Lead Opinion
The central question presented by this appeal is the constitutionality of the gift enterprise statutes (sections 553.15 to 553.18, Code, 19'50) as applied to plaintiff’s trading stamp business. Section 553.15, Code, 1950, prohibits all “gift enterprises, as hereinafter defined” and section 553.16, Code, 1950, defines the term “gift enterprise” in one of the longest sentences in the Code, filled with abundant legal phraseology, to mean a scheme whereby a seller of merchandise would issue trading stamps to purchasers redeemable by someone other than the seller.
There is a short argument in appellee’s brief that its operation was not a gift enterprise because its operation does not involve a gift, but rather a fixed obligation incurred in advance of tbe delivery of merchandise to the stamp saver. There is no merit in tbe argument. Tbe legislature chose to cast its prohibition in tbe form of a definition statute by calling something a gift which in common understanding would not be a gift, but this is a proper and not uncommon way to legislate a prohibition and tbe statutory definition is controlling. Tbe trial court held
A statement of the facts appearing in the evidence is necessary to an understanding of the contentions made. Both parties called a number of witnesses and introduced many exhibits. Officers and employees of the plaintiff-corporation and many of its licensees testified as to the general methods and extent of the company’s operations. Plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, is authorized to do business in Iowa, and in forty-six other states, and is presently doing business in forty-two states. It has done business in Iowa since 1909' and now has license contracts with more than a thousand retail merchants located in seventy-nine counties in this state.
Mechanically, plaintiff’s plan works as follows: Plaintiff enters into a license agreement with retailers authorizing them to use its “Co-operative Cash Discount System.” Plaintiff furnishes the licensee with S & H Green Trading Stamps at the rate of $14 or $15 for a pad of 5000 stamps and the licensee issues stamps to his customers at the rate of one stamp for each ten cents paid in cash or before the 15th of the next month after a retail purchase. The retail purchaser pastes the stamps in a book provided by plaintiff, and when the book is filled (1200 stamps) he takes it or sends it to one of plaintiff’s redemption stations and exchanges it for merchandise. The evidence shows the merchandise in the redemption station is given an average retail price in terms of stamps, to give an average redemption value of $2.50 to a stamp book. Plaintiff furnishes its licensees with advertising material which they can use to show they use its plan, and catalogs which contain pictures and descriptions of merchandise for which the stamps can be redeemed, to be distri buted without charge to the licensee’s customers. Plaintiff has ten redemption stations in Iowa and three more were in the process of construction at the time of trial.
It was plaintiff’s theory developed by its evidence that its plan was in practice a method of giving the familiar discount of
The record shows plaintiff usually licenses merchants within specified areas (about 5 blocks) engaged in different types of businesses but there are four or five other stamp companies doing business similar to, and presumably in competition with, plaintiff iu this state. One such company, the Gold Bond Stamp Company, has filed an amicus curiae brief on the side of the appellee in this case.
The evidence introduced by defendants was mainly directed to show plaintiff’s system was not a “discount for cash” plan. Retailers testified as to the normal net profit in a cash business said to be about 2% in the food business, and the system therefore results in increasing the cost to the consumer, for the licensee who, prior to licensing was doing a strictly cash business in competition with other cash businesses, must increase his sale price to cover the cost of the stamps. In general it can be said defendants’ evidence was designed to show, and did show, beyond a
I. The trial court held the system was a cash discount plan. There is much support for this holding. In Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Garfield,
In Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hudson,
In Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts,
Many more cases could be cited but the above are typical of the statements contained in numerous opinions. Perhaps the question of whether the system is or is not a discount for cash plan is a little academic. We recognize the legislature could prohibit any plan inimical to public welfare no matter what the plan is called. The argument, that it is in effect a cash discount plan is an argument against the law’s constitutionality because it prohibits a common practice among merchants advantageous to all concerned. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, supra.
