Spero v. Lockwood, Inc.
721 P.2d 174
Idaho
1986
Check Treatment

*1 SPERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, Herman S.

LOCKWOOD, INC., corporation,

Defendant-Respondent.

No. 15772.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

May 1986. Rehearing July Denied 1986. (argued), G. and Jeffrey James Reid R.

Christenson, Boise, plaintiff-appellant. for Lynch (argued), B. James R. Charles Boise, Clark, defendant-respondent. for SHEPARD, Justice. appeal judgment

This is an from a en- tered the district court favor of de- fendant-respondent-employer Lockwood following six-day trial. bench Plaintiff- brought employee Spero action had wrongful discharge. Lockwood We affirm.

Spero was Lockwood a sales- hired August and due economic man 1969. was off December cutbacks laid by Lockwood in Spero was rehired to a district and in 1977 was transferred Spero paid included Idaho. plus parts salary a commission on all fixed machinery district purchased fired Lockwood. In 1983 Lockwood from requests, Spero despite repeated Spero, given termi- never a reason nation. trial, court, following made

The district fact. findings of and detailed meticulous had been fired just or cause Lockwood without just or to establish the burden held employer. In mak- good cause was noted findings the district court ing such testimony the conflict between specifically supervisors, Lockwood’s supervisor testimony of the held that more credible Spero’s position was favoring just of lack of the issue Spero had found that Although the court superiors, of his critical criticism “ceased his found that *2 75 although acceptable bounds,” competent, conflicting, tial evi reasonably and within upon hearsay” “only dence, ap based rumor upon that not be and will disturbed slandering Spero had been accused of one Co. 52(a); Circle C Ranch peal. I.R.C.P. found, superiors. “In his The court a 353, (1983); Jayo, v. 659 107 104 Idaho P.2d arbitrary and capricious it was an nutshell State, v. 74, Reuth 103 Idaho 644 P.2d discharge ‘just’ within or the rubric 1333, 1336 (1982). Although court the trial ” ‘good cause.’ Spero prevailed had on the issue that principal the The issue before trial for his just of a lack of cause admittedly employ- whether termination, upon dam the issue of term, ment-at-will for no fixed duration or ages, Spero the court found trial job security converted into a con- the issue the at-will em of whether initial by personnel policy adoption tract the of a had, personnel ployment by man by in manual 1977. The trial Lockwood ual, em into a contract of been converted findings specific court made and detailed only ployment Spero could be from which regarding the manual. The court found find just or We terminated for that the manual not communicated to no error. Spero’s obtaining copy that a The is af- decision of the district court “appears to little more than a have been respondent. firmed. Costs fortuity; and not the stuff contractual understandings or formation.” did not request his receive or a in relation to J., DONALDSON, C.J., BAKES, security, evi-

