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Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd. v. Reid Road Municipal Utility District No. 2
282 S.W.3d 652
Tex. App.
2009
Check Treatment

*1 authority applied this concluding that regarding the jury questions

conditioning Stage Lighting BML claim whereas

same differ- conditioning between two

involved at hand id. case claims. See

ent questions re- conditioning within

involves claim; therefore, BML the same

garding point. not on

Stage Lighting is reasons, is merit in these there

For Insureds’ third issue.

Conclusion above, this court

For the reasons stated Order in its en- affirm the March

should the court

tirety. To the extent reverses Order, respectfully dissent.28

the March STORES, FOOD

SPEEDY STOP

LTD., Appellant,

REID ROAD MUNICIPAL UTILITY 2, Appellee. NO.

DISTRICT

No. 14-07-00225-CV. Texas, Appeals

Court Dist.). (14th

Houston

Feb. 2009.

Rehearing March Overruled addition, majority's disposi- as to the Insureds’ claims for In even if the correct, completely negligent supervision, alleged tion of the were negligence, issues (1) court should dismiss as moot the Insureds' of article 21.21 of the Insurance violations appeal April as to trial court's Code, (5) claims sever remand these order, (2) Lexington’s moot motion dismiss as proceedings consistent further appeal to dismiss Insureds' as to (6) opinion, and affirm the remainder order, (3) Desig- Lexington’s deny To “Motion judgment. of the trial court’s Review,” (4) reverse nate Items for Camera

erty may testify regarding that market value, even if he is not or desig- (hereinafter nated an witness Rule”). “Property Today we must rule, applied decide whether this countless property owners, times individual ap- plies corporate property owners. The Supreme Court of directly Texas has not spoken matter, on the and our sister of appeals courts divided this issue. The trial court granted a no-evidence summary judgment striking after all of the evidence offered the cor- porate property owner the condemna- tion action. One of the stricken affidavits by representative was made a corpo- rate Property Rule. If Owner Rule entities, does not to corporate then the trial court did not in striking err If affidavit. Owner Rule apply, does then the trial court erred in striking the affidavit. We conclude that to all owners, including corporate prop- erty owners. Because evidence in the stricken a genuine affidavit raises issue of material fact regarding compensation, we reverse and remand. Background And

Factual Procedural Stores, Appellant Speedy Stop Food Russell, Victoria, Bill for appellant. W. Ltd., a partnership (“Speedy Texas limited Dippel, appellee. C. Charles Stop”) owns a 2.0661 acre tract of land in County, (“Property”). Ap- Harris Texas FROST, Panel consists Justices pellee Municipal Utility Reid Road District SEYMORE and GUZMAN. (the “District”) 2No. initiated a condemna- tion action the trial court for the below MAJORITY OPINION purpose acquiring a .0592 acre waterline over, under, through, easement and across FROST, KEM THOMPSON Justice. construction, opera- appeal summary judg- This is an from a tion, and maintenance of facilities for ment in a condemnation case. At the cen- transportation delivery of water. controversy long- ter of the is Texas’s standing special rule that a The trial court three appointed owner who familiar the market commissioners to condemnation prop- assess Property immediately commissioners convened before and

damages. These proffered the District hearing, immediately after the condemnation of the Ambrose, a state- appraisal by easement. LaBeff does have real- appraiser. opined Ambrose certified license, estate broker’s and he is not a *3 $9,342. damages are Speedy Stop’s appraiser. licensed real-estate Speedy damages Special Commissioners assessed designate Stop expert did LaBeff as an Speedy in that amount in Stop, favor witness. in deposited and the District sum that Speedy Stop transcript also attached a registry amount into the of the court be- appraisal of David Ambrose’s testimo- and Speedy Stop timely objections filed low. ny special from the commissioners’ hear- special findings to the commissioners’ un- ing. testimony, opined In this Ambrose statute, triggering der the condemnation Speedy Stop’s damages total proceeding de in the trial court. The novo $9,342. Speedy Stop stated that it at- granted par- court first a motion for testimony tached this as an admission summary judgment tial of the favor against interest. District, only after remaining which summary-judgment In its reply, the Dis-

