FAYE SPRACKLIN, APPELLANT, V. GORDON E. SPRACKLIN, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF EUGENE G. SPRACKLIN, APPELLEE.
No. A-12-834
Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
September 10, 2013
21 Neb. App. 271
Inbody, Chief Judge, and Irwin and Moore, Judges. Irwin, Judge.
___ N.W.2d ___
Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. - Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue of material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
- Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
- Motor Vehicles: Words and Phrases. The term “affinity,” as it is used in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,237 (Reissue 2008), is defined as the relationship which arises as a result of the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the other. - Motor Vehicles. Pursuant to the language of
Neb Rev. Stat. § 25-21,237 (Reissue 2008), a driver who is the father-in-law of his passenger is related to the passenger within the second degree of affinity. - Statutes. In construing the meaning of a statute, a court must examine the statutory section as a whole, rather than focusing on individual, separate parts of the statute.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: KIMBERLY MILLER PANKONIN, Judge. Affirmed.
Ralph E. Peppard, of Peppard Law Office, for appellant.
Thomas A. Grennan and Abbie M. Schurman, of Gross & Welch, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
INBODY, Chief Judge, and IRWIN and MOORE, Judges.
IRWIN, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Faye Spracklin appeals an order of the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, granting summary judgment to Gordon E. Spracklin, the personal representative of the estate
II. BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are undisputed. On September 15, 2009, Faye was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Eugene when the vehicle was involved in an accident. Faye suffered injuries in the automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Faye was married to Gordon, Eugene‘s son, and as a result, Eugene was Faye‘s father-in-law. Eugene is now deceased.
On May 1, 2012, Faye filed a complaint in district court. In the complaint, Faye alleged that Eugene was careless, reckless, and negligent in his operation of the vehicle on September 15, 2009, and that he was responsible for the accident which occurred. Faye also alleged that she suffered “permanent injuries” as a result of the accident. Faye asked that the district court order Gordon, as the personal representative of Eugene‘s estate, to compensate her for her medical expenses, her lost wages, and her permanent disability.
Gordon filed an answer to Faye‘s complaint on June 11, 2012. In his answer, Gordon admitted that Faye and Eugene were involved in an automobile accident on September 15, 2009, but denied that Eugene was careless, reckless, or negligent and denied that Eugene was responsible for the accident. Gordon also provided “affirmative defenses” to Faye‘s claims. Gordon alleged that Faye‘s claim was “barred by operation of the Nebraska Guest Statute” and that as result of the guest statute, Faye had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Subsequently, Faye filed a motion for partial summary judgment and Gordon filed a motion for summary judgment. Both parties’ motions asked the district court to determine whether the Motor Vehicle Guest Statute,
Section
The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for any damages to any passenger or person related to such owner or operator as spouse or within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity who is riding in such motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire, unless such damage is caused by (1) the driver of such motor vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or (2) the gross negligence of the owner or operator in the operation of such motor vehicle.
For the purpose of this section, the term guest is hereby defined as being a person who accepts a ride in any motor vehicle without giving compensation therefor but shall not be construed to apply to or include any such passenger . . . as a prospective purchaser. Relationship by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree shall include parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren, and brothers and sisters. Should the marriage of the driver or owner be terminated by death or dissolution, the affinal relationship with the blood kindred of his or her spouse shall be deemed to continue.
In August 2012, a hearing was held on the parties’ motions for summary judgment and, thus, on the applicability of
After the hearing, the district court entered an order finding that Faye was “related to” Eugene pursuant to
Faye appeals from the district court‘s order.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Faye alleges that the district court erred in granting Gordon‘s motion for summary judgment and in denying her motion for partial summary judgment. The basis for Faye‘s assignments of error is her assertion that the district court incorrectly interpreted
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 312, 647 N.W.2d 85 (2002). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue
[3] Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. State ex rel. City of Elkhorn v. Haney, 252 Neb. 788, 566 N.W.2d 771 (1997).
V. ANALYSIS
The only question presented by this appeal is whether, pursuant to the language of
Faye and Eugene were connected by virtue of Faye‘s marriage to Gordon, Eugene‘s son. To be more specific, Eugene was Faye‘s father-in-law and, along those same lines, Faye was Eugene‘s daughter-in-law. It is clear, then, that Faye and Eugene were not related as spouses or within the second degree of consanguinity, as they were not blood relatives. As such, in order for Faye and Eugene to have been related pursuant to the language of
The Nebraska Supreme Court and this court have previously defined affinity as it relates to other statutory provisions. In Zimmerer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 Neb. 351, 34 N.W.2d 750 (1948), the Supreme Court defined affinity as it was used in
Similarly, in State v. Vidales, 6 Neb. App. 163, 571 N.W.2d 117 (1997), this court discussed the term “affinity” as it is used in
A judge shall be disqualified from acting as such in the county court, district court, Court of Appeals, or Supreme Court, except by mutual consent of the parties . . . in the following situations:
(1) In any case in which (a) he or she is a party or interested, (b) he or she is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree, (c) any attorney in any cause pending in the county court or district court is related to the judge in the degree of parent, child, sibling, or in-law or is the copartner of an attorney related to the judge in the degree of parent, child, or sibling . . . .
In State v. Vidales, we noted that affinity is a relationship created by marriage. In addition, we concluded that the terms “‘in-laws‘” and “‘affinity‘” are essentially interchangeable. Id. at 170, 571 N.W.2d at 122.
[4] The term “affinity” has never been specifically defined as it was used in
[5] Applying this definition of affinity to the facts of this case, we conclude that Faye was related to Eugene “within the second degree of . . . affinity” pursuant to
On appeal, Faye agrees that affinity is defined as the relationship which arises as the result of the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the other. However, she disagrees that Eugene is related to her by affinity. Specifically, she argues that “[t]o be related to the driver by affinity she would have to be a blood relative of the spouse of the driver” and she is not. Brief for appellant at 7. Faye‘s argument is without merit.
Faye‘s understanding of the relationship between one spouse and the blood relations of the other spouse is too narrow. Faye argues that a relationship of affinity exists only as to the spouse and not as to the blood relatives of the other spouse. To put this more simply, Faye argues that although she was related to Eugene by affinity because he is a blood relative of her spouse, Eugene was not related to her by affinity because he was related as such to only his spouse‘s blood relatives. Faye‘s argument fails, however, because when a relationship is created by marriage, or by affinity, the relationship exists between the blood relative of one spouse and the other spouse. Faye and Eugene were related by virtue of Faye‘s marriage to Gordon, Eugene‘s son. Together, they possessed a relationship by affinity, and, pursuant to
On appeal, Faye also asserts that the specific language of
Section
Specifically, Faye focuses on the language in
[6] In construing the meaning of a statute, a court must examine the statutory section as a whole, rather than focusing on individual, separate parts of the statute. See In re Application of Rozgall, 147 Neb. 260, 23 N.W.2d 85 (1946). In fact,
[I]t is a cardinal rule of construction of statutes that effect must be given, if possible, to the whole statute and every part thereof [and] it is the duty of the court, so far as
practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible.
Id. at 264, 23 N.W.2d at 89. See, also, State v. Donner, 13 Neb. App. 85, 87, 690 N.W.2d 181, 184 (2004) (“[i]n reading a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense“).
When we read
Additionally, we note that in
Based on our review, we conclude that Faye and Eugene were related within the second degree of affinity. As a result of Faye‘s marriage to Gordon, Eugene‘s son, Eugene was Faye‘s father-in-law and the two were related within the second degree of affinity pursuant to the language of
VI. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to
AFFIRMED.