MICHAEL SEAN SPEIGHT III, v. AMANDA KAELBLEIN, MICHAEL KAELBLEIN, NANCY KAELBLEIN, and ERIC STEPHANIE
No. 24-cv-12363-PBS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
May 16, 2025
LEVENSON, U.S.M.J.
LEVENSON, U.S.M.J.
Pro se Plaintiff Michael Sean Speight III brings this
All of Plaintiff‘s claims are based on alleged wrongdoing in connection with proceedings before the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. Although the claims are worded in ways
Accordingly, I recommend dismissing Plaintiff‘s claims against Defendants.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
As best as can be gleaned from the Amended Complaint, from June 2021 through May 2022, Plaintiff lived with Amanda Kaelblein and their minor child, V.S., in Derry, New Hampshire. Docket No. 66-1, ¶ 2(A). On May 28, 2022, after the relationship between Plaintiff and Amanda deteriorated, Amanda took V.S. to Massachusetts without Plaintiff‘s consent. Id. ¶ 2(B). Approximately one month later, on June 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition regarding child custody and support in Derry Family Court in New Hampshire.2 Id. ¶ 2(C).
Plaintiff alleges that, on November 3, 2022, Attorney Stephan “had a hearing” regarding child support before Judge George Phelan of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. Id.
On November 15, 2022, a hearing was held in Derry Family Court regarding Plaintiff‘s request for “temporary orders” that would “reunite[ him] with V.S.” Id. ¶ 2(E). Following the
As discussed further below, the Amended Complaint contains little in the way of specific, factual allegations regarding Amanda‘s parents, Michael and Nancy Kaelblein. Plaintiff alleges broadly that they “supported” Amanda and/or “supported” the “inconsistent statements” she allegedly provided during state court proceedings. Id. ¶ 2(G). Plaintiff further alleges that, as recently as August 2024, they “gave false and misleading statements to a Massachusetts Probate Court Clinician Jennifer Westbrook.” Id. Plaintiff also claims that Michael and Nancy Kaelblein worked with their daughter, Amanda, to “keep the Plaintiff from V.S.” Id.
B. Brief Procedural Background
Plaintiff sued Amanda Kaelblein, her parents Michael and Nancy Kaelblein, and Eric Stephan in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire on February 26, 2024.7 Docket No. 1. Months later, on September 13, 2024, the case was transferred to the
On October 4, 2024, I held a status conference, during which I proposed denying as moot the numerous pending motions (most of which had been filed by Plaintiff prior to the transfer to the District of Massachusetts) and allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint. See Docket No. 63. No party objected to the proposal, so the pending motions (Docket Nos. 14, 16, 25, 26, 28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 46, 47, 56, 59, and 61) were denied—without prejudice as moot, and Plaintiff was given until October 18, 2024, to file an amended complaint. Docket No. 63.
On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff moved to file an Amended Complaint and attached a document, labeled “Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint,” that set forth Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint. See generally Docket No. 66-1.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff outlines claims under
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages—in the amount of $250,000 from Attorney Stephan and $100,000 “[f]rom all three of the Kaelblein[s]“—for “emotional distress, loss of parenting time, financial losses, and reputational harm.” Id. ¶ 4(A). He also seeks punitive damages for Defendants’ “willful, malicious, and reckless disregard” for Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 4(B). Additionally, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 4(C).
On November 6, 2024, Michael and Nancy Kaelblein filed a motion to dismiss (Docket No. 70), and on December 3, 2024, Attorney Stephan filed a motion to dismiss (Docket No. 81).8 I held a hearing on the two motions to dismiss on February 3, 2025. Docket No. 92. Following the hearing, I took the motions under advisement.
II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
A. Michael and Nancy Kaelblein‘s Motion to Dismiss
Michael and Nancy Kaelblein argue that Plaintiff‘s claims should be dismissed for two reasons. See Docket No. 71, at 1. First, they argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the “domestic relations aspects” of Plaintiff‘s claims and that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s remaining claims on the ground that they are closely and
With respect to their first argument, Michael and Nancy Kaelblein claim that “[i]t is axiomatic that domestic relations are excepted from federal court jurisdiction.” Id. at 4 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)). They acknowledge that “the domestic relations exception ‘has been narrowly confined,‘” but they point to language from a 40-year-old First Circuit opinion indicating “that federal courts should abstain from adjudicating claims that are closely related to, though not within, the jurisdictional exception.” Id. (quoting Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981)).9 They argue that, because Plaintiff‘s claims for damages and declaratory relief “hinge entirely on the state court‘s determination as to the proper custody and support of the minor child,” the claims fall squarely within the domestic relations exception. Id. at 5. It is immaterial, they contend, that Plaintiff‘s claims were brought under
For their second argument—that Plaintiff‘s claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under
B. Attorney Stephan‘s Motion to Dismiss
Attorney Stephan advances four arguments for dismissing Plaintiff‘s claims against him. See Docket No. 82, at 1-2.