issue the amount of compensation was to objected trict to LaBeffs affidavit and Speedy Stop. be awarded to moved to exclude it on following The District then filed a second motion grounds: summary judgment for it assert- (cid:127) designating The time for experts has single ed a ground, namely no-evidence expired, Speedy Stop did not des- that there is no evidence of the amount of ignate LaBeff as an witness. just compensation paid to Speedy to Stop taking (cid:127) of the easement. its LaBeff is not to anas motion, the sought judgment District expert because he is not a licensed Speedy Stop be one dollar in awarded appraiser. real-estate damages nominal for the condemnation of (cid:127) methodology satisfy LaBeffs does not the easement. In response, Speedy Stop reliability requirement for LaBeff, offered the affidavit of Carlton testimony. president vice general partner of the objected The District also to the admission Speedy Stop. LaBeff made the affidavit on testimony of Ambrose’s and appraisal. behalf of the owner of the The record reflects that the trial court that, Speedy Stop. LaBeff for testified sev- focused on the issue of whether the Prop- years, eral he in charge has been of all real erty corporate Owner Rule enti- acquisitions estate for Speedy Stop, which not, ties. The argued District it does and operates more than a hundred Speedy argued Stop it does. The trial convenience stores in According Texas. court sustained the objections District’s affidavit, LaBeff the person has LaBeffs affidavit and to responsibility Ambrose’s testi- dealing with easement mony appraisal. stores, The trial court issues all of the granted the District’s he was motion to exclude acquisition involved with the of the these items from the summary-judgment convenience store on the that is subject evidence. this condemnation action. With evidence before it as to compensation LaBeffs affidavit shows that he is how much familiar District must pay Speedy with the market Stop, granted the trial court question. LaBeff testified that there is a the District’s no-evidence motion for sum- $62,000 difference in the fair mary judgment. The trial court rendered witnesses). Therefore, if, Stop receive one as the District Speedy for the condemna- asserts, the Property dollar Owner Rule does not easement, and the trial court tion of the apply entities such as that the trial court clerk distribute ordered Stop, the trial court did not err in exclud- $9,341 registry in the remaining if, ing LaBeffs But appeal, In this court to the District. asserts, Stop trial court’s

Speedy Stop challenges the does to corporate entities such as summary judgment. Speedy Stop, the trial then court abused by sustaining its discretion the District’s Presented Issues objections to LaBeffs affidavit sup- *4 the

Speedy Stop presents following is- pressing his sues: brief, In appellate its (1) granting Did the trial court err in Stop explicitly challenge does not the trial no evidence motion District’s] [the evidentiary court’s ruling striking LaBeffs summary judgment? Nonetheless, affidavit. the Texas Su (2) summary judg- [Speedy Stop’s] Was preme emphasized Court has that we must evidence, ment the affidavit of Carl- presented liberally construe issues to ob LaBeff, ton as the owner as fair, just, equitable adjudication tain a witness, of the lay some evidence rights litigants. Perry v. property rights being Cohen, 2008). (Tex., S.W.3d condemned? light Speedy Stop’s In argument attack (3) testi- appraisal [the District’s] Was ing the basis for the trial suppres court’s mony by Mr. Ambrose at the affidavit, sion LaBeffs we construe hearing condemnation or Mr. Am- Speedy Stop’s assigning brief as error to appraisal brose’s some evidence (hold ruling this of the trial court. See id. had property being condemned ing by that court of erred conclud value? ing appellant assign failed to error as to Stop appellate brief argues its because, special-exceptions order yet reasonable liberal construction of ap corporate entities and that LaBeffs affida- brief, pellant’s appellant challenged this vit, Speedy Stop, on behalf of raises a fact given presented argu order that appellant issue as to the amount of order, ment the basis of this challenging pay Speedy Stop. District must LaBeffs though appellant expressly did not chal familiarity affidavit shows order). lenge we address states evidentiary the trial ruling striking condemnation of the easement LaBeffs affidavit.

