Spencer Ex Rel. Spencer v. Staton

reversed, phens’s be convictions his sen- vacated, SPENCER, Bernice Individually

tence and the indictment Louise and on Raevyn him Behalf of dismissed. Shadow and

Spencer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, B. outlining the sanctions for a STATON, Individually Jack and in His violation,

Speedy Trial Act the statute Capacity; Dewayne Brumley, Official leaves to the court’s discretion whether to Individually and in His Official Ca- dismiss the indictment with or without pacity; Guffey Lynn Pattison, Individ- 3162(a)(2). prejudice. § 18 U.S.C. “This ually Capacity, and in His Official discretion is channeled through three fac Defendants-Appellees.

tors, mandatory: consideration which is No. 06-30020. (1)the (2) offense, seriousness of the United Appeals, States Court of facts and circumstances of the case which Fifth Circuit. (3) dismissal, led to the the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the June 2007. [Speedy Trial and on the Act] administra Order on Grant of Rehearing justice.” tion of United States v. Mar July 26, in Part tinez-Espinoza, 299 F.3d Cir.

2002). Stephens notes that usual “[o]ur

practice is to remand for the district court id., factors,”

to consider the and argues

that this ease pattern. fits into the usual agree.

We Accordingly, we remand the

case for the district court to determine

whether dismissal should be with or with

out prejudice, giving proper consideration

to the factors set forth 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2).

Ill reasons, foregoing

For the we reverse

Stephens’s convictions, sentence, vacate his

and remand for the district court to deter-

mine whether the indictment should be

dismissed prejudice. with or without Ac-

cordingly, we do not reach Stephens’s oth-

er arguments appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

their stay, they lived in a mobile home along with Spencer’s brother-in-law, John aunt, Vasco Zinnerman. John Jimmy Turner, his cousin and several members family of his extended lived near- by. Walker, Henry Clay (argued), IV H. Walker, V, Lyons, &

Clay Walker Shreve- 24, August On Nancy Andrew and John- LA, port, Spencer. for son, the of a owners Pleasant Hill feed store, were shot to death a botched (argued), F. Bienvenu David Shawn robbery attempt. Suspicion quickly co- Simon, Holahan, Peragine, Louise Smith & Turner, alesced around Spencer, John and Orleans, Redfearn, LA, New Ronald E. Zinnerman, whom witnesses had seen near Corkern, Jr., Crews, & Corkern Natchi- the store shortly before the murders. In toches, LA, Defendants-Appellees. incident, course of investigating the

Detectives Jack Dewayne Staton and Brumley traveled to Spencer mobile home in early-morning hours of Au- gust 25. Staton and questioned JONES, Judge, Before Chief and Spencers and Zinnerman at a local GARZA, Judges. DAVIS and Circuit police station. JONES, Judge: EDITH H. Chief During interrogation, her Bernice Spencer any denied involvement in the civil-rights brought this action under murders. She claimed to be unaware who Plaintiff-Appellant U.S.C. owned a .22 caliber rifle recovered from Spencer appeals Bernice the district the mobile home or that it widely was grant summary judgment court’s of to De- known in community “people that Staton, fendants-Appellees Detective Jack walking [were] around [the mobile-home Detective Dewayne Brumley, and Sheriff park] guns” day on the of the shoot- Guffey Lynn Pattison. Because material ing. Further, she told Staton and Brum- (1) fact issues exist regarding whether the ley that her husband had been with her arrest warrant Staton and ob- majority “the day,” except for cause, tained supported by probable brief visit he made to nearby his aunt’s (2) and Brumley’s Staton’s and entitlement mobile home. question To the when she immunity, we reverse the dis- planned to California, return to she re- trict court’s dismissal of federal plied: “Um, probably next couple days.” claims; affirm dismissal of the state-law All suspects three were released after a tort Detectives; claims affirm few hours. as Pattison; to Sheriff and remand for further consideration. As their investigation progressed, how- ever, Staton and Brumley discovered that

