13 Conn. 11 | Conn. | 1838
The questions reserved for our consideration, are, 1. Was the Parmelee execution returned in due time? 2. Was the conduct of the defendant with respect to the personal property sold under the execution, fraudulent as to creditors ? 3. If it was, what effect ought it to have upon the levy upon the real estate ?
1. On the one part, it is said, that according to the legal mode of computing time, as the defendant’s judgment was rendered on the 23d of October, and his execution was not returned until the 23d of February, more than four months had elapsed, and so his lien was lost: that the rale is now settled, that when the computation of time is from an act done, the day of doing the act is included in the computation. Clayton’s case, 5 Co. 1. The King v. Adderley, Dong. 464. 1 Sw. Dig. 228. Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. Rep. 77. The United States v. Arnold, 9 Cranch, 104. On the other part, it is contended, that there are many cases where the day on which an act is done is excluded from the computation ; (Lester v. Grant, 15 Ves. 248. Ex parte Dean, 2 Cowen, 604. Windsor v. China, 4 Greenl. 298. 302. Backus v. Danforth, 2 Conn. Rep. 297. 300.) and that amidst so many conflicting decisions, this court will establish a uniform and permanent rale.
It is certain, that in this state, the day of the date, in some cases, is not included in computing time; yet in the service of writs, the statute directs that the day of service shall be computed, and upon notices of sales upon executions, it is believed that the day of the publication of notice has always been computed. This court would be very unwilling, at this late period, to create a doubt as to the legality of a practice so long and so uniform, upon a subject of common business. They would say, that such a practice could hardly have obtained so long, unless it had received the sanction of the courts. If a doubt were now to be supposed to exist, it would create great anxiety in the minds of those who were to execute process, or were in future to be affected by it; and render the past a subject of ruinous litigation. If a uniform rule is now to be established, it must be done by that power whose regulations are usually merely prospective.
If it be said, that by this construction, no time is limited for the return, this is true. But where a duty is prescribed and no time is limited, the law, of course, prescribes a reasonable time. No time is fixed in which a deed is to be recorded ; but it is to be done in a reasonable time; and this has been found much better than any certain time ; because now, every allowance may be made for the circumstances of the parties. But the statute adds : “And all executions, served, returned and recorded as aforesaid, shall vest all the title in the creditor, his heirs and assigns.” These words are not stronger, and do not create more difficulty, than the enactment respecting deeds. There it is said : “No deed shall be accounted good and effectual against any person or persons, but the grantor, &c., unless recorded as aforesaid.” It was said in argument, that we can never know when an execution has vested a title in the creditor, unless the record is made within a limited time. This
2. The next inquiry is. as to the effect of the conduct of the defendant, in the sale of the personal property. How far can it affect his right to the real estate? The defendant, who was the owner, or the agent of the owner of this execution, assumed the direction of the sale. He prescribed the time when the sales should stop, and when they should be renewed. They were frequently and suddenly suspended, at his will and pleasure, when numbers were present, and bids quick; and in answer to complaints made upon the subject, he declared he should take his own time; and the officer seems to have yielded himself to the controul of the defendant, as entirely as if he was his servant. And although we do not say, that in cases of difficulty, the oflicer might not advise with the creditor, or debtor, or both; yet he is not to become the tool of either. He is the minister of the law, entrusted with an important duty, essentially affecting the rights of others; and in cases where any discretion is entrusted to him, he should exercise it with all fidelity, knowing no superior but the law of the land.
In this case, the natural tendency of this interference, • by the agents of the creditor, was, to create suspicion in the minds of those who attended the sale, that all was not fair ; to drive away some, to disgust all, and to prevent that fair and open competition, which can alone prevent great sacrifices of property, when sold in this way. This is not all. It appears that the defendant attempted, in the intervals of sale, to persuade some of the principal bidders that it was not for their interest to purchase ; and finally, on the third day, effected an arrange-
That such an arrangement at an auction sale, is contrary to principles of public policy, and therefore, contrary to law, has been repeatedly decided in the state of New- York. Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johns, Ca. 29. Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johns. Rep. 195. Thompson v. Davies, 13 Johns. Rep. 112. Hawley & al. v. Cranmer & al. 4 Cowen, 717. And with regard to such sales, when made under legal authority, we do not hesitate to adopt the language of Judge Radcliff, in the case first cited. “ The law has regulated sales on execution with a jealous care, and enjoined such proceedings as are likely to promote a fair competition. A combination to prevent such competition, is contrary to morality and sound policy. It operates as a fraud upon the debtor and his remaining creditors, by depriving the former of the opportunity which he ought to possess, of obtaining a full equivalent for the property which is demoted to the payment of his debts, and opens a door for oppressive speculation.” 3 Johns. Ca. 32. This language is precisely adapted to the case before us. It was for the interest of these debtors, as well as of their creditors, that the property seized upon this execution should go as far as possible to extinguish this debt ; and no possible motive can be assigned for the delays and negotiations of the defendant, but that he might get this property into his own hands, with as little competition as possible. Such proceedings are calculated to injure the debtor and his other creditors, and to bring reproach upon the law which authorises this involuntary disposition of the property of an unfortunate debtor, as well as of the fraudulent debtor. Nor will the law stop to inquire, whether in this particular case, actual damage has arisen. It is enough to know that such proceedings necessarily lead to fraud and oppression ; and therefore, the law must treat them, as it regards third persons, as fraudulent.