would decrease the market value of the $62,000.1 See Porras Standards Of Review (Tex.1984) Craig, 675 S.W.2d 504-05 evidentiary (stating We review a trial courts’s they rulings the market value of their if for an abuse of discretion. In re (Tex.2005) J.P.B., it, they (per state that are familiar with even curiam). though they testifying are not as The trial court abuses its disere- $62,000. suggests affidavit value of the The District that LaBeff’s market reasonably can be construed to state that the disagree. We condemnation of the easement will increase year Mayes, Tire & Rubber Co. v. guiding reference to acts without tion if it (Tex.2007). arbitrary in an or 755-56 principles, rules or Aqua- manner. Downer unreasonable ANALYSIS Operators,

marine Supreme Court of Texas has (Tex.1985). 241-42 are familiar held that owners who summary reviewing a no-evidence property, the market value of their whether the non- judgment, we ascertain may testify as to including real summary-judgment ev- pointed movant out value, opinions regarding their even probative genuine force to raise a idence of though they qualify do not wit elements of fact as to the essential issue though they nesses and would not be even grounds. in the no-evidence attacked testify regarding the market allowed to Pritchard, P.C., 73 v. Brewer & Johnson property they value of do not own. (Tex.2002). 193, 206-08 A no-evi- Homes, Ivy, Redman Inc. v. summary granted dence must (Tex.1996); Craig, Porras v. party opposing if the the motion does (Tex.1984). Though 504-05 summary-judgment evidence respond with a natural person, the owner Porras was fact. genuine that raises a issue material *5 Property the Porras court stated that the Root, Kellogg v. Brown & Arguelles See applies Rule to “the owner” of the Owner Inc., 714, 222 (Tex.App.-Hous- S.W.3d 723 Porras, property. See 675 S.W.2d at 504- 2007, pet.). no In our de ton [14th Dist.] Corporate property owners are own summary review of a novo are, just persons ers natural and the all judgment, we consider the evidence give any Porras court did not indication nonmovant, to the light most favorable that the Property Owner Rule is limited to favorable to the non- crediting evidence persons.2 owners are natural See id. who jurors movant if reasonable could and dis- Out of the of three intermediate courts regarding contrary evidence unless reason- Trucks, specifically that have addressed jurors able could not. Mack Inc. Tamez, (Tex.2006). issue, 572, Corpus the courts in v. 582 Waco Property Christi have concluded that the genuine The raises a issue of fact evidence entities, jurors applies if Rule to corporate reasonable and fair-minded could Owner light differ in their conclusions in of all of and the Fort Worth court has held that it summary-judgment not.3 Compare Copeland, evidence. Good- does Libhart v. Porras, added). dissenting colleague (emphasis 2. Our reasons as follows: S.W.2d at 675 504 witness, (1) the court stated that a corporations It is can act well-established unqualified give expert that, is otherwise to testi only through agents human when an mony, may testify regarding the market value corporate representative officer or acts on property property of but not the his own of corporate entity, behalf of a act is the act others; (2) corporations cannot be witnesses Oaks, corporation Hammerly itself. See designate repre but rather must or Edwards, 387, (Tex. Inc. v. 391 behalf; (3) testify sentative their be 1997). Therefore, corporate repre when a corporate testify owner cause cannot as a corporation’s sentative testifies on the behalf witness as to market value of its own corporate property, as to the market value of implicitly the Porras court decided testifying property the owner of the as to Property Owner Rule does not the market value of the owner’s See 659, corporate post p. owners. See n. 1. id. witness; speak court did not Poiras of dissenting colleague 3. Our asserts that proper rather it that "the owner stated of value, ty testify Shrimp Taiwan court did not hold that the to its market even he if corporate qualify Owner Rule could not about the value of property belonging post p. like 659-60. How- to someone else." owners. See