BACKGROUND both Spencer John and Zinnerman owned Bernice arrived handguns Louisiana they frequently used target from California August shooting 2003. Her home; behind the mobile that husband, John Spencer, had left California John attempted had buy am- several weeks earlier to care for an ailing day munition on the of the shootings; and Hill, aunt in Pleasant During Louisiana. that a witness had overheard Zinnerman DISCUSSION you “Are sure Spencer: ask John are denoting victims] murder [expletive A. Review Standard of dead?” We review de novo the district court’s informa- newly acquired Because of summary judgment grant, applying the tion, Brumley returned to the same standard used below. Roberts August only to learn home on mobile (5th City Shreveport, 397 F.3d left and Zinnerman had Spencers that the Cir.2005) (citing Tejeda, Keenan v. Fear- morning. earlier that for California Cir.2002)). Summary flee, F.3d attempting that the three were ing the record judgment appropriate when warrants obtained arrest the Detectives Zinnerman, genuine reveals “no issue as to materi charging Spencers for the moving party al fact” and that “the robbery armed and first- the men with murder, judgment an to a as a matter of law.” Spencer as entitled degree and Bernice 56(c). fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. accessory after the Spencers appre- were August On Malley B. Violation1 later Spencer in California. John

hended waiting outside confessed that he had been alleges that the war- Spencer Bernice in a when his cousin the feed store car by application rant submitted Staton and to death. Jimmy Turner shot the Johnsons facially unsup- was invalid and was held in the Solano Spencer Bernice by probable cause. ported Review California, jail au- County, until Louisiana qualified immunity Detectives’ assertion of her extradition. The ac- thorities secured a requires us first to ask “whether reason- Spencer cessory charge against Bernice ... ably well-trained officer would have eventually part plea as of a was dismissed known that his affidavit failed to establish at- between a Louisiana district agreement that probable cause and he should torney Spencer. and John applied have for the warrant.” v. Spencer Bernice sued Detectives Staton 335, 345, Briggs, 475 U.S. 106 S.Ct. Parish Sheriff and and Sabine (1986). 1098, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 The Detec- 42 Guffey Lynn Pattison under U.S.C. that the warrant was tives’ determination arrest, impris- alleging false false immunity qualified them to valid entitles onment, and several state- conspiracy, and basis, unless, it objective “on an from suit tort claims. The Defendants moved law reasonably competent is obvious that no on summary judgment based have concluded that a war- officer would immunity. Finding po- that a reasonable the circum- rant issue” under should that lice officer could have concluded there S.Ct. at 1096. stances. Id. 106 Bernice probable was cause to arrest to the application Staton’s warrant granted court sum- Spencer, the district example of a issuing judge is a textbook mary and dismissed the federal judgment invalid, affidavit.2 Af facially “barebones” charges. Spencer appealed. and state contrast, cause at the scene. this case able 1. We note that since Bernice claim, by police uncon- only arrested a California officer not one for concerns inves- nected to the Louisiana double-murder false arrest. tigation by Staton and Brum- Detectives —not ley distinguishable one in case is from —this affidavit states: 2. The warrant application itself does not which ME, undersigned authority, BEFORE arrest, provide a sufficient basis for but appeared, LT. JACK personally came and arresting prob- officer can otherwise establish 662 Cir.1974) (“It (5th accepted has been biographical and reciting Spencer’s