The defendants argue it is not a cash discount plan because many licensees did an all-cash business, and therefore it could not be said the plan induced customers to pay cash rather than buy on credit. If the plan is a cash discount plan to merchants who did a cash and credit business it would not lose its character because the licensee did an all-cash business. As stated in Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Garfield, supra, where this same argument was advanced: “* * * the fact that the appellant conducts his business on an all-cash basis does not preclude him from giving a cash discount.” (
II. It is admitted here, and universally held, that the legislature’s authority to enact antitrading stamp laws is to be referred to what is commonly called the police power: the power of the legislature to enact regulations essential to the public safety, health and welfare. Courts do not attempt to define the limits of police power but the inquiry is whether the legislation bears some substantial relation to the object of public or general welfare. If it does not then it is a clear infringement of rights secured by fundamental law, but there is a presumption that the
During the past half century many states have enacted laws similar to our gift enterprise statutes. We will not discuss all of the eases where plaintiff, or other stamp companies doing a similar business, have assailed the gift enterprise statutes as unconstitutional, but our study of the cases convinces us that the overwhelming weight of authority is that such statutes as ours are unconstitutional as not being within the sphere of police power.
Our gift enterprise statutes were passed in 1909 and plaintiff was doing business here then. In October 1910 one of plaintiff’s licensees was prosecuted under the gift enterprise statute in Wapello County District Court. In granting a directed verdict to the defendant at the close of the state’s ease, District Judge Eichelberger filed a written opinion holding the gift enterprise statutes unconstitutional. In this opinion Judge Eichelberger stated: “I base my decision largely on the well considered case of State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
The state did not appeal this case and plaintiff and its several competitors continued to do business in this state until 1938 when prosecutions under the gift enterprise statutes were commenced against plaintiff’s licensees .in Webster County. Plaintiff sought, in the District Court of Webster County, and obtained, an injunction against the prosecutions of its licensees and again the decision was not appealed. So the case is one of first impression in this court but we deem it somewhat significant that for more than 45 years plaintiff has violated this statute and the officials charged with its enforcement have not interfered, except on the occasions mentioned. There is little doubt the officials accepted the district court decisions as correct and this is not surprising in view of the flood of authority in the decisions of other appellate courts to support such holdings.
III. The courts have quite generally held that antitrading stamp legislation is unconstitutional as not a proper exercise of
In the above eases the decisions are generally based upon the broad ground that antitrading stamp laws constitute unnecessary restrictions on the right of contract; unwarranted interference with a natural right to attract custom; prohibit contractual relations which do not affect the public health or morals or welfare; and are not the proper exercise of police powers. The opinions in the cases cited above contain the citations to earlier cases on the same subject.
The defendants rely upon Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co.,
A reading of the cases first cited in this division will show that the majority of state court opinions since the East case refuse to follow the reasoning of the federal cases. See particularly People v. Victor and Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, both supra.
In Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co.,
In our judgment the great weight of authority and the better reasoning supports the view that legislation which practically prohibits the use of trading stamps is not a constitutional exercise of the police power. But, for the purpose of this case we need not decide whether the legislature is without power constitutionally to prohibit the issuance and use of trading stamps.