657 setts, 783, 1997, Minnesota, (Tex.App.-Waco Oregon 798 have 949 held Shrimp Farm Village and Taiwan pet), representatives a corporate of proper Dev., Shrimp Inc. v. Farm U.S.A. ty fall within the 61, 915 (Tex.App.-Corpus 71 if they familiarity demonstrate denied), 1996, writ Mobil Christi Oil knowledge question as a Falls, City v. 489 Corp. Wichita result their the corporate work for enti 1972, 148, 150 Worth (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Harbond, Anderson, ty. v. Inc. 134 n.r.e.). does not appear There 816, (Fla.App.1961); So.2d 818-19 M.A. Supreme a ease to be from the Court of Comm., Realty Co. v. State Roads 247 Md. point. or this court Texas on this 522, 793, (1967); 233 A.2d 795-96 Newton Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Council, Courts Scout v. Girl Inc. Massachusetts Tennessee, have Washington held that Auth., Turnpike 189, Mass. 335 138 applies to corpo 769, (1956); N.E.2d 775 McClure Village owners, rate while courts Hawaii and 339, Valley, Browns 143 Minn. 173 N.W. it Nebraska have held that does not. 672, (1919); 673 Oregon Assembly of 112 Compare Marquart, Atkinson v. Ariz. God, 167, (1962). 230 Or. 368 P.2d (1975); 304, 541 P.2d Denver Ur uniformity The interests of and consisten Berglund-Cherne ban Renewal Auth. v. weigh cy allowing in favor corporate Co., P.2d Colo. to be of property “owners” Stations, (1977); McCall Service Inc. v. Rule; otherwise, nat Park, Overland 215 Kan. City persons greater ural have rights (1974); P.2d Tennessee v. Liv regarding their than Co., ingston Limestone Weber, owners. See 63 P.2d at 420-21. *6 (Tenn.1977); v. 943-44 Weber West Seattle only a compromise Such result would not Co., & Improv. 188 Wash. 63 Land general and equal notions of fairness treat 418, 420-21 with (1936), City P.2d and but ment also undermine the stated County Honolulu v. International Air Property rationale for the Owner Rule. Co., 628 Service 63 Haw. P.2d The Property Rule is (1981); Baptist Owner based on 200-01 First Church of Nebraska, premise that property Neb. the owners ordinari Maxwell 135 (1965). addition, ly know the market of their propert N.W.2d value Florida, in Maryland, y4 courts Massachu and a sound therefore have basis for ever, testify Shrimp "corporate president the Taiwan court cited that a to mar Shrimp’s presi Libhart, concluded and that “as U.S.A. corporate property.” ket value of See shareholder, principal and dent Tao could Homes, (citing 949 S.W.2d at Redman [property ques the value establish Inc., Shrimp 920 S.W.2d at 669 and Taiwan opinion if his on fair tion] was based market Inc., Ass’n, 71). Village Farm 915 S.W.2d at Shrimp Village value.” See Taiwan Farm It is clear the concluded Libhart court Ass’n, Inc., dissenting 915 S.W.2d at 71. Our applies even when the colleague by distinguish argu tries to Libhart realty by person. natural is not owned a Lib ing that the Libhart court relied on an admis hart, 949 S.W.2d at 798. pastor rely the on sion and did the post p. Owner at Rule. See 659. We example, property 4. For of real must disagree with this characterization of Libhart. pay property year each based on the taxes pastor’s opin Libhart court relied the The property, market value of their unless that property ion as to the value of the real owned exempt property completely from church, is taxation. proposi the cited Redman 11.01, (Vernon § See Tex. Tax Code Ann. 23.01 "property that tion a is 2008). can, do, many challenge property,” Owners to the market of his Shrimp proposition property cited the the Taiwan for valuation of their as not reflect- Porras, charge of all real Speedy Stop. LaBeff is See to its value.

