Spera v. StateSpera v. State
The appellant/cross-appellee, James Joseph Spera, appeals his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. The state cross-appeals the trial court‘s granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. We affirm the judgment for trafficking and rеverse the judgment of acquittal with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict.
Spera was tried by a jury on November 3-5, 1993, for trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. He was found guilty on both counts. On November 18, 1993, the trial court granted a renеwed motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count and sentenced Spera to four and one-half years’ imprisonment with a minimum mandatory three years on the trafficking count.
We find no merit in Spera‘s arguments that he was improperly chаracterized as a drug dealer or that he was deprived of a meaningful closing argument. We do find merit in the state‘s argument that thе trial court improperly granted a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Spera was charged with cоnspiracy to traffic in cocaine in violation of
Officer Michael Peasley of the Pinellas County Shеriff‘s Office testified Spera‘s arrest was the result of a controlled buy setup between a confidential informant (C.I.) and the sheriff‘s office. On December 27, 1990, the C.I. set up a deal between himself and Frederick Bonin. He met with Bonin and another person identified as William Brame. They discussed the purchase of two ounces of cocaine. The transaction did not take placе because Bonin and Brame did not bring the cocaine with them, and the C.I. would not
Officer Peasley and the C.I. were waiting in the mall parking lot when Bonin and Brame arrived. Peasley wanted to see the cocaine before he would turn over the money, but Bonin and Brame did not have the cocaine on them. Brame said the source was in the parking lot. Peasley left to make a phone call for instructions on whether he should give them the money before receiving the cocaine. Uрon his return, Peasley gave Bonin $1,175.00 for the purchase of one ounce of cocaine. Bonin gave the money to Brаme, who got into his car and drove toward Bennigan‘s. Brame got out of the car and stood by the curb in front of Burdine‘s Department Stоre. Less than a minute later, a black Camaro pulled up along side of Brame, and he got into the car. The driver of the car was later identified as Spera. The black Camaro drove slowly around the parking lot, stopped briefly, then camе back around. Brame exited the car and returned to his own vehicle. Brame drove back to Peasley and the C.I. Brame handed a napkin to Bonin, who handed it to Peasley. The napkin concealed a baggie containing a white substance. That substance was later identified as 26.8 grams of cocaine. Brame testified it was his understanding that he would get one ounce (aрproximately 28 grams) of cocaine from Spera.
While Brame was driving back to the location of Bonin, Peasley and thе C.I., Spera got out of his car and went into Bennigan‘s. He was arrested as he exited Bennigan‘s. During a search of his person, $1,130.00 of the marked money given to Bonin was found. Six and one-half grams of cocaine were found in his car over the visor.
A motion for judgment of acquittal should only be granted if there is no legally sufficient evidence on which the jury could base a conviction. Brown v. State, 294 So.2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). The cirсumstantial evidence in this case was sufficient to establish a conspiracy between Spera, Bonin and Brame to deliver an ounce of cocaine. Spera was not merely present at the scene. He brought the cocaine tо a prearranged place in the mall to exchange money for drugs. He was not there fortuitously. He had the amount of сocaine requested, and he received the proceeds from the sale. The fact that he did not give the buyers the agreed upon twenty-eight grams does not negate his agreement to deliver that amount. See Kocol v. State, 546 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
Since there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Spera conspired to traffic in cocaine, we reverse the trial court‘s order granting the motion for judgment of acquittal with directions to reinstate the jury verdict. In all other respects, we affirm.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.