First, Attorney Stephan contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s claims because they are barred by the Rooker-Feldman and/or Younger doctrines.10 Id. at 4-6. Both doctrines, Attorney Stephan argues, preclude this Court from adjudicating
Second, Attorney Stephan contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s claims against Attorney Stephan in his official capacity for two reasons: (a) such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and (b) a state official acting in his official capacity is not considered a “person” under
Third, Attorney Stephan contends that the claims brought against him in his individual capacity must be dismissed because he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 7-8. Specifically, Attorney Stephan contends that “a state official who performs prosecutorial functions . . . is absolutely immune from damages actions,” id. at 7 (quoting Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2013)), and that he performed such functions when he “prosecut[ed] the child support complaint against [Plaintiff],” id.
Fourth, Attorney Stephan contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him for any civil rights violations, as the Amended Complaint provides nothing more than “bald assertions and unsupportable conclusions.” Id. at 9.
III. Legal Standards
Because Michael and Nancy Kaelblein and Attorney Stephan move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s claims for both lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, I briefly review the relevant standards under
Before digging into the merits, I note that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than fоrmal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nonetheless, pro se litigants are not free to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the pleading requirements set forth therein. See FDIC v. Anchor Props., 13 F.3d 27, 31
A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under
Under
IV. Analysis
As previewed above, the motions to dismiss presently before the Court raise several arguments for dismissal, some jurisdictional and others merits based. Courts are typically required to ensure that they have subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case. See Sinapi v. R.I. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 910 F.3d 544, 549 (1st Cir. 2018) (“A district court generally has the obligation, when there is any question, to confirm that it has subject matter jurisdiction prior to considering the merits of the underlying controversy.“). Accordingly, I will address the parties’ jurisdictional arguments before reaching their arguments about the sufficiency of Plaintiff‘s factual allegations under
A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s Claims or Should Abstain from Exercising its Jurisdiction.
Michael and Nancy Kaelblein point to the domestic relations exception in arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s claims. They also join in Attorney Stephan‘s argument that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (or should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction) under the Rooker-Feldman or Younger doctrines.
As I will discuss, there are genuine uncеrtainties about the present status of the domestic relations exception. It is unnecessary to decide the point in this case, however, because Plaintiff‘s claims run directly afoul of a different limitation on the Court‘s authority, the Rooker-Feldman and/or Younger doctrines.
The so-called “domestic relations exception,” delineated by the Supreme Court in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” 504 U.S. at 703. The limitation is one of subject matter jurisdiction, and its aim is to “keep federal courts from meddling in a realm that is peculiarly delicate, that is governed by state law and institutions (e.g., family courts), and in which inter-court conflicts in policy or decrees should be kept to an absolute minimum.” Dunn v. Cometa, 238 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2001). The First Circuit has acknowledged the narrowing impact of the Ankenbrandt decision:
Despite the breadth of the phrase “domestic relations exception” and the potential reach of the exception‘s aim, Ankenbrandt made clear that the exception is narrowly limited. In general, lawsuits affecting domestic relations, however substantially, are not within the exception unless the claim at issue is one to obtain, alter or end a divorce, alimony or child custody decree.
Id.
Michael and Nancy Kaelblein argue that Plaintiff‘s claims “fall directly within the domestic relations exception.” Docket No. 71, at 4-5. At first blush, their argument has some appeal. Although Plaintiff‘s claims were brought under
But a closer look at First Circuit case law on the domestic relations exception leads to thorny questions as to whether Plaintiff‘s claims fit “directly” therein. These are threshold questions that, when considered in the context of this case, raise doubts about the applicability of the exception.
The most challenging issue here stems from Plaintiff‘s invocation of the Court‘s federal question jurisdiction, as many of the cases recognizing the domestic relations exception implicate only diversity jurisdiction. Here, Plaintiff explicitly alleges violations of his constitutional rights under
To be sure, some district judges within the First Circuit have concluded that the domestic relations exception suffices to bar claims based on federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cole, 2015 WL 5023772, at *4 (finding that the federal district court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff‘s claims under the domestic relations exception, even though the plaintiff‘s complaint “appear[ed] to straddle diversity and federal question jurisdiction“); Scholwin v. Spence, No. 07-cv-11937-JLT, 2008 WL 11511609, at *6 (D. Mass. Apr. 23, 2008) (“Although this is a federal question case, this court takes the position that the rationale behind the domestic relations exception equally аpplies on these facts.“). But the point is not well settled.