IV. Section 6, Article I, of the Constitution of the State of Iowa provides: “All laws of a general nature shall have a
We said in State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling,
Our gift enterprise statutes do not prohibit or interfere with the use of trading stamps generally. They only attempt to do so with such as are not furnished and redeemed by the merchant issuing them. Even if we assume antitrading stamp legislation can be sustained under police powers, to protect public morals and promote general welfare, how can it be said there is any basis at all for classification in the use of trading stamps between merchants who furnish and redeem their own and those who obtain their stamps from another who agrees to redeem them? One of the merchants in this case testified he furnished and redeemed his own trading stamps for about ten years and then changed to plaintiff’s stamps as he “was looking for something that would be * * * cheaper and easier to handle.” After the change to a licensee of plaintiff he noticed it was more “at
The opportunity for coercion that the stamp company system is able to exert is about the same form of coercion followed by business houses generally. It is not unlike the coercion exercised by a wholesaler seeking to get a retailer to handle his line on the ground that a competitor of his is handling the same line. This record shows no one stamp company enjoys a monopoly. Plaintiff may be the largest and most publicized today but it has competitors. One of the merchants here testified his decision to adopt the S & H plan “may be compared to a decision to purchase a line of canned goods, or a line of frozen foods, or other identifiable brands of other merchandise or sendee, that the S & H plan
A bare inspection of the gift enterprise statutes shows the classification that singles out the stamp company plan for prohibition has only arbitrary relation to any conceivable purpose of the legislation. Indeed it would seem the public welfare would be better served by a company plan with wide acceptance in many states — especially in the filling station business where there is much tourist trade — over an issuing and redeeming merchant plan.
The great weight of authority is against the validity of such statutes, under the equality provisions of Constitutions. The general rule stated in 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, section 511h, page 1027, is: “Equal protection of the laws is denied by statutes forbidding the use of trading stamps or the issuance thereof except by manufacturers or merchants redeeming them * * *.”
In State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77, 85,
In People ex rel. Madden v. Dyeker,
A later New York decision, People ex rel. Appel v. Zimmer
In State v. Dodge,
In In re Opinion of the Justices,
In People ex rel. Attorney General v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
In State v. Holtgreve,
Many more cases to the same effect could be cited and most all of the opinions we quote from above contain the citations to many other opinions of similar import. As against all of the authorities cited the defendants cite two cases, State v. J. M. Seney Co.,
“It must be conceded, however, that in the decision of State v. Wilson, supra, the Bupreme Court of Kansas holds that the Legislature is authorized to classify the use of trading stamps so as to prohibit the use of the company’s trading stamps while permitting the use of all stamps that are issued and redeemed by the merchants issuing them. The decision is, however, contrary to practically every other decision upon the subject, and does not commend itself to our judgment. If that decision be followed to its logical conclusion, then there would be, there could be, no difference or distinction, however trivial, that would not be a sufficient basis for legislative classification. Under such a holding the constitutional provision requiring that all laws shall be given uniform operation whenever possible would be completely ignored by the courts, and the Legislature might disregard it with impunity.”
Of course it is always presumed that all Acts of the legislature are passed in utmost good faith and also that they are conformable to the Constitution. And it is not until the unconstitutionality of a given Act is plainly made to appear that the Court is called upon to declare it void. But after indulging every possible presumption and intendment in favor of the validity of a statute, and being unable to find that it can be sustained as a constitutional exercise of legislative power, it becomes the duty of the court to declare it void. Our obligation not to interfere with the legislature’s right to pass laws is no higher than our obligation to protect the citizens from discriminatory class legislation violative of the constitutional guaranty of equality of all before the law. If the use of trading stamps is inimical to public welfare, and it is proper to regulate or prohibit their use, then there should be no exceptions if the constitutional command of “uniform operation” is to be observed.
We are constrained to agree with the learned trial court, as well as with the majority of the courts of the' country, and hold the classification made in the gift enterprise statutes is clearly
Notes
553.16 “ ‘Gift enterprise’ defined. Whenever two or more persons enter into any contract arrangement or scheme, whereby for the purpose of inducing the public to purchase merchandise or other property of one of the parties to said scheme, any other party thereto, for a valuable consideration and as a part of such scheme, advertises and induces or attempts to induce the public to believe that he will give gifts, premiums, or prizes to persons purchasing such merchandise or other property of such party to said scheme, and that stamps or tickets will be given by the seller in connection with such sales entitling the purchaser of such property to receive such prizes or gifts from any other party to such scheme, the parties so undertaking and carrying out such scheme shall be deemed to be engaged in a ‘gift enterprise’, unless the articles or things so promised to be given as gifts or premiums with or on account of such purchases, shall be definitely described on such stamp or ticket and the character and value of such promised prize or gift fully made known to the purchaser of such merchandise or other property at the time of the sale thereof, and unless the right of the holder of such stamp or ticket to the gift or premium so promised becomes absolute upon the completion upon the delivery thereof without the holder being required to collect any specified number of other similar stamps or tickets and to present them for redemption together, and the right of the holder of such stamp or ticket to the prize or gift so offered is absolute, and does not depend on any chance, uncertainty, or contingency whatever.”
