142 Iowa 446 | Iowa | 1909
Hannah Hendershott died in April, 1904. She had never been married, and she left surviving her collateral heirs only. On January 22, 1898, when seventy-one- years of age, she executed the will involved in this controversy. On that date her sister, Mrs. Dunloff, was living in the State of Ohio. This sister had been a helpless invalid for many years, and had been cared for in the home of her daughter, Lydia Spiers, the proponent herein. - The testatrix devised her entire estate, consisting of about $7,000, to the use of her invalid sister and the daughter. On February 23, 1898, the deceased executed another will, and entered into a contract with one Calvin Gruwell whereby she agreed in substance to devise her entire estate to him in consideration of care and support during the remainder of her life. On October 13, 1898, she executed a revocation of all wills theretofore made. In November, 1898, a guardian was appointed for her by the district court of Cedar County, and he instituted litigation on behalf of his ward to set aside the contract with Gru-" well. After the death of the testatrix', the will of February 23, 1898, was offered for probate, but its probate was successfully contested. Thereupon the proponent presented for probate the will now under consideration. The contestants resisted the probate on the alleged ground of undue influence and mental unsoundness, and that the will
The testimony on behalf of the contestants tended to show that the testatrix began to fail bodily and mentally some time prior to January, 1898; that her disease was senile dementia; that it was progressive, and that she constantly grew worse up to the time of her death. The testimony on behalf of proponents tended to show that prior to January, 1898, she had lost some of her former vigor, bodily and mental, but that she was fully competent on January 22, 1898, to make a will, and that she did make it in accordance with a previous purpose of long standing. It tends also to show that after this date, and especially in the summer of 1898, she failed mentally to a marked degree, and that in October of that year she was mentally unsound. We will consider the errors specified by the appellants in their order in the presentation of argument, as near as may be.
It is further urged that no time was fixed. The question indicates a reference to a previous question which is not set forth in the abstract. We think the answer fairly indicates a reference to “that time” the will. as the time of making
It is also urged that the answer was a mere conclusion
Neither contention can be sustained. The real contest in the case was over the question of fact, whether the mental disability of the testatrix had progressed to such a stage on January 22d that she was incapable of making an intelligent and valid will. The evidence was in conflict on that question. There'was sufficient support in the evidence .for a verdict either for or against the validity of the •will, so far as the mental' capacity of the testatrix was
Contestants put in evidence the record of the proceedings for the appointment of a permanent guardian. These proceedings were commenced about the time the revocation was executed. The final order was entered therein in November of the same year. The probative force of these proceedings necessarily bore more heavily upon the execution of the revocation in October than upon the execution of the will in the January previous. The evidence abundantly justified a finding of a material difference in the mental condition of the testatrix'in October, as compared with January. We can not say, therefore, that the verdict is without support in the evidence, nor that any inconsistency is involved in finding the will valid and the revocation invalid.
We do ncrt overlook the argument of appellants that they never pleaded that the testatrix was of unsound mind at the time she executed the revocation; but that, on the contrary, they pleaded the revocation as a valid instrument. However, the whole tendency of their evidence was that the mental condition of testatrix was bad in January and still worse in October.
The foregoing covers the principal points urged by the appellants as grounds for' reversal. Other and minor errors are argued. What we have already said is decisive of all questions presented, and we will not pursue the argument in further detail. The fighting ground of the case was in the field of fact, and we find nothing in the record which would justify us in interfering with the verdict of the jury.
The judgment below must therefore be affirmed.