The fact that Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint does not explicitly request injunctive relief further complicates application of the domestic relations exception. As explained above, the domestic relations exception applies only to claims that seek “to obtain, alter or end a divorce, alimony or child custody decree.” Dunn, 238 F.3d at 41. When a lawsuit “in no way seeks such a decree,” the exception does not apply. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704; see Rubin v. Smith, 817 F. Supp. 987, 991 (D.N.H. 1993) (finding the domestic relations inapplicable where the plaintiffs “merely request[ed] damages” and there was “no evidence . . . to indicate that plaintiffs [were] seeking [any other] relief“).
Presumably in recognition of this limitation, Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that he is not asking the Court to invalidate orders entered by the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. Such protestations are not wholly convincing. As the First Circuit has indicated, the Court need not—and should not—simply take plaintiffs at their word. See Irish v. Irish, 842 F.3d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that, in considering whether the domestic relations exception applies, courts should look past plaintiffs’ “self-serving characterization[s] of [their] action[s]” and should instead focus on “the reality of what is going on“); see also Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, No. 92-1624, 1992 WL 474105, at *2 (1st Cir. Dec. 9, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (finding, in an analogous case, that the plaintiff‘s claims fell within the domestic relations exception, even though the plaintiff had “attempted to cure the jurisdictional deficit by filing an amended complaint seeking only damages,” reasoning that the “real aim” of the
Here, Plaintiff‘s claims appear to be tantamount to requests for injunctive relief, even though Plaintiff does not expressly request that the Court invalidate the child support order issued by the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. Granting the relief that Plaintiff requests would amount to essentially the same thing. For instance, in Count I of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that Attorney Stephan violated Plaintiff‘s due process rights “by issuing a child support order that was not authorized by the judge.” Docket No. 66-1, ¶ 3(A) (emphasis added). Count II similarly alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights by, among other things, “supporting the issuance of an illegal child support order.” Id. ¶ 3(B) (emphasis added). Despite Plaintiff‘s best efforts to dress this up as a damages action, the veneer wears thin; it is difficult to imagine how the Court could rule in Plaintiff‘s favor without finding that the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court‘s issuance of the challenged child support order was “not authorized” or “illegal.”11
To sum all this up, Michael and Nancy Kaelblein‘s invocation of the domestic relations exceрtion is tenable, but complicated. The Court could assume, as other courts within this Circuit
There is no pressing need to decide whether the domestic relations exception bars Plaintiff‘s claims. As discussed belоw, there are simpler routes available, and the Court may be better advised to steer around this issue. Applying the domestic relations exception requires, at the outset, that the Court ascertain and characterize Plaintiff‘s true aim in bringing this lawsuit. Given the vagueness of Plaintiff‘s pleading, this is an interpretive exercise that would require the Court to pin down the meaning of a pro se litigant‘s allegations. Such an undertaking seems unnecessary.
2. The Rooker-Feldman and Younger Doctrines
Given the vagaries of the domestic relations exception and its application in federal question cases, it makes sense to follow the First Circuit‘s approach in Mandel v. Town of Orleans, in which the court sidestepped the domestic relations exception and determined that the claims at issue “more clearly offend[ed] another broader constraint on federal court authority.” 326 F.3d at 271. Such a course has been adopted by several other sessions of this Cоurt. See, e.g., Masomi v. Madadi, No. 18-cv-10058-FDS, 2018 WL 1122362, at *1 n.1 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2018) (noting that the “matter may fall within [the] domestic relations exception” but dismissing under
Like the domestic relations exception, both the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines serve to keep the federal courts out of matters that are the exclusive purview of state courts. Which doctrine applies in a given case depends on whether we are talking about state proceedings that have concluded or about ongoing state cоurt litigation. Here, the parties’ submissions do not spell out the precise status of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court action.12 During oral argument, Plaintiff represented that there is an order in place from the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court setting terms of custody and visitation but that—at least as of the date of oral argument—the action was ongoing with respect to visitation. Plaintiff further represented that his child support obligations had been settled.