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
I. The majority refers to “the flood of authority” it says supports its view that Code sections 553.15 to 553.18 are not within the sphere of the police power and therefore violate due process of law. A dozen cases are cited at the beginning of its Division III as so holding. Many of the decisions cited for this and other propositions are not authority therefor.
For example, the latest of the dozen citations is Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N. J. 203,
Another of the majority’s citations, to which particular attention is directed, People v. Victor,
The other case the majority particularly commends in its Division III is Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride,
Although the majority seems to feel plaintiff’s plan is simply a cash discount system and our statute is an improper exercise of the police power in violation of due process, its decision is confined to the point that the law violates the equality and uniformity provision (section 6, Article I) of the Iowa Constitution and presumably the equal protection clause (section 1, 14th Amendment) to the United States Constitution. Seven decisions of many said to be to the same effect are cited in the majority’s Division IV to support this holding.
Two of these decisions, State v. Dalton (1900), 22 R. I. 77,
Further, State v. Dalton, supra, says the court does not differ from the condemnation of the trading stamp business described in Lansburgh v. District of Columbia,
Such a decision as in the Dalton and Dodge cases could not have been reached since 1916 when Rast v. Can Deman & Lewis Co.,
Further, decisions of fifty years ago such as State v. Dalton and State v. Dodge, both supra, People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker (1902),
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly approved the statement “The police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguard of the public interests.” See for example Camfield v. United States,
Further, in State v. Dalton and State v. Dodge, both supra, as in People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker, supra, and several other early cases, perhaps the main question considered is whether the trading stamp device was a lottery. Much of the discussion in the three last cited decisions and others is of that question. This is also true of State ex rel. Simpson v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (1910),
In re Opinion of the Justices (1917),
II. I am not so credulous as to agree the elaborate plan plaintiff calls its “co-operative cash discount system” is a mere cash discount plan. Plaintiff’s licensing agreement expressly permits dealers to issue as many stamps where credit is extended to the 15th of the following month as for cash sales and it contains no express prohibition against giving stamps for payment of bills of longer standing. Further, it appears plaintiff acquiesces in “double stamp days” when twice the usual number of stamps is given with purchases. It is not suggested there is a “familiar discount” of about four per cent for purchases for cash or on credit up to forty-five days.
Dealers pay plaintiff $3 a thousand for the stamps, “license” and “services” — $3.60 for the 1200 stamps to fill a single book. For this cost of $3.60 to dealers the customer, if he saves the stamps and presents them for redemption, is supposed to get merchandise of an aA^erage retail value of $2.50. Dealers also must pay for the large number of stamps given out that are never presented for redemption for which plaintiff parts with no merchandise.
If plaintiff’s plan is a mere discount for cash it would seem dealers are unAvise to pay so much for so little. The obvious fact is that plaintiff’s plan is a promotion scheme designed to induce the public to purchase merchandise from its dealers exclusively and it appears plaintiff’s agents so represent the plan to prospective licensees. As said in Tanner v. Little, supra, 240 U. S.