3. How far will these proceedings affect the subsequent levy upon the real estate 1 Upon a former occasion, it was contended, and it has now been alluded to, that the Parmelee execu
It is not necessary, however, to inquire how the law now is in that country, or whether that principle was ever adopted in this state- because the facts found in this case show, that this execution was never levied upon personal property sufficient to satisfy it. Had this fact not been so found, it would have been very difficult to find a mode of ascertaining the value of the property seized, but by the sheriff’s sale; and when fairly conducted, it must be the legal standard.
It is said, that such misconduct in a party is to be considered as a satisfaction, or equivalent to a satisfaction of the execution ; and the opinion of a great judge in Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 254. is pressed upon us. There, the execution against a person who was confined in the state prison, had been satisfied, by a settlement between the parties; and then property to thirty times the amount of the execution was sold for a nominal sum, in order to leave a balance, to feed the execution, and enable the creditor to sweep away property to an immeasurable extent in other counties. Upon such facts, the Chancellor, in a strain of virtuous indignation, says: “ The creditor, who suffers an execution which the law has lent him for his security, to be perverted to such a purpose, ought to be deprived of any further use of it. It is satisfied and cancelled-, by the force of such an act.” And he fortifies his position, by the principle above alluded to, that the sheriff having seized sufficient property, the execution was thereby satisfied and discharged; alluding also to the fact, that the property was sold for a nominal price.
In this case, the property was not sold at a nominal price; nor was the whole personal property sufficient to satisfy the execution. And if that property, at its full value, was not sufficient to satisfy the execution, we are not able to discover
It has been said, that the object of the defendant was, to gain some advantage to himself, with respect to the real estate. If by our law, the real estate could not be levied upon, until the personal property was exhausted, there might be some foundation for this supposition. But it has been decided, that real estate may be attached, although the personal property is sufficient. Isham v. Downer, 8 Conn. Rep. 282. And the words of the act concerning executions, are almost the same as those respecting attachments. An attachment shall be served, by attaching the goods and chattels, or if none can be found, by attaching the person or lands of the defendant. Stat. 36. tit. 2. s. 5. As to executions, the statute prescribes, that in case personal property sufficient to satisfy the debt and charges cannot be found, and the creditor shall not agree to accept or take the debtor’s lands, the body may be taken. Stat. 57. tit. 2. s. 75. The forms of writs are also similar: “attach the goods or estate of”-“of the goods chattels, or lands you cause to be levied.” Stat. 242, 3. tit. 38. s. 3, 5. We think, therefore, that there can be no doubt, that if real estate can be taken by attachment, although there is sufficient personal property to satisfy the demand, the same rule is equally applicable to executions.
The defendent had, therefore, no inducement to take the mode he did with the personal estate, for the purpose of reaching the real estate ; and we cannot presume, without proof, that such was his object. It cannot be inferred, merely because he wished to prevent competition ; for that measure might have been adopted, if his only object was to get the property cheap. Nor is it found that in the negotiation during the sales, there was any allusion to the real estate.
After these sales were closed, upon the final disposition of the property purchased by the defendant and his competitors,
It appears that these creditors threatened the owners of this debt, that they would present to the appraisers a bond binding themselves to pay for this real estate, a certain sum of money. It is, therefore, fairly to be presumed, that when they promised not to interfere with the real estate, they referred to this fact, and intended that no such bond should be presented. Now, as no such mode of testing the value of real estate set off upon execution, is recognized by our law ; as it is an expedient of at least a doubtful character, and if sanctioned, might lead to other experiments still more fallacious, we do not see any illegality or impropriety in the agreement, by which it was stipulated that such a bond should not be offered. It was only an agreement to forbear to do what no law required them to do; what certainly it is very unusual to do; and what, if permitted, might lead to practices with appraisers, which might be highly dangerous.
There is, then, in this agreement, nothing, which ought to affect the levy upon the real estate. The execution was not satisfied. The conduct of the defendent and his officer, however improper, was to be punished in another way. And to hold that the officer, or the party, should be responsible to
We think, therefore, that the plaintiff’s bill must be dismissed ; and as this controversy has been of long standing, so that the facts were fully in the knowledge of the parties, we think the defendant is entitled to costs.
Bill to be dismissed with costs.