ter information, circuits that a principle affidavit states in this and other contact offense, may ... consider an affiant’s charged than the federal court nothing more af- conclusory testimony, oral extrinsic to the written by a statement accompanied fidavit, issuing before the her husband and which is sworn assisted determining in magistrate, Louisiana authori- whether evading Zinnerman cause”); probable supply the factual basis warrant was founded It does not ties. (5th States, F.2d necessary Lopez for issuance v. United cause Cir.1966) may (probable analysis v. cause See United States of an arrest warrant. (5th Cir.1993); “brought take into account information Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456 Brown, ... form magistrate’s attention United States statements”).3 Cir.1991). of oral case, asserts, however, after care that he The record review, uncertainty significant the affidavit with oral testi ful reveals supplemented concerning testimony what oral Staton im mony personal knowledge on his based aggre parted issuing judge, that —in the to the and when he investigation such conveyed judge’s The sworn gate information to the did so.4 Staton’s —the probable Spenc deposition cause for statements are insufficient to judge supports the Fourth Amend demonstrate as a matter of law that Sta- er’s arrest. Because warrants, require testimony written ton’s constituted “sufficient in ment does not support independent judg an invalid warrant can be reha formation to an otherwise testimony probable oral before a ment that cause exists for the by bilitated sworn Warden, judicial given contemporaneously Whiteley Wyo. officer warrant.” v. 564, 560, upon applica Penitentiary, of the warrant State 401 U.S. 91 presentation (1971).5 Hill, 315, 1031, 1035, tion. v. 500 F.2d 28 L.Ed.2d 306 United States S.Ct. Shields, 943, (6th Cir.1992); STATON—DETECTIVE of SPSO P.O. BOX 978 F.2d 946 LA., 71449, who, 1440, MANY, Zip Gaugler Brierley, Code United States ex rel. v. 477 sworn, 516, having by duly depose (3d Cir.1973); been me did Leeper F.2d 521 v. United AUGUST, day States, 281, say (10th Cir.1971); that on the 24TH of F.2d 446 286 2003, Berkus, 1148, one BERNICE LOUISE SPENCER United v. 428 F.2d States 1152 committed the offense of ACCESSORY AF- (8th Cir.1970). Englade, Kohler v. 470 Cf. FACT, TER THE LA.R.S.14:25 TO FIRST (5th Cir.2006) (officers F.3d 1111-12 MURDER, DEGREE LA.R.S.14:30 within support application cannot an invalid warrant HILL, and Parish at PLEASANT state only by with information known them but not LA. The affiant states that the accused magistrate). communicated to committed the above described offense following THIS based on the information: deposition testimony 4. We note that Staton’s HUSBAND, SUBJECT DID HELP HER about conversations he had with the Sheriff JOHN GLENN SPENCER AND VASCO T. Attorney and District is immaterial to our ZINNERMAN, EVADE LAW ENFORCE- Roberts, analysis here. See v. 441 Frazier MENT THE TWO HAD OFFICERS AFTER (8th Cir.1971) (unsworn F.2d 1228 oral COMMITTED ARMED ROBBERY AND testimony separate delivered on a occasion to FIRST DEGREE MURDER. nonjudicial a officer cannot rehabilitate a sub- affiant) (signature of warrant). sequently acquired Sworn before me this to me and subscribed day August 28th addition, Spencer argues sought Staton (signature judge) intentionally judge by falsely to mislead the Judge, 11th Court Judicial District asserting that was “involved” in the 3.See, Lott, e.g., "fleeing” jurisdiction. v. Owens ex rel. Owens murders and was Delaware, 154, 156, (4th Cir.2004); United States v. Under Franks v. 438 U.S. finding erred in the warrant Moreover, allege that the constitutional- does justify under ly Spencer’s were made sufficient to arrest.7 provided he statements oath. State Law Claims C. Brumley ap Detective Because has not alleged facts sufficient fully with Sta- participated to have

pears support the .various state law claims she there is material investigation, in the ton First, the Appellees. asserts position “in a he was fact issue whether prosecution malicious claim fails his picture, to understand see the whole for want of evidence that Brumley, Malley], and thus ful responsibility [under Staton, or Pattison acted with malice. questions.” probable cause ly to assess Hermann, Michalik v. Second, her defamation claim fails be- (5th Cir.2005). Michalik holds that “such alleged cause she has not that the Detec- officer, not the affiant [who an who is published defamatory tives material about support an arrest provided the affidavit obtaining her or acted with malice in liable, warrant], may along held be Hendricks, Arledge arrest See warrant. affiant, principles of Mal- under (defa- 715 So.2d 138 (La.Ct.App.1998) notes, however, also ley.” Id. Michalik mation actions under Louisiana law must liability does not extend be elements,” allege five “essential including person yond the affiant and “who malice). publication fully responsible applica for” a warrant Third, or not the whether Brumley may the latter tion. Id. be supported by for Bernice’s arrest was if reveals that he not position the evidence cause, the Detectives’ behavior investigation but also only assisted this case does not meet the standard re of the affidavit participated preparation quired for a claim of intentional infliction sup presentation or of the warrant of emotional distress. See White v. Mon judge. porting affidavit to the (La.1991) Co., 1205, santo 585 So.2d 1209 qualified immunity, of purposes For (requiring conduct to be “atrocious and does not establish evidence in the record utterly society”). intolerable in a civilized law, that, a as a matter of reasonable Fourth, imprison the claim of false police officer could have believed evi- ment, Spencer’s to constitute which subsumes false-ar dence he had was sufficient warrant, claim, cause, Murray v. Town Mansu justifying a rest see of ra, 832, (La.Ct.App.2006), 838 arrest.6 The district court thus 940 So.2d Bernice’s 2674, 2676, (1978), against the Detectives or Sheriff Pat- 57 L.Ed.2d 667 violation 98 S.Ct. the Fourth Amendment is violated when an tison. intentionally, with a disre- official or reckless truth, gard testimony for the includes false additional, Appellant an meritless makes a warrant affidavit. Our conclusion that the sought to constitutional claim that Defendants barebones, however, any forecloses is marriage punishment for her to arrest her as Kohler, analysis. Franks See 470 F.3d 1114 Spencer Amend- John in violation of her First ("The principles of Franks have never been right The to freedom of association. ment warrants”). applied facially to invalid supporting totally devoid of evidence record is proposition. Record evidence indicates respect children 6. With to Bernice’s minor Appellant Brumley pursued that Staton and however, Raevyn Spencer, Ap- Shadow and assisting they solely believed she was because showing they pellant has made no suf- Spencer’s flight, not because of her in John any deprivation of constitutional fered any allege as his wife. right or have basis to status 664 ac Brumley’s of Detective and Staton’s arrest was made

