement of the case he stated both sides claimed title from the same source. Counsel for defendant claimed he had more [made] no agreement that such was the fact, but had objected to plaintiff's alleged title."
The trial court's definition of the only issue in the cause under the evidence concluded to like effect, viz., that there was neither admission nor evidence showing defendant's claim of title from J. H. J. Williams or Susan A. Williams. The court correctly thus defined the issue: "* * * The issue now in this case is whether this land is in the lower half" of the tract mentioned in the conveyance to J. Arthur Williams.
In excluding plaintiff's proffered evidence of adverse possession, the court had and applied the sound authority of Jeffrys v. Jeffrys,