job nor was there sufficient cur. upon that read or relied dence ever Justice, employment BISTLINE, dissenting. manual or continued its reliance on terms. Lockwood was free apply opinion not majority’s does change any a manual at time and Conspicuously this issue. Idaho law on disregard level of could certain executives any substantive discussion absent their pleasure. the manual at state’s this what contravenes noted, The court “Even Mr. never discharge employ- respect of an thought testified he manual was ee. Hence, the district court con- contract.” Hos v. Minidoka Memorial MacNeil In employment-at-will cluded relation- 589, 208, 209 pital, 701 P.2d Idaho not ship began which in 1974 was modified (1985), year an last held that this Court by the manual. “hired employee pursuant to a pursu Unless an hired employ specifies the duration specifies the dura ant to contract which ment, reasons for which or limits the employment or limits the rea tion discharged” is not employee may be dis sons for which an Excluding those employee “at will.” charged, is at the ofwill situations, is that current law Idaho party employer may termi either employee at can time relationship nate the dis except “when motivation incurring liability. Mac reason without public policy.” Id.1 charge contravenes Hospital, Neil v. Minidoka Memorial (1985); Jackson Idaho Dist., Irrigation v. Minidoka Jackson Dist., Irrigation Minidoka 98 Idaho 333-34, 57-58 563 P.2d Idaho (1977). forth factors Court set unanimous determining what constitutes to consider findings of the district court “public policy”: supported instant case are substan- exception. proval acknowledge excep- majority this 1. The fails to disap- silence to mean tion. I not view this The employment at will rule is not ... foreman because she refused go out an absolute bar wrongful to a claim of with him and that his hostility, condoned discharge. general exception As a shared, if the defendant/employ- allowing rule either the employer or the personnel er’s manager, ultimately re- employee to terminate the sulted in being her said, fired. The court relationship cause, an employee without “We hold that a termination *3 damages claim wrongful dis- a contract for of of charge when the motivation the at will which is by motivated bad for fir- faith ing public policy. contravenes The fol- or malice or based on retaliation is not lowing exception cases illustrate this to in the best interest the sys- economic of general the rule. public tem good or the and constitutes In Petermann International a breach the contract.” of Teamsters, Brotherhood 174 Cal. Hocks, Nees v. In 272 Or. App.2d (1959), the court (1975), concluded, the court “there stated, “[generally, relationship such a can be circumstances in which an em- is terminable at the will party of either ployer discharges for such a (citations omitted) any for reason whatso- socially undesirable motive that the em- (citations omitted). However, ever the respond damages must any for right discharge to under injury done.” The court held that the * * * such a by be limited plaintiff compensato- should be awarded public policy.” considerations of ry damage being fired because she continued, quoting from 72 C.J.S. jury served duty against the wishes of Policy “public page state, at to employer. (Emphasis added.) her principles ‘is the under which Idaho, legislature In explicitly has private contract or dealing freedom of public stated this state as it is by restricted law relates to the employee: anof community. statement, Another some- public policy of this state is de- [T]he definition, times referred to as a is that clared to be as follows: Economic inse- whatever contravenes morals or curity is a serious unemployment due to society established interests is ” health, menace to morals and wel- against public policy.’ In Peter- people fare of the of this state. Involun- mann, plaintiff/employee had been tary unemployment subject is therefore a subpoenaed testify to before the Califor- of national and state interest and concern Legislature nia was instructed his pre- action requires appropriate which give testimony. false spread vent its lighten and to its burden answering was fired for truthfully. In crushing which now so often falls with reversing judgment pleadings a upon unemployed force worker and defendant, for the the court stated that family. his The achievement of social coercing perjury “patently contrary security requires protection against this public welfare.” greatest hazard of our economic life. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas In encouraging provided by This can be Co., (1973), 260 Ind. 297 N.E.2d 425 employers provide more stable plaintiff reporting was fired for ployment____ (emphasis I.C. 72-1302 § injury to her arm order to file for added). compensation. workmen’s The court held that such an act was in clear contra- legislature’s express In decla- view vention of that the concerning involuntary unemploy- ration upon had stated a claim relief which ment, dis- readily it is not seen how the granted. could be which, individual, charge of an in the words Co., “arbitrary Monge v. Beebe Rubber judge, of the district anything plain- capricious,” N.H. can viewed as but 316 A.2d 549 public If the public policy. tiff claimed she was harassed her violative of expressed by request or a policy of this state —as our receive relation in- legislature job security, to eradicate or minimize nor was there suffi- —is read voluntary unemployment, then how is that cient that ever or evidence or arbitrary upon relied continued his policy not violated manual employment in on its terms. capricious here? The reliance acts of change the manual to address this issue does Lockwoodwas free to majority’s failure people at and a certain level of execu- to the Idaho. time disservice disregard the man- tives could upon in Irri The cases relied Minidoka noted, pleasure. The court ual their being ignored; they teach that gation are “Even Mr. never testified he malice, firing faith or with done bad thought the manual was contact.” contravenes societal norms or estab interests, public poli public violates analysis inadequate. lished I find Seem- cy. exact we have That situation ingly, majority that none of the asserts *4 legislature expressly has the Idaho may here: findings overturned district court’s be involuntary unemployment is However, stated that clearly our unless erroneous. policy; judge be public the district only to applies the district deference arbi Spero’s 52(a). low found that findings. If court’s factual I.R.C.P. capricious an act trary and other words incorrectly applied the the district court —in If this does not faith and malice. bad case, may of