fails because authority.” “statutory Plai tions, claim pursuant Spencer support fails to her Thibodeaux, 1009, 1012 930 So.2d v. sance indif that Pattison acted deliberate (quoting Kyle City v. (La.Ct.App.2006) of rights. ference to her constitutional The (La. Orleans, So.2d 971 353 New exacting requirement proving of deliberate 1977)). corresponds a warrant long as So neg indifference “cannot be inferred from of Article requirements to the technical Dep’t Hernandez v. Tex. ligence alone.” Criminal Procedure 203 of Louisiana’s Servs., Regulatory Protective & Code, imprisonment or false arrest a false Cir.2004). (5th Moreover, proof 884 See La.Code Ceim. claim cannot stand.8 of officer misconduct is single of a instance 203; Kroger Touchton v. Proc. Ann. art. an ordinarily give insufficient to rise to Co., (La.Ct.App.1987). 512 So.2d 525 in supervisor’s inference of the deliberate here; requirements were satisfied Those training supervision. or difference to require an arrest Louisiana courts do TX., Thompson Upshur County, 245 proba ing independent officer to make an (5th Cir.2001). F.3d of a warrant or ble-cause determination affidavit. Id. supporting E. Children’s Claims

D. Pattison Sheriff There no or state-law constitutional Pattison, we af As to Sheriff basis for the claims asserts on ruling that Spenc firm the district court’s behalf of her minor children. The district produce competent er has failed to properly court them. dismissed her summary-judgment evidence sustain they participated § claims. Unless conduct, subject supervisors are not CONCLUSION liability the acts or omissions of City their Mouille v. subordinates. See reasons, For these we REVERSE the Oak, Tex.,