III. It may be conceded a majority of the decisions before 1916 held antitrading stamp laws were not a proper exercise of the police power and violated rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. As indicated in Division I hereof most of these cases were decided when it was thought, the police power was much more limited in scope than is now accepted. See State v. Pitney, supra,
The annotation in 26 A. L. R. 707, 708, on “Constitutionality of trading stamp legislation” says: “An important change, however, in the attitude of the courts toward such legislation occurred in 1916, when the Federal Supreme Court, in the case of Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. (1916)
11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 281, page 1042, states: “The courts in the several jurisdictions differ greatly in their attitude toward the validity of laws restricting the issuance of trading stamps as a device to -further sales of merchandise, and authority on this question is fairly well divided, although many of the recent cases sustain such legislation.” (Emphasis added.)
The due process clause of the 14th Amendment is identical with Article I, section 9, of our state Constitution which plaintiff alleges and the majority obviously feels our statute violates. We have repeatedly pointed out that the equality or uniformity provision (Article I, section 6) of our state Constitution is the same in substance and effect as the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment and if a statute does not offend against one of these provisions it is inoffensive to the other. Dickinson v. Porter,
Thus the majority indicates our statute is a violation of the due process provision of our state Constitution although the highest court in the land has held statutes similar in principle (at least on that point) do not violate an identical provision of the Federal Constitution. And the majority squarely holds the statute violates Article I, section 6, Iowa Constitution although the Federal Supreme Court has held statutes not unlike ours in effect do not violate a similar provision of the 14th Amendment. This is most unsatisfactory, if not anomalous, especially since there is no Iowa decision that conflicts with those of the supreme court. It is obvious our statute violates both Constitutions in the respects indicated or it violates neither one.
In Des Moines J. S. L. Bank v. Nordholm,
“There is no doubt that this court- has the power, in interpreting the Constitution of Iowa, to reach a conclusion on the contract clause different from that reached by the Supreme Court of the United States when interpreting a similar clause of the Federal Constitution,- * * *.
“But assuming that to be true, good policy and a desired consistency between the two Constitutions rather dictate that the interpretation of the two clauses be similar. Such consistency in interpretation will accomplish consistency in operation. Uniformity in the construction of these contract clauses is most desirable, if not absolutely necessary.”
The annotation above referred to in 26 A. L. R. 707, 710, 711, says upon this very question: “It seems desirable that there should be harmony of judicial interpretation so far as similar constitutional provisions are concerned, and that the grounds of the Federal Supreme Court decisions should be recognized as valid in construing provisions of state constitutions similar in effect to the provisions of the Federal Constitution involved in those cases.”
21 C. J. S., Courts, section 205, page 363, states -. “* * * where the question presented is as to the construction or violation of a provision of the state constitution which is similar to a provision of the federal constitution, and the same question has been decided by the federal supreme court with respect to the federal constitution, the federal decision is strongly persuasive as authority, and is generally acquiesced in by the state courts, although it is not absolutely binding.” To like effect is 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 105.
The majority completely ignores these considerations. Apparently it is under the misapprehension that these decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the trading stamp cases are no more persuasive than precedents of other state courts. The rule is they are strongly persuasive. I think they should be followed.
Such a statute as ours is not unequal in the constitutional sense because it is not all-embracing, does not apply a complete remedy to an existing evil, or prohibit other conduct which cannot be distinguished in kind from that prohibited. If the majority’s reasoning were followed to its logical conclusion countless police regulations would be held unconstitutional as not uniform.
“It is well settled that the legislature of a State may (in the absence of other controlling provisions) direct its police regulations against what it deems an existing evil, without covering the whole field of possible abuses [citations].” Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank,
“If the legislature shares the now prevailing belief as to what is public policy and finds that a particular instrument of trade war is being used against that policy in certain cases, it may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it .may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed [citations].