overturn law to this we course legislature’s express state contravene the ruling. court’s the district public policy, this one won ment of state’s a contract ex- determining While whether If does? Idaho’s ders what fact, question is a for the trier ists here, people of has not been violated Stores, Idaho Allied Johnson v. Idaho well wonder whether that I believe in year said last Chief Justice Donaldson applied wrong rule in district court MacNeil, supra, be today considered to determining a contract existed. whether is, If it substance. then we should have followed this The district court should reversing today. Ac be the district court reasoning from Blue Cross & Toussaint cordingly, I dissent. Mich. Michigan, Blue Shield of (1980): 292 N.W.2d HUNTLEY, Justice, dissenting. employer need not establish While an I Bistline’s dis- agree fully with Justice practices, where an personnel policies or an I write to discuss alternate sent. poli- such employer to establish chooses ground majority’s which also indicates them practices and makes cies and result is incorrect. employees, the known its to in case The evidence was sufficient this relationship is enhanced. presumably adoption cooper- to find that Lockwood’s orderly, employer The secures changed Spero’s force, policy manual the em- loyal and ative and work employment contract to an from an at-will mind ployee peace of associated re- agreement Spero could be under which that he conviction job security and the Shepard’s only pre-employ- Justice fairly. leased No be treated will following opinion apparently found the place and negotiations need take ment Spero’s hold to parties’ sufficient need not meet facts minds at-will, spite in of Lockwood’s the em- tract matter that subject; does it nor personnel policy manual: adoption particulars nothing of the ployee knows practices employer’s policies man- that the [district] may change them to or that was not communicated ual enough It “ap- unilaterally. obtaining of and that chooses, in its own presumably pears little more than to have been in interest, create an environment fortuity; of contractual and not stuff that, what- employee believes He did which the understanding formation.” personnel policies practices, ever the presumption that employee may dis- be they are charged unless, established and official at at the employer’s time, fair, given purport majority’s words, to be and are “an is hired applied consistently uniformly pursuant to a specifies contract which employee. duration of the each has limits the then employee may reasons for which created a “instinct with an obli- situation (Citations omitted). gation.” subsidy have discharged____” Such a necessary in centu- the 18th and 19th attempted The district court to distin- industry ries struggled develop when Toussaint guish present case from the on economy American need for worker’s —the grounds. The two district court erred on security paled comparison with the need First, both counts. the district court held society to tame our wild continent. man- that Toussaint received the today’s highly developed competitive response questions job se- ual about economy, no commercial concerns need curity while not. I find the did subsidy such employees. vis-a-vis their indistinguishable. situations to be employees usually Non-union have to ac- that, occasions, his su- testified several cept the contract which their of- long you pervisors assured him that “as fers; they negotiate no leverage have your job, you’re on the team.” Dan special Therefore, treatment. where an Walters, Spero’s supervisor, tes- immediate proven performs has that he impor- tified that “sales all that was were job adequately productively in accord- Moreover, court, Michigan tant.” company judiciary policy, ance with *5 above-quoted stated that passage, no discourage employers should from arbi- specific pre-employment negotiations were terminating trarily employment. This ar- necessary employment gument compelling more becomes even distinguish- ground tract. As a second employee implicitly re- may when an have Toussaint, ing cited the district court company to fire the lied on a not Toussaint the manual at fact that received majori- employee except for cause. Yet hiring initial did not receive desirability discuss ty does not hiring. years his until As stated after doctrine, discussing Lock- at-will instead above, Michigan no court found need expect hiring Spero as if we could wood’s concerning per- implicit bargaining place negotiations had that elaborate taken Further, Spero could not sonnel manual. taken the two. have between We should least have received manual until at-will step today first allow the adopt the company because did not its well-de- employment doctrine make until the manual then. While exit from of Idaho. served the law “fortuitously,” received the manual have states Several The end seems inevitable. justifies to the still the benefit limit the already have acted to eliminate enforcing provisions. the manual’s employment doctrine. scope of the at-will applied If the district court had the above Michigan taken the tack of the have Some Toussaint, court would language from from implying terms contractual court had to have found that have adopting a such actions ployment contract had been modified to See, e.g. Tous policy manual. personnel employment require cause to terminate the saint, Her supra; v. Democrat Yartzoff relationship. 651, 576 Company, 281 Or. Publishing ald adopt (1978) (concurring with compelling I see a reason P.2d holding jury could Toussaint standard. Michigan reasons the em doctrine in the actions of the at-will find consideration behind handbook). adopting the advanced apply great force to not approach century. states have taken economy late 20th Other good faith and fair implying a covenant of provides sub- at-will doctrine limiting contracts, thereby all creating dealing in commercial sidy to concerns for which an the reasons Co., See,

discharged. Foley Paving v. U.S. 499, 505, Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.2d (1968) (applying the covenant of dealings in- and fair

faith contract.) ap- I believe these centive

proaches dominate the law not- future. We should shackle

too-distant approach. an outmoded

ourselves with BAINBRIDGE, Claimant-ap

Margaret

pellant, respondent, Cross CASCADE PLYWOOD

BOISE

MILL, Employer, Compa

Northwestern National Insurance

ny, Surety, Defendants-respondents, appellants.

Cross

No. 15649.

Supreme of Idaho. Court

June 1986.

Rehearing July 1986. Denied Greenfield, Boise, for claimant- F.

John respondent. cross appellant, Thomas, Barrett, Moffatt, John W. Blanton, Boise, for defendants- Barrett & appellants. respondents, cross