Irrespective of the exact status of the state court proceedings, it is evident that Plaintiff‘s claims are barred either by the Rooker-Feldman or the Younger doctrine. One way or another, Plaintiff is either impermissibly asking the Court to review a state child support order or to interfere with an ongoing state child support action. See Pierre v. Cristello, No. 17-cv-30105-KAR, 2017 WL 4768006, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2017); see also Gray-Bey v. 42 U.S. Code 654(3) Mass. Dep‘t of Revenue Child Support Enf‘t Div., No. 20-cv-12042-DJC, 2021 WL 8323638, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 2021) (“Child support matters and issues surrounding the enforcement of child support[] . . . would be precluded under one or both of [the Rooker-Feldman and Younger] doctrines.“). “The Court, therefore, either has no jurisdiction or should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.” Pierre, 2017 WL 4768006, at *2.
a. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, ‘lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.‘” Id. (quoting Littler v. Massachusetts, No. 17-cv-11277-RGS, 2017 WL 3495173, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2017)). As the First Circuit has held, “[i]t is not necessary that the federal action formally seek to invalidate the state judgment; it is enough if the federal action would in substance defeat or negate a state judgment, for example if ‘the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.‘” Mandel, 326 F.3d at 271 (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1999)). In other words, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is properly applied where, regardless of how the claim is phrased, the only real injury to . . . [Plaintiff] . . . is ultimately still caused by a state-court judgment.” Pierre, 2017 WL 4768006, at *2 (second and subsequent alterations in original) (quoting DuLaurence v. Telegen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 73, 80 (D. Mass. 2015), aff‘d sub nom. DuLaurence v. Telegen et al. (May 5, 2015)).
Based on Plaintiff‘s representations at oral argument, the injuries of which he complains were caused by a child support order entered by Judge Phelan of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. Adjudicating Plaintiff‘s claims would inevitably require the Court to determine whether the court‘s issuance of that order was improper. See Docket No. 66-1, ¶ 3(A) (asking the Court to find that Attorney Stephan violated Plaintiff‘s due process rights “by issuing a child
b. The Younger Doctrine
To the extent that Plaintiff‘s claims relate to aspects of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court action that are ongoing, the Court should decline to interfere under the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger doctrine instructs federal courts, absent extraordinary circumstances, “not to ‘interfere with ongoing state-court litigation.‘” Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004)). The First Circuit has explained that “[a]bstention is appropriate when the requested relief would interfere (1) with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an important state interest; and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal constitutional challenge.” Id. at 34-35.
Plaintiff‘s request for relief, to the extent that it pertains to ongoing proceedings before the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court, meets all three elements of the Younger test, and there is nothing about the circumstances of this case that would take it outside the Younger
B. Attorney Stephan (in both his Official and Individual Capacities) Is Immune from Claims Seeking Damages Under Section 1983.
”
Attorney Stephan contends that Plaintiff‘s damages claims must be dismissed because hе is entitled to immunity both under the Eleventh Amendment and under the doctrine that affords absolute immunity to state actors who perform prosecutorial functions. See Docket No. 82, at 6-8. Both arguments appear dispositive.
Plaintiff‘s damages claims against Attorney Stephan in his official capacity are barred by principles of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Larke v. Dep‘t of Revenue Child Support, No. 10-cv-12148-JLT, 2011 WL 1877684, at *2 (D. Mass. May 17, 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff‘s claims against a Department of Revenue attorney to the extent that the plaintiff sought monetary damages). “The Eleventh Amendment generally bars actions for money damages in federal court against a State, its departments and its agencies, and its employees acting in their official capacities unless the State has consented to suit or Congress has overridden the State‘s immunity.” Gray-Bey, 2021 WL 8323638, at *3. “Congress did not abrogate Massаchusetts’ sovereign immunity by enacting Section 1983.” Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep‘t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)). As such, Plaintiff‘s damages claims against Attorney Stephan in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Inasmuch as Plaintiff explicitly sues Attorney Stephan in his official capacity, Attorney Stephan does not qualify as a “person” as defined under
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
2. Damages Claims Against Attorney Stephan in his Individual Capacity Should Be Dismissed Because He Is Entitled to Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity.
Absolute immunity is afforded to “a narrow swath of public officials, including ‘judges performing judicial acts within their jurisdiction,’ ‘prosecutors performing acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,’ and agency officials with functions similar to judges and/or prosecutors.” Goldstein, 719 F.3d at 24 (quoting Bettencourt v. Bd. of Regist. in Med. of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 782 (1st Cir. 1990)). As the First Circuit has explained, “[t]hе protection afforded by an absolute immunity endures even if the official ‘acted maliciously and corruptly’ in exercising his judicial or prosecutorial functions,” id. (quoting Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Regist. in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 702 (1st Cir. 1995)), and even “in the presence of ‘grave procedural errors,‘” id. (quoting Nystedt v. Nigro, 700 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2012)).
