It is not questioned that the surrogate had power to revoke the letters of administration issued to Beach, and we are of opinion that the other proceedings in the Surrogate’s Court were regular and valid. Under sections 2603 and 2606 of the Code, the surrogate had authority, upon the petition of the plaintiff, as surviving administrator, to compel Beach to account for and deliver over the funds of the estate which he had received to the plaintiff. The decree for the payment and delivery, of the fund to him having been made, and executions upon the decree having been returned unsatisfied, he was authorized by section 2607 of the Code to maintain an action upon the official bond to recover the sum thus *610 decreed to be paid to him. If necessary for the maintenance of this action, we think the provisions of section 2609 could also be invoked in his favor. Within the meaning of that, section he, in his representative capacity, is a person aggrieved, and, upon that theory, could maintain this action.
We do not deem it important now to determine the precise relation which the plaintiff individually, as one of the principals in the bond, bears to the sureties in reference to the default of Beach. We will assume, as most favorable to the appellant, what has apparently been decided in some cases, that he, as one of the principals, will be bound to indemnify the appellant for any sum which may be recovered against him on account of the default of Beach
(Babcock
v.
Hubbard,
The case of
Nanz
v.
Oakley
(
We, therefore, see no reason to doubt that this case was properly disposed of in the courts below, and that the judgment should be affirmed with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
