169 F. 379 | 8th Cir. | 1909
This was a suit by heirs at law of Fanny S. Wilder, deceased, to defeat a charitable bequest in her will upon the ground that it was void under the laws of the state of Minnesota, where she was domiciled, and for the allotment to them of the property embraced in the bequest. It was brought against the executors and the “A H. Wilder Charity, Founded by Fanny S. Wilder,” a charitable corporation organized to accept the bequest by trustees named in the will and conformably to directions therein. The trustees themselves were also made parties defendant. The ground of federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship. The cause having been submitted upon the pleadings and stipulated facts, the Circuit Court held with the defendants and dismissed complainants’ bill. The court was of opinion that prior litigation in the courts of the state involved the same question, that the heirs had participated therein, had been heard, and were defeated, and consequently the judgments of those courts barred further controversy. The heirs prosecuted this appeal. The defendants say the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of the cause, but that, if it did, its decree dismissing the bill was right.
It is said, in substance, that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, because the suit was not one at common law or in equity, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States and the judiciary act, but, on the ■ contrary, was of a probate character, and
If the case was not one of probate or administration within the proper meaning of those terms, but in nature and form was one at law or in equity, the right of the heirs to invoke the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is not affected by the law of the state. Jurisdiction of cases in law and equity involving controversies between citizens of different states was conferred by the Constitution upon the courts of the United States; and the laws of Congress, passed in pursuance of the Constitution, creating the courts inferior to the Supreme Court, and defining and distributing the jurisdiction, have given the Circuit Courts original cognizance of such cases. Nothing is more clearly settled than that the jurisdiction so conferred cannot be defeated or impaired by the laws of a state regulating the distribution of its own judicial power among its own courts. When this is asserted to have been done, the inquiry always turns to the intrinsic character of the controversy, and if, when viewed in the light of recognized principles of jurisprudence, it appears to be a suit of a civil nature at common law or in equity, it matters not that by local statute exclusive cognizance has been in terms reserved to the courts of the state generally, or to some specially designated local tribunal. This must, of necessity, be so; otherwise, the judicial power of the United States, as understood at the adoption of the Constitution, would have no uniform or permanent measure, but would depend upon the varying legislative action of the several states, and as to that founded on diversity of citizenship the tendency would be towards its extinction by absorption in the exclusive jurisdiction of the local tribunals. The equity jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution upon the courts of the United States is the same as that then possessed by the High Court of Chancery in England in its judicial capacity, as distinguished from the jurisdiction of a political or governmental character which was exercised by the Chancellor as the representative of the crown. It is uniform throughout the United States, not differing in one state from that in another, and is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legislation. True, where a state gives a remedy, not theretofore existing, by civil action in its courts of general jurisdiction, such remedy may also be had in the courts of the United States, if consistent with their forms and modes of procedure; but that is an extension or enlargement of jurisdiction, and not a limitation or impairment.
It is quite true that, if the controversy before us was purely one relating to probate or administration, the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction; but was the case of that .character? The right to take property by inheritance or by will is not a natural right, but is a privilege which is the creature of the law. The power to authorize and regulate the disposal and distribution of property at death rests with the state, and it may impose such conditions as may be deemed necessary to its interests and policy as the sovereign. So in a sense the estate of a deceased person is without an owner until the way has been cleared by the execution of the laws regulating its devolution. The
We think that a controversy like that before us is not one strictly pertaining to probate and administration, but, on the contrary, has every element of a plenary suit inter partes, and that it belongs to a class of which the English courts of chancery were accustomed to take cognizance as involving the execution of trusts. 3 Pomeroy’s Eq. Juris. § 1127. The suit of the heirs was not a will contest in the customary acceptation of that phrase. No question was involved that would properly arise at the presentation of a will for admission to probate. The heirs did not seek to annul the probate of the will in question. They did not challenge the testamentary capacity of the testatrix or the sufficiency as to authentication or form of the written expression of her testamentary purposes. On the contrary, it was averred in their bill of complaint and admitted in the answer that the instruments in question had been duly admitted to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased, and that letters testamentary had been duly issued to the defendant executors. It was likewise averred and admitted that all allowable debts and claims had been paid, all bequests preceding that of the residuary estate had been discharged, the estate had been fully administered up to the time for final decree assigning the residue to the persons by law entitled thereto, and that an application of the executors for a final decree of distribution had been filed in the probate court. The suit was brought after the ordinary matters incident to probate and administration had been fully disposed of and when final distribution was at hand, and its object was to have the bequest of the residuary estate declared contrary to the laws of the state relating to the disposition of property for charitable purposes, and to secure for the complaining heirs their respective shares thereof upon the ground that the deceased had