“State officials and agency employees have been held to be absolutely immune for actions taken within a prosecutorial function in child welfare and support proceedings,” so long as they are “performing functions that require prosecutorial discretion,” not “merely administrative or investigative” tasks. Wilson v. Brock, No. 01-cv-00284, 2002 WL 1676287, at *5 (D.N.H. July 18, 2002). Thus, “[i]n determining whether an official qualifies for absolute immunity, an inquiring court must examine the particular functions that the official performs.” Goldstein, 719 F.3d at 24.
Attorney Stephan points out in his submission that Plaintiff‘s claims “directly implicate the prosecutorial functions that Attorney Stephan performed in prosecuting the child support
The actions Plaintiff complains of—that is, Attorney Stephan‘s conduct with respect to the challenged child support order—are undisputably prosecutorial in nature. See Pierre, 2017 WL 4768006, at *3 (explaining that a government attorney‘s performance of “paternity and child support enforcement activities” were “prosecutorial in nature“); see also Taylor v. Garcetti, 55 F. App‘x 853, 854 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The defendants’ actions . . . in civilly enforcing [the plaintiff‘s] child support obligations were prosecutorial in nature“); Washington v. Montgomery Cnty. Common Pleas Ct., No. 17-cv-00341, 2017 WL 5632881, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2017) (collecting cases to support the proposition that “child support enforcement attorneys are entitled to prosecutorial immunity“), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 5660023 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2017). The Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations that would suggest that Plaintiff is suing Attorney Stephan for any acts outside the scope of Attorney Stephan‘s prosecutorial responsibilities.
On this ground, Plaintiff‘s damages claims against Attorney Stephan in his individual capacity should be dismissed.
C. Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim.
Even if it were proper for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s claims (or if Attorney Stephan were not immune from damages claims brought under
The Amended Complaint can only be described as consisting оf “conclusory allegations of conspiracy” unsupported by “references to material facts.” Slotnick, 560 F.2d at 33. Plaintiff alleges generally that Michael, Nancy, and Amanda Kaelblein “worked together to keep the Plaintiff from V.S.“; that Michael and Nancy Kaelblein “supported” their daughter Amanda in making inconsistent statements in court; and that Amanda Kaelblein and Eric Stephan “conspired to get a child support order in Massachusetts that was not legally authorized.” Docket No. 66-1, ¶¶ 2(G)-(H). But there are no specific factual averments spelling out what it is that Plaintiff claims Michael and Nancy Kaelblein actually did to “support” their daughter‘s allegedly
All plaintiffs, including pro se plaintiffs, must “set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting eаch material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Wright v. Town of Southbridge, No. 07-cv-40305-FDS, 2009 WL 415506, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 15, 2009) (unpublished table decision) (quoting Adams v. Stephenson, No. 96-2266, 1997 WL 351633, at *1 (1st Cir. June 23, 1997)). Because Plaintiff has failed to do so in this case, his claims are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Cole, 2015 WL 5023772, at *7 (dismissing the plaintiff‘s section 1983 claim where the complaint “include[d] nothing to explicate the relationship or nature of the cooperation constituting the alleged conspiracy“).14
V. Plaintiff‘s Additional Pending Motions
Several additional motions filed by Plaintiff remain pending. See Docket No. 84 (Plaintiff‘s motion for default judgment as to Amanda Kaelblein); Docket No. 97 (Plaintiff‘s motion for default judgment as to Amanda Kaelblein, as well as for a hearing on damages); Docket No. 100 (Plaintiff‘s request for a status conference). Given that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, these motions should be denied as moot. See Afrasiabi v. Gov‘t of Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 24-cv-10451-MJJ, 2025 WL 880206, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 2025) (“Courts have held that they have an ‘affirmative duty’ tо confirm they have ‘jurisdiction
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Michael and Nancy Kaelblein‘s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 70) and Attorney Stephan‘s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 81) and that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint without prejudice. I further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff‘s Motion for Default Judgment as to Amanda Kaelblein (Docket No. 84), Plaintiff‘s Motion for Default Judgment, Motion to Compel, and Request for Hearing on Damages (Docket No. 97), and Plaintiff‘s Motion for Status Conference (Docket No. 100).
Dated: May 16, 2025
/s/ Paul G. Levenson
Paul G. Levenson
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties are advised that under the provisions of
Notes
Docket No. 72-1, at 5 (emphasis added).The Plaintiff is not challenging any part of the child support order placed on January 17, 2023.
Though he is challenging the prior order placed on November 3, 2022 and vacated on November 18, 2022 that was placed without judicial approval and violatеd his due process and equal protection rights, which set off a chain reaction that eventually violated his parental rights in the process.