*1 for the just compensation pay ton has purpose impos-
taking. That serves a whole society as for ing the costs on rather programs, than social worthwhile have the misfortune the individuals who the cost first falls.86 standing where to be sum, gener- that the interest we hold trust accounts is pooled ated IOLTA the clients and customers property of trust, money deposited into whose appropriation of government taking purposes is public interest compensation just under entitling them just compen- But Fifth Amendment. than takings may be less sation for the taken, nothing, or amount the interest circumstances, so deter- on the depending a remand. remedy requires mining P.C., SPEISER, & MADOLE KRAUSE Krause, Speiser, Madole & d/b/a Cook, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ORTIZ; Rudy Rudy A. & A. P.C., Defendants- Associates Appellants. No. 00-55195. Appeals, Court of United States Ninth Circuit. * 12, 2001 Sept. Submitted 21, 2001 Filed Nov. * States, unanimously panel finds this case suitable Armstrong United U.S. See argument. oral Fed. (1960). for decision 40, 49, without 80 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 34(a)(2). R.App. P. *2 Flores,
Sidney C. Law Offices of Flores Barrios, Jose, California, & San for the defendants-appellants. Veth, Speiser, Madole,
John J. Krause & P.C., Irvine, California, plaintiff- for the appellee. FERGUSON, FERNANDEZ,
Before: McKEOWN, Judges. Circuit FERNANDEZ, Judge: Circuit Rudy A. A. Rudy Ortiz Ortiz & Associates, P.C., a Virginia corporation,1 appeal the district court’s denying order entry their motion to set aside of de- enlarge fault and to time to answer. We affirm.
BACKGROUND Madole, P.C.,
Speiser, Krause & Cali- firm, fornia law entered into an agreement Ortiz, attorney, purpose with an for the representation responsi- dividing legal arising bilities out of an airline crash case. concluded, dispute After the case was attorneys regarding arose between the attorneys’ division of the fees. result, 7, 1999, Speiser January As a complaint Superior filed a in the Krause California, County Court of the State 28, 1999, Orange, April Speiser and on Hereafter, convenience, corporation. opinion applies equal force to the this will with Ortiz, only analysis refer but the as to him fault,” does entry of default alone mail to because a letter certified Krause sent appealable an final order. entry not constitute intent to seek indicating its Id.; Edrick see also Savarese v. receive a in the event it did not of default Transfer Inc., Storage, & complaint. timely answer to the *3 Cir.1975); Bumb, 4, 6 Madsen v. 419 an answer state having filed Without . (9th Cir.1969) court, the case to the Unit- Ortiz removed District for the Central ed States Pursuant to Rule
District of California. DISCUSSION 81(c) Proce- the Federal Rules of Civil The district court’s determination dure, file an answer required was Ortiz in this case was well within the boundaries 6,1999. by May complaint to the argues its discretion. Ortiz his Ortiz, however, reading did not bother pellu the neglect to read and understand 81(c) carefully enough to understand Rule 81(c) regarding of Rule the cid command and, therefore, answering did not bother complaint2 the was time to answer excusa much. He complaint. He admits as 60(b)(1). ble See Fed.R.Civ.P. later that the district court’s issu- also' said regarding ance of an order to show cause attorney’s egregious an fail While and ex- jurisdiction perplexed somehow unambigu follow clear and ure to read and because, thought, perhaps cused him he be might ous rules sometimes actually not have been re- might the case construing “mistakes the rules do neglect, 16, 1999, Thus, Speiser July moved. usually neglect.” not constitute ‘excusable’ as to requested entry Krause an of default v. Brunswick As Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. day. that same Ortiz. Default was entered 380, 392, P’ship, Ltd. 507 113 socs. U.S. Speiser Krause notified Soon thereafter (1993). 1489, 1496, 74 123 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. it intended to seek a default Ortiz situation, As we have said in a similar judgment. presented persuasive “counsel has not then made a motion to set aside Ortiz of no justification for his misconstruction time to enlarge the default and to Accordingly, rules. there is nambiguous neglect that his was answer on the basis deviating general no basis for from the The district court denied the excusable. law not consti rule that a mistake of does entry the de- motion and ordered the neglect.” Kyle Campbell tute excusable appealed. (9th fault then judgment. Co., Soup 28 F.3d 931-32 1994); High see also Idaho’s Comm. for OF REVIEW STANDARD (9th Desert, Yost, Inc. v. 825 Cir.1996). 81(c) just that Again, of discre is We review for abuse clear, an attor tion decision to enter a and as we once said about the district court’s it, no Carpenters’ ney default Haw. who did not follow see judgment. “[w]e Stone, courts to excuse Trust Funds v. 511- reason for federal Savarese, Cir.1986). 513 professional neglect.” That standard of review such F.2d at 147. “necessarily encompasses entry of de based, 81(c) proceeding pertinent part: upon or is reads in “In a action days after the service of the removed action in which the defendant has or within answered, pleading, upon then ... summons such initial not the defendant shall answer filed, days receipt through after the days ser- or within within 20 after removal, period petition whichever copy vice or otherwise of a of the initial longest.’’ pleading setting forth the claim for relief tries to and then treat that as a mere formalistic Interestingly enough, Ortiz neglect by asserting preparatory of his incantation to their deciding avoid the effect when they fell into a state of confusion what they that he would have done had been it, an order to show the district court issued judge. district But as we see that, perhaps, the case thought cause. He standard means that within substantial really been had removed had not which he margins upheld the district court could be thus tries to excuse one removed. He had it way determined issue one or the plain provision of the law failure to read other. failure to read still by resting upon his Here the district court would not neces- provision. In other equally plain another sarily have had it decided that ex- erred
