75 So. 770 | Miss. | 1917
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant, as defendant in the court below, prosecutes this appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the bill of complaint exhibited by appellee T. H. Spencer, seeking to reform a deed executed by Carrie T. Spencer, the mother of the parties hereto, whereby certain lands were conveyed to the appellee and in which there is an alleged mistake. The litigation presents an unfortunate controversy between brothers. The bill charges that S. M. Spencer, Sr., the father of both appellant and appellee, was at one time the owner of certain valuable plantations in Washington county, a division of which he intended to make among his four children, the two sons, parties to this litigation, and two' daughters; that while
There is only one ground of the demurrer which merits discussion. Appellant by demurrer challenges the right of the complainant as a voluntary grantee to any reformation whatever. Appellant invokes the general rule that a voluntary conveyance is not supported by a consideration, and that such instrument cannot be reformed unless there is some consideration or unless all parties consent. The rule invoked by appellant would certainly apply were this a contest between complainant, as grantee, and his mother, the donor. The bill shows that the mother is dead, and therefore she, as grantor, cannot maintain a bill against appellant to correct the alleged mistake. This then being a contest between the two sons of the grantor, a contest between heirs, both of whom are voluntary grantees, the rule invoked by appellant does not apply. If as a matter of fact the mother intended to convey a larger portion of the plantation to the
“All parties deraign from a common source, and stand before the court in the same attitude as if they had inherited the property jointly, and then undertaken to amicably divide the same, and a mutual mistake had occurred in their deeds of partition. . . . The power of a court of equity to reform instruments and. correct mistakes growing out of such transactions in proper cases is universally recognized.”
The Miles Case is the only one by our court to which counsel direct our attention as bearing directly upon the question presented for decision. We find very few cases on the main point of this case. The cases of Wycke v. Greene, 16 Ga. 49, and McMechan v. Warburton, Irish Law Reports, 1 Ch. Div. 435 (Irish Law Reports 1895, 1896, p. 566), are applicable.
The latter case presented the same situation as here— where the donor is deceased and the contest is between the grantees. The syllabus reads:
“The court will rectify a voluntary deed after the death of the donor where it is clearly shown that, through mistake, the deed failed to carry out the proved intention of the donor.”
In the opinion of the Vice Chancellor rendered in 1894, it is said:
, “It was contended by the defendant Warburton that, as this was a voluntary deed, this court cannot interfere to rectify it in favor of volunteers. The elementary principle of this court,-that it will not interfere to enforce specific performance of an incomplete voluntary agreement, or to rectify an erroneous voluntary disposition of proper*81 ty in favor of a volunteer, is subject to this exception, that after the death of the donor it will interfere to rectify a disposition which is clearly proved to have, through mistake, failed to carry out the proved intention. The principle is, I think more correctly stated by confining it to this, that the court will not rectify a voluntary disposition against the donor. That it will do so in favor of a donor is shown by the case of Lackersteen v. Lackersteen, 30 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 5, where a voluntary settlement was rectified by Wood, V. CL, at the instance of the settlor. This explains the view taken by Romilly, M. R., in Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 34, where he stated the exception I have mentioned in case of a deceased donor, that upon clear proof of the intention of the donor, which, by a mistake, was not correctly carried out by the instrument of gift according to such intention, this court will interfere to correct the mistake, and thus act in favor of. the intention. If the donor were living it would have, of course, been competent for him to consent to such rectification, or to dissent from it. If the later, it could not be reformed against his will, for a volunteer must take the gift as he finds it; but after his death, and in absence of proof of any change of intention, it cannot be assumed that he would have dissented, and it might even be presumed that he would not dissent. In this view, Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30, is not a departure from the true principle, and it is certainly an authority for the plaintiffs on this point.”
The court of appeal unanimously affirmed this decision of the Vice Chancellor, and the language which we have quoted, we believe, expresses the better view. We unhesitatingly adopt it as equitable. The action of the learned chancellor in overruling the demurrer is approved, and the cause remanded, with leave to appellant to answer the bill within thirty days after receipt of mandate by the chancery clerk.
Affirmed and remanded.