4 Ind. App. 525 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1892
The appellee was sued by the appellant to recover damages for an injury to his person.
A special verdict was returned. Each party moved for judgment upon the verdict. The appellant’s motion was overruled, and the appellee’s motion was sustained. These rulings are assigned as errors.
The jury found, in substance, that the appellee, on the 12th of January, 1890, was a corporation owning and man
The expenses incurred by the appellant on account of his injury are stated, and his damages are assessed at $350.
It is the province of the jury, in rendering a special verdict, to find the facts only, leaving judgment thereon to the court.
All conclusions of law stated in the verdict before us must be eliminated in considering the ruling of the court; and unless the verdict states all the facts essential to a recovery by the appellant, upon whom rested the burden of the issue, the action of the court must be upheld. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186; Conner v. Citizens’ St. R. W. Co., 105 Ind. 62; Indiana, etc., R. W. Co. v. Barnhart, 115 Ind. 399.
A turnpike company, operating under the general law relating to such corporations, need not construct or maintain its road of a greater width than eight and one-half feet; and the road need not be of uniform width throughout its course. Neff v. Mooresville, etc., G. R. Co., 66 Ind. 279; Wayne, etc., T. R. Co. v. Moore, 82 Ind. 208.
There is nothing in the special verdict showing that the appellee was under obligation to construct or maintain its. road of greater width than it was at the place of the accident.
The facts are not stated with clearness and certainty.
It is not shown that the appellee was responsible for the presence at the place where it was of the post or other hard substance against which the appellant fell, if that would make any difference under the circumstances.
The injury appears not to have been caused by any defect in the travelled part of the highway, or because of insufficient width of the road for the reasonable and proper use thereof; but it appears to have been occasioned by driving out of the travelled way,- “ to the west of the bridge.” It is not shown where the horse left, or commenced to leave, the travelled way. It does not appear from the facts stated that the travellers could not have driven upon the bridge because of the narrowness of the approach. They did not drive upon the bridge, because of the fact that they drove to the west of it.
If the lantern which the appellant’s fellow-traveller held in his right hand was lighted, it would seem that no precaution was taken to discover the way except upon that side, so that the horse was driven off the left side of the road, and the left wheel of the vehicle was caused to leave the travelled surface in a manner which the appellee could not reasonably be required to anticipate in the construction and maintenance of its road.
The judgment is affirmed.