words, neglecting solace in his to he seeks cause) (or neglect good cusable was shown. automatically re observe that a case But it decided that neither was. That papers are moved when the removal In- certainly conclusion was not error. filed, here. they as were See served deed, being it was much closer to rhadam- 1446(d); § Resolution Trust 28 U.S.C. opposite anthine than the conclusion would 1230, Developers, 43 F.3d Corp. Bayside v. have been. (9th Callahan, Cir.1994); v. 788 1238 Okot AFFIRMED. (9th Cir.1986). However, 631, 633 his anodyne of one clear rule is no for neglect FERGUSON, Judge, dissenting: Circuit by neglect of another damage caused procedure history “The of is a series of Savarese, 513 F.2d at one. As we said attempts problems to solve the created feel, judge, 147: did the district “We as procedural preceding generation’s re- parties cases to the fed that who remove Resnick, Precluding Ap- forms.” Judith acquainted with eral courts should become (1985). 603, 70 L.Rev. 624 Cornell peals, of comply with the Federal Rules Civil Procedure.”3 respectfully By applying I dissent. rule, ig- the District Court per former se to the briefly Ortiz also alludes holdings nored the of Pioneer Investment defaults. good regarding cause standard Ltd. Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates 55(c). That standard is See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1489, Partnership, 507 U.S. 113 S.Ct. rigorous less than excusable See (1993) progeny, 74 and its 123 L.Ed.2d Funds, Carpenters’ Trust Haw. analysis and equitable which call for an however, distinction, is one of at 513. The under interpretation “neglect” broader at degree, might make a difference 60(b)(1). Similarly, by gloss- Fed.R.Civ.P. lawyer, margin. But the failure of this developments, majority ing over these properly removing party, who was the to per reintroduces this former implicitly 81(c) does language read the clear rule. id.; good not amount to cause either. See Savarese, F.2d at 146. 11 Chapter In of a creditors of the bar date sought debtor an extension
CONCLUSION
of claim under Fed.
proofs
late
9006(b). Pioneer,
R. Bankr.P.
507 U.S.
Appellate judges
tempted
are often
to
9006(b)(1)
382, 113
1489. Rule
the abuse of discretion standard
S.Ct.
mention
tempi
rules.” Id. at 382. The
Hotel
to follow court
3. We do not overlook Briones Riviera
But,
Casino,
(9th
1997).
Post
true of Bateman v. United States
F.3d 379
Cir.
same is
&
said,
Service,
1222-23
did not
al
as we
the error in
case
“only
from a failure to read and at-
result
2000).
neg
whether such
In order to determine
bankruptcy court the discretion
grants the
excusable,
suggested
the Court
ligence is
to
filing if the failure
permit
a late
analysis, which would take
resulted
comply with an earlier deadline
all
circumstances
into account
relevant
bankrupt-
The
neglect.”
“excusable
from
party’s
Id. at
surrounding the
omission.
and held that
cy court denied the motion
395, 113
The
stated
S.Ct. 1489.
Court
circum-
neglect was limited to
include the follow
analysis
such an
should
beyond
party’s
were
rea-
stances that
(1)
danger
prejudice
ing factors:
Circuit re-
sonable control.
Sixth
(2)
opposing party;
length
“the
385-86, 113
remanded.
Id. at
versed and
impact
judicial
potential
and its
S.Ct.
(3)
delay,
proceedings;”
“the reason for the
within the reason
including whether was
the decision of the Sixth
affirming
(4)
movant;”3 and
control of the
able
Circuit,
Supreme
held that “ne-
good
acted in
faith.”
“whether the movant
meaning,
ordinary expected
has its
glect”
Id.
carelessness,
negligence,
which includes
Casino,
In Briones v. Riviera Hotel &
Id. at
and inadvertent mistake.
(9th Cir.1997)
curiam),
(per
[I]n reasoning, and determined judgments, intelligence to default this Court emphasized judgments that such are that he should not burden the District has in of the case until “appropriate only extreme circum- Court with merits stances; should, possi- jurisdiction pro whenever was determined. As a a case ble, inexperienced attorney, Put litigant be decided on the merits.” and an Or- majority’s finding by the effects of the disagree also with the could have been confused I unambiguous an rule. sponte that Ortiz misconstrued Show District Court's sua Order to during below anal- As discussed Cause. facts, ysis ordinary person present the District regarding confusion tiz’s NELSON, Tarza R. Plaintiff- Cause Order to Show sponte sua
Court’s Appellant-Cross- its effect jurisdiction and federal regarding Appellee, Even the is understandable. on removal District or the by the Court rules cited the effect directly not address majority do Warden; HEISS; Prunty, Barbara K.W. on the by the court sponte order of a sua Gomez, Director of Correc James process.7 removal X, Inclusive; tions; through I Does Sylvia Garcia, Defendants-Appel H. Fourth, there is no evidence that lees-Cross-Appellants, good than faith. anything less with acted misreading “resulted appears that his It and carelessness, not from negligence from Through X, Inclusive, I Does Bateman, and willfulness.” deviousness Defendant. Finally, the merits at 1225. Rather, the never decided.
this case were 00-55523, Nos. 00-55567 way easy took the out court district Appeals, United States Court judgment default summarily entering Ninth Circuit. $157,291.55. * 17, 2001 Submitted Oct. equities weigh favor Accordingly, the Filed Nov. Ortiz, granted he should have been Because District relief. by failing to abused its discretion standard, I legal would apply the correct this case. and remand
reverse
*8
the effects
unambiguous
could have further researched
are
as the
7. Even if the rules
petition
been
re-
majority argues,
sponte
Ortiz should have still
on his
the sua
order
aforementioned,
60(b)
Bateman,
granted
relief. As
Rule
not determinative. See
moval
applicability in the
that,
factor has limited
the third
although
(finding