Live summary judgment district court’s for De- Cir.1992). attempts to show a Brumley solely tectives subordinates, train adequately failure to claim, AFFIRM for Sheriff Patti- connection requires claim that a causal proceed- son and REMAND for further between the failure to train and the viola whether, ings. express opinion We no Spencer’s rights, and that the fail tion of trial, Spencer pre- at or the will detectives to deliberate indif ure to train amounted in respective vail their contentions. rights. to constitutional ference PART; Roberts, REVERSED IN AFFIRMED at if See 292. Even subjective PART; knowledge Sheriff had IN AND REMANDED. Pattison (4) charged against 8. State the Article 203 states: offense the arrested; person to be The warrant of arrest shall: (5) person against Command that the (1) writing Be and be in the name of the in Louisiana; complaint whom the was made be ar- State of booked; and (2) rested and State the date when issued and the mu- (6) issued; magistrate signed by Be the with the nicipality parish where or (3) title office. person of his State the name of the to be ar- or, unknown, rested, may specify The warrant of arrest the name if his is des- ignate by any noncapital amount bail in when the person name or de- cases magistrate authority scription by he can has to fix bail. which be identified certainty; with La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 203. reasonable GARZA, Judge Beasley attending, Judge, was but Detec- M. Circuit EMILIO in dissenting part: Brumley accompany in and tive did not Detective concurring part presentation actual majority opinion except I concur Judge Beasley.. warrant to It application im- the denial of respect with Brumley is unclear where Detective was munity Brumley. Detective during presentation, Judge but Beas- Hermann, In 422 F.3d 252 Michalik v. ley explicit about the fact that Detective (5th Cir.2005), held, “[Liability this court presented Staton was alone when he only Malley may against under lie not application, including warrant the warrant affiant, ... an officer who but also any affidavit and additional oral submis- actually application the warrant prepares nothing sion the evidence. There is knowledge with that a warrant would be contradicting Judge Beasley’s testimony prepared solely based on the document allege and Ms. does not otherwise. however, to ex- unwilling, .... areWe evidence, Based on this record it is clear liability beyond ... the affiant tend such Brumley, that Detective unlike Detective person actually prepared, who or was and Staton, an affiant. was not He neither of, fully responsible preparation for the signed any the warrant affidavit nor made application.” Id. so Judge oral submissions of evidence to holding, interpret- the Michalik court was Beasley. There is also no evidence that Prairie, case, ing prior Bennett v. Grand Brumley prepared Detective the warrant Cir.1989), where the lead 883 F.2d 400 any may involvement he application, investigating prepared officer the warrant had, reasonably have as the co-lead inves application and knew that the application tigator, does not meet the standard prepared would be limited to what he but liability contemplated non-affiant Mi- not the affiant. The affiant served chalik, namely actually “an officer who only perfunctory signing pre- role in prepares application the warrant with senting application the warrant but was knowledge that a warrant would be based investigation. in the not otherwise involved solely prepared.” on the document Mi According precedent, to this for Detec- chalik, 422 at 261. The Michalik any or officer to face tive liability explicit denying court was 1) liability he must either be an affiant or investigated the crime those officers who 2) prepared application have the warrant plaintiffs for whom the could not es but knowledge that a warrant would be tying prepa facts them to the tablish solely prepared. based on the document he presentation ap of the warrant ration or reading Even the record in favor of Ms. plication. Narrowly applying Id. Spencer, I can find no record evidence liability to non-affiants makes sense exact indicating that Detective falls one, where a ly for cases such as category. intd either The record reveals facially application may deficient warrant jointly that Detectives and Staton may additionally sup not been or have They together the investigated crime. by present oral submissions of the ported spoke prosecutor about officer, ing Detective Staton —submissions prior seeking cause the arrest warrant. presence of the of Detective made outside typed by The warrant affidavit Brumley. Brumley, Detective and no further evi- majority opinion places I too developed prepared dence was as to who believe Brumley, on Detective de- Brumley accompa- heavy the affidavit. Detective burden immunity him Ms. banquet nying nied Detective to the where ex- any facts which would alleged has not America, UNITED STATES liability and where the him pose Plaintiff-Appellee, no such facts. “Where record reveals qualified immunity and pleads defendant governmental BRAZELL, official whose Wayne

shows he is a Robert Defendant-Appellant. discretion, the exercise of position involves rebut has the burden ‘to plaintiff then No. 06-30102. offi- by establishing this defense Appeals, United States Court of wrongful conduct violated allegedly cial’s Fifth Circuit. ” Polles, Felton v. clearly established law.’ June Cir.2002) (emphasis has not original). Because Ms. to Detective respect burden with met this the district

Brumley, I would affirm immunity. grant

court’s PETITION FOR REHEARING

ON petition

IT that the IS ORDERED as follows:

rehearing granted part is panel opinion of the discuss- portion

The state law claims for false

ing appellants’ withdrawn, and imprisonment

arrest and is remanded to dis-

these claims will be in the first

trict court for consideration

instance. opinion sentence of the

The second disposition. to conform with this

amended concluding paragraph opinion

The

is also amended to state: reasons, we

For these REVERSE summary judgment for De-

district court’s on the

tectives Staton arrest and

claim and on state law false claims,

imprisonment AFFIRM for Sheriff pro-

Pattison and REMAND for further no

ceedings. express opinion We wheth-

er, trial, Spencer or the detectives will

prevail respective in their contentions. PART; IN AFFIRMED

REVERSED PART;

IN AND REMANDED.

Case Details

Case Name: Spencer Ex Rel. Spencer v. Staton

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Jun 15, 2007

Citation: 489 F.3d 658

Docket Number: 06-30020

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.