testifying as acquisitions Speedy Stop, 504; Berger, 430 S.W.2d estate State at more than a hundred operates (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco in n.r.e.). stores in Texas. He was to con convenience There is no reason acquisition the of the conven are famil volved with officers who corporate clude property the is the corporate ience store on market value of iar with and he subject of this condemnation action per reliable than natural are less property dealing responsible for the market is the individual familiar with sons who are at all of the easement issues property. Supreme with value of their LaBeffs affidavit shows already adopted Stop has stores. of Texas Court the market value of the per familiarity Rule as natural Property Owner Homes, Therefore, Inc., testimony LaBeffs Redman sons. See Porras, 669; admissible under the 675 S.W.2d at 504- at Rule, excluding and the trial court erred Thus, makes sense to the rule it objec based on the District’s After careful con this evidence all owners. tions, sideration, majority sought all of which to exclude agree with we Porras, expert testimony. evidence as courts of states and Texas 504-05; Libhart, 675 S.W.2d at 949 S.W.2d this the issue reached have addressed 798; Shrimp Village Taiwan Farm at conclusion. Ass’n, Inc., at Because hold that the We genuine LaBeffs affidavit raises issue owning entities regarding fact material representative and that issue, excluding the trial court’s error in is familiar corporate owner affidavit harmful. this was question Speedy Stop’s first and second we sustain rule the mar testify under this as to may issues, judgment, reverse the trial court’s being without ket value proceedings remand for further con as an witness. See Lib designated opinion.5 sistent with 798; hart, Shrimp Taiwan Village Farm SEYMORE, J., dissenting. *7 Atkinson, 559; 71; 541 P.2d Denver Justice, SEYMORE, W. CHARLES Auth., 483; Renewal 568 P.2d at Urban dissenting. 818-19; Harbond, Inc., 134 So.2d at Stations, Inc., Rulings 524 P.2d at on admission or exclusion of Service McCall Co., 795-96; 1173; Realty 233 A.2d at evidence rest within the sound discretion M.A. Council, Inc., the trial court. Health- Scout 138 of Newton Girl Horizon/CMS McClure, Auld, 887, 775; 673; v. Corp. 173 N.W. at care 34 S.W.3d 906 N.E.2d (Tex.2000). God, 942; Living 368 P.2d at We should not reverse the Assembly of Co., 943-44; ston 547 S.W.2d at trial court’s decision to admit or exclude Limestone Weber, unless it is that the trial 63 P.2d at 420-21. Carlton LaBeff evidence shown discretion, president Speedy court abused its errone- testified as the vice probably rendition of an Stop’s general partner ruling and made his affi ous caused owner, Liberty v. Mut. improper judgment. Gee davit on behalf disposition, on this we need not and 5. Based the market value. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. ing (Vernon 2008). not address whether the trial court erred do § 41.41 striking testimony apprais- Ambrose's al.

659 (Tex. Co., 394, Second, disagree 396 I the majority’s Ins. Fire 1999). suggestion that admissibility for we are presented The standards with a impression case of first to relative summary judgment in a whether proceed evidence unqualified corporate representative or to a ing applicable are the those same as give should to allowed regular trial. Blood Servs. v. Lon United testimony regarding the market value of 29, (Tex.1997); 938 30 Mil goria, S.W.2d property. The Texas Supreme Court has Co., Raytheon v. 229 ler S.W.3d Aircraft held may testify that a landowner regard- 358, (Tex.App.-Houston Dist.] 365 [1st ing the market real value of his 2007, Accordingly, pet.). no for reasons lack despite his of competence testify to below, court outlined I hold the trial the value regarding belonging not abuse its did discretion. to another. Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d First, brief, Speedy in its Stop did (Tex.1984). 503, 504 LaBeff is the vice directly consequences address the of its president Thomas, C.L. Speedy The timely designate experts. failure to Stop’s general partner. signed He his affi- designate experts as required failure owner, davit “on behalf of the as the own- the rules is exclusion of sanctionable er’s representative and as the owner.” Al- 193.6; expert’s Tex.R. P. report. Civ. though he stated that he supervised all of Brown, 63, Duerr 262 see also v. 76 Stop’s S.W.3d Speedy property acquisitions, he is 2008, (Tex.App.-Houston no [14th Dist.] not the land owner. Sebek, 20, Metzger land,