“ * * * If a class is deemed to .present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and. merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law [citation].” (Emphasis added.) Central Lbr. Co. v. South
See also Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes,
Substantially the same language is quoted with approval from Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co.,
Further, I think the majority’s holding that our statute classifies merchants into two classes — those who issue trading stamps redeemed by others and those who issue stamps redeemed by themselves — is fallacious. The prohibition of the law applies to everyone. None may issue stamps to be redeemed by others by gifts or premiums except upon the conditions stated in the Act. There is no unconstitutional discrimination in this. See Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, supra,
State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling,
Even where legislation makes a classification, “logical appropriateness of the inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons is not required.” Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst,
I am not convinced the legislature could not in effect prohibit use of trading stamps redeemable by others pursuant to a previous “contract arrangement or scheme” without forbidding issuance of all trading stamps. Just what considerations may have induced the lawmakers to enact the law in its present form
If any conceivable state of facts will sustain the law we are bound to presume such condition existed. See Tolerton & Warfield Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, supra,
“Further, it is plaintiff’s burden to negative every conceivable basis which may support this statute [citations].” Dickinson v. Porter, supra,
It is not necessary that the evils the legislature believed justified the enactment of the law actually did exist so long as its belief was not purely arbitrary. Tanner v. Little, supra,
“It is the duty and function of the legislature to discern and correct evils, and by evils we do not mean some definite injury but obstacles to a greater public welfare [citations].” Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., supra, at page 357 of 240 U. S., page 374 of 36 S. Ct., page 687 of 60 L. Ed.
These are some of the considerations which may have persuaded the legislature to forbid, in effect, the issuance of trading stamps redeemable by others, pursuant to previous arrangement or scheme:
Such a plan presents such a conspicuous example of what the legislature regarded as an evil as to justify special treatment. (See State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., supra, at page 713 of 153
But there is a difference in kind as well as of degree in the conduct prohibited. It may reasonably be thought issuance of stamps procured from and redeemed by another engaged in that business leads to monopolistic tendencies that do not exist where the stamps are furnished and redeemed by the dealer. The former plan tends to concentrate business in those who utilize it and to give them an undue advantage over their competitors to the latter’s injury. Then a so-called company stamp plan might practically be forced upon unwilling dealers by threats of loss of trade if they do not “sign up.” There is substantial support in the evidence for this consideration. The majority’s suggestion that business houses generally or wholesalers in particular resort to like acts of coercion, if true, is wholly immaterial on the issue of uniformity of this statute.
When this law was passed the legislature may have concerned itself with the increased cost of living and sought means of combatting it. Under plaintiff’s plan and those like it the merchant is compelled to pay three per cent of his receipts to a middleman who in turn redeems such stamps as are saved and presented with premiums of an average retail value of 2.08% of the cost of the merchandise for which the stamps were issued.
As stated in District of Columbia v. Kraft, 35 App. D. C. 253, 269, 30 L.R.A., N.S., 957, 965, and followed in State v. Wilson, supra, at page 804 of 101 Kan., page 686 of 168 P.: “An entirely unnecessary middleman, for his own profit solely, has injected himself between the regular merchant on the one hand,
And this from State v. Wilson, supra, must be kept in mind: “One may regard these arguments by which the objectionable character of the trading stamp business is sought to be established as unsound, and still hesitate to say with confidence that they are not fairly debatable — that their acceptance is inconsistent with a fair consideration of the subject by, a reasonable mind.” (Page 805 of 101 Kan., page 686 of 168 P.)
The majority says, “The legislature has no general power to pass laws dispensing* with a ‘middleman.’ ” Throughout its existence this court has repeatedly pointed out the unsoundness of such an approach to the question of constitutionality of legislation. McMillen v. County Judge (1858), 6 (Clarke) Iowa 391, 394, states: “The true inquiry, however, is, whether the exercise of the power is inhibited. In ascertaining the power of the legislature under the constitution, we look not to what the instrument authorizes to be done, but to what is prohibited.” Our decisions on this subject are carefully reviewed in Knorr v. Beardsley (Bliss, J.),
The conclusion herein reached that Code sections 553.15 to 553.18 do not violate the equality or uniformity provision of our state Constitution or its equivalent, the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, finds special support from State v. Wilson, supra,
I would reverse.
