37 Cal. 96 | Cal. | 1869
This is an action to recover land in Santa Clara County; Defendant had judgment, and plaintiff appeals on the judgment roll, without any statement.
The plaintiff relies on title derived from the defendant through a sale under a judgment and execution against him. The following are the material facts, as found by the Court: Prior to April 26th, 1861, defendant was in possession of a tract of land including the locus in quo, and he' continued in possession of the premises in controversy till October, 1864, and till after the commencement of this action. The whole tract so in defendant’s possession was included in one inclosure till after the recovery of a certain judgment by one Villagraña. On the 11th of October, 1864, said Villagraña recovered the judgment referred to against Geissman, defendant in this action, for the possession of a portion of
At" the time of the filing of the declaration of homestead, as aforesaid, the title in fee was in a stranger; but the title was acquired by defendant before said Sheriff’s sale.
At the time the judgment was docketed and became a lien, the premises constituted the homestead of the defendant, as to everybody except the owner of the land. There is no question made as to its being a homestead, if a party having a naked possession, only, the title being in a stranger, can acquire a homestead right in the land so possessed. The statute does not specify the kind of title a party shall have in order to enable him to secure a homestead. It says nothing about title. The homestead right given by the statute is impressed on the land to the extent of the interest of the claimant in it—not on the title merely. The actual homestead, as against everybody who has not a better title, becomes impressed with the legal homestead right by taking the proceedings prescribed by the statute. The estate or interest of the occupant, be it more or less, thereby becomes exempt from forced sales on execution, and can only be affected by voluntary conveyances or relinquishment in the mode prescribed. The land in this instance, as to everybody having no superior title, became the homestead of the defendant, for all the purposes of protection against forced sales and voluntary conveyances in any other than the statutory mode, as effectually an if the defendant had held the title in fee simple. There was nothing which the Sheriff was authorized to sell under execution. The fact that the defendant, after the attaching of the homestead right, acquired the true title from a stranger, does not affect the question. This did not vitiate the homestead right which had attached to the land, and given an independent estate not subject to execution. The title so acquired cannot be considered as a thing separate and apart from the land
We think the District Court correctly held that no title passed by virtue of the Sheriff’s sale and deed.
Judgment affirmed, and the remittitur directed to issue forthwith.