pet.); not LaBeff.1 La- competent Beff (Tex.App.-Houston no is not regarding [1st Dist.] writ) Stop’s value of (“Every trial has the court ‘inherent disposition power’ control the Third, disagree the majority’s economy cases on its docket “with of time suggestion that in Shrimp Taiwan Farm itself, counsel, effort for for for Village Inc. Shrimp v. U.S.A. Farm ” Co., litigants.’ (quoting Landis N. Am. Development, Inc. 248, 254, 299 U.S. 57 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed. 61(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi writ de- (1936))). Consequently, this court nied) Libhart v. Copeland, affirm summary should (Tex.App.-Waco pet.), our solely Stop’s based sister courts held the timely designate expert failure to wit corporations. In Taiwan Thirty Assoc., nesses. Joe v. Two Nine Joint Shrimp Farm the court of Venture, (Tex.2004). cited proposition that a (Tex.1984) majority "Corporate The opines: *8 predicated entirely is Rule owner property just persons as natural owners ship. on the an owner It rests fact that ordi are, any give and the court did not narily property. the knows value of his Ber indication that the is ger, corporation at 559. A that persons.” limited to who are natural property present testimony cannot with Supra p. colleagues My Por- miss the who, designating agent employee out an point ownership. ma ras about definition, is not the submit owner. that the jority Berger, State v. Porras cited Supreme implicitly Texas Court decided this (Tex. App.-Waco writ Moreover, extending Porras. issue in the n.r.e.), support ref'd of their conclusion expert Owner Rule to testimo allow witness, unqualified that is otherwise who ny designated agents corporations from of give testimony, expert may testify regard unqualified give who are otherwise such ing the market value of his own not purpose testimony would emasculate the property Craig, 675 of the of others. Porras v. intent of Rule Texas Rules Evidence. may testify re years, for eleven poration regarding the may testify owner