Upon the defense of estoppel of the heirs by prior judgment we need refer to but one of the proceedings in the state courts. The facts necessary to an understanding of it are as follows: Amherst H. Wilder, of Ramsey county, Minn., died testate in 1894, leaving as his sole heirs his widow, Fanny S. Wilder, and their daughter Cornelia, who afterwards became Mrs. Appleby. By his will, after certain specific bequests, he left one-third of his estate to his widow, and the residue to trustees upon certain trusts, in part for the benefit' of the widow and daughter, all ultimately to be devoted to charitable purposes in certain contingencies. In January, 1903, Mrs. Appleby died, leaving a will in which she devoted her residuary estate to purposes similar to those described in the will of her father. Mrs. Wilder died in April, 1903. As already observed, she bequeathed the residue of her estate to a charitable corporation, to be formed by trustees charged with that duty, and the Wilder Charity was thereupon brought into being. Trustees under the will of Mr. Wilder, being doubtful as to its meaning and their duties, brought a suit in the district court of Ramsey county, Minn., to obtain an authoritative judicial construction of its terms and directions as to their conduct upon which they might safely rely. There were made parties defendant the respective executors of the three wills, the Wilder Charity, which took the charitable bequest under the will of Mrs. Wilder, and various other persons interested in the estates. The suit was known as “Watkins v. Bigelow.” The complainants in the suit' now before us, heirs of Mrs. Wilder, not having been made parties, requested the executors of her will to file an answer in Watkins v. Bigelow, contesting the validity of Mr. Wilder’s bequest to charity, and to permit their counsel to speak in the names of the executors on that issue. To explain their interest in the matter they claimed that' his bequest to charity was void, and the
“The heirs of Fanny S. Wilder have a right to be in this case if her gift to charity is invalid. If it is valid, they have no right here. The court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of Mrs. Wilder’s will in this action, if it is necessary to do so in order to decide these motions. It is necessary to do so. because the court must decide whether the complaint in intervention or the proposed answer shows that the heirs have an interest in the fund in this case.”
Upon appeal by the heirs to the Supreme Court of the state, the •order was affirmed. Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 210, 100 N. W. 1104. The following brief excerpt from the opinion shows definitely what was there decided:
“Whether the appellants have any interest in the result of this action depends upon the answer which shall be given to this question: Is Mrs. Fanny Spencer Wilder’s will valid? This is the sole question presented for our consideration by the record.”
The question was answered in the affirmative. It is now contended that the validity of Mrs. Wilder’s residuary bequest was not involved in Watkins v. Bigelow, and therefore, there is no bar to the present suit. It is said the object of that case was to secure a con
The question involved was not a mere collateral one arising during the progress of a cause, but was of the ultimate and substantial right's of the parties. The order of the district court was not in an inconclusive summary proceeding. It went to the very foundation of their claims, and was in terms decisive of the merits after a full hearing. It was a final and appealable order, and was affirmed upon like hearing by the highest judicial tribunal of the state. The matter directly in issue now, as then, is the validity of Mrs. Wilder’s residuary bequest. The grounds of attack upon it are the same, with no new feature of fact' or law, and there is also an exact identity of parties in interest. There would, therefore, seem to exist all of the elements of an estoppel by judgment. It is not material that the Wilder Charity did not expressly join in the motion to strike the complaint in intervention from the files. The heirs made it a party to the intervention by general designation, and also by name made it a party to the appeal to the Supreme Court. A formal joinder of issue is not' always essential. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Haggart (C. C. A.) 163 Fed. 801. Neither does it matter that the question decided in the prior case was purely one of law (Mitchell v. Bank, 180 U. S. 471, 21 Sup. Ct. 418, 45 L. Ed. 627), nor that the decision was upon a motion or demurrer (Com’rs v. McIntosh, 30 Kan. 234, 1 Pac. 572; Truesdale v. Trust Company, 67 Minn. 454, 70 N. W. 568, 64 Am. St. Rep. 430; Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Navigation Co. [C. C.] 27 Fed. 277), provided the merits were involved and were decided, and the order or decision of the court was final. We think the complaining heirs have had their day in court upon the validity of Mrs. Wilder’s bequest, and, having been defeated, are concluded.
The decree of the Circuit Court' is affirmed.