property in connection of leasehold property. garding Without value of market value enti- condemnation the of apportionment distinguishing between its justified lessee, the court but not president, lessor ty and its award between “a that the bare assertion principal shareholder addressing decision with whether testify to market value property pursuant expert or testified qualified as an it refers to testimony shows long as exception). to landowner intrinsic value.” and later regard for vertical Giving due Libhart, former mem- decisis, my opinion considered it is al stare church, previously a dissolved bers of Corp. City in Mobil holding the Oil association, unincorporated formed as an disposition our of Falls controls Wichita of for fraud and pastor former their sued (Tex.Civ. 148, 150 appeal. parsonage. See conversion n.r.e.). ref'd writ App.-Fort Worth The court of 790-91. S.W.2d at of case the issue In a condemnation where that he testified was pastor] noted “[the unqualified an cor testimony from $55,000. parsonage trying to sell drawn, Fort sharply porate agent was former member’s] agreed [the He emphatically con Appeals Worth Court that much.” Id. that it worth counsel was exception that the does cluded landowner Citing Porras and Taiwan at 798. agents corpo designated not extend to held the the court Shrimp Farm owners, agent unless rate regarding the value pastor’s admission Accordingly, I qualifies expert. as an Id. constituted some evidence parsonage the trial court’s decision would sustain damages. jury could award from which LaBeff exclude LaBeffs affidavit because appeals did not base its court of Id. The subject property. not the owner of the an pastor’s capacity as on the opinion church. agent the sum- Speedy Stop further contends a number of cases Stop cites Speedy be- mary judgment should be reversed of a courts allowed Texas testimony of Reid appraisal cause the testify regarding value entity to business witness, Ambrose, amounts Road’s However, of those cases none the condemned to some evidence entity a business agent of involved an argues had value. landowner allowed was trial court abused its discretion general rule that the dif to the exception report and tes- excluding David Ambrose’s immediately of land before ference timony special commissioners. before by the taking proved must be after the The record is silent relative to the qualified expert. properly testimony of excluding court’s rationale for Ambrose’s Bank Tex. Commerce Maxey v. noted, previously report and As Lubbock, (Tex.Civ.App.- Stop ignores possibility n.r.e.) Amarillol978, (involving the trial court not consider Ambrose’s did testifying about Stop did not report simply because Co., 459 value.); Tellepsen Const. State experts. timely designate (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th S.W.2d 447 contention that writ) Speedy Stop supports its (same); Pig Tex. Dist.] *9 and earlier tes- report Ambrose Stands, Krueger, 441 Inc. hearsay, arguing that such 1969, timony are not Antonio writ (Tex.Civ.App.-San against admission inter- n.r.e.) statements an of (holding principal shareholder Yarbrough’s Dirt Speedy Stop cites leases of cor est. negotiated corporation, who proposition supporting Pit v. Tuner that a record the contention that the by expert by an an report conclusion hired ad constitutes an by admission Reid Road, by is to an admission a I party verse similar would hold that the trial court did that a party opponent, and conclusion an not abuse its by excluding discretion Am- expert by opposing party report hired an brose’s witness and earlier against party opponent. is admissible For all the above, reasons outlined I 210, 214 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 65 S.W.3d affirm of the trial However, I pet.). per no am not court. respectfully dissent. by Yarbrough. suaded the rationale in Mkts., Inc., McCluskey v. Randall’s Food 14-03-01087-CV,

No. 2004 WL (Tex.App.-Houston

*3-5 [14th Oct. Dist.]

19, 2004, pet.) (mem.op.). no To hold that by expert

all statements made an witness party

are admissions of the who called the expert is to misconstrue the rules of evi SOLVENT UNDERWRITERS SUB dence, agency, and the purpose law SCRIBING TO ENERGY INSUR employment expert witnesses. INTERNATIONAL, ANCE INC. COV 801(2), To be an admission under rule ER NOTE NO. EII-3824 and Solvent party’s statement must be made Subscribing Energy Underwriters 801(2). agent or servant. Tex.R. Evid. A International, Insurance Inc. Cover person not an agent is or unless he servant EII-3825, Note No. Appellants, subject party’s is to another control. See AG,

Coleman v. Klockner & Co. (Tex. App.-Houston [14th AMERICA, FURMANITE pet.). no If there is no proof

Dist.] INC., Appellee. control, there is no agency relationship. No. 14-07-00889-CV. Ross v. Tex. P’ship, One (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990), denied, Appeals Texas, Court of (Tex.1991) curiam). (per (14th Dist.). Houston Evidence, expert Under Rules of Feb. 2009. required own, regarding his theo retically impartial, Rehearing Rehearing En opinion. See Tex.R. Banc April Overruled Accordingly, testimony Evid of an not, ipso facto, should be deemed an admission of the party originally expert’s

sought opinion.

Although testimony expert may of an

admissible as an admission a party if

opponent is the of the party opponent,

servant see Tex.R. 801(2),

Evid presented has acting

evidence Ambrose was as an

agent or servant of Reid Road for any

purpose other than to provide expert testi-

mony. Because there is no evidence in the

Case Details

Case Name: Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd. v. Reid Road Municipal Utility District No. 2
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Mar 26, 2009
Citation: 282 S.W.3d 652
Docket Number: 14-07-00225-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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