59 Miss. 47 | Miss. | 1881
delivered the opinion of the court.
On a former day of this term we reversed the decree of the court below, because the record showed the propriety of the appointment of the appellant as administrator of the estate of Mason, there being property (debts due the intestate) in this State, and declined to pass upon all the questions presented by counsel for the appellee, because we considered them prematurely presented, as they ought to arise on an application for distribution, and not upon a motion to revoke the letters of the administrator appointed by the courts of this State. Upon the request of counsel, both for the appellant and appellee, and understanding that the parties now before the court really represent the two classes of distributees, we have considered the case as if it was on proceedings for distribution. The cause is to be decided upon the construction of § 1270 of the Code of 1880, which is as follows: “ All personal property, situated in this State, shall descend and be distributed according to the laws of this State regulating the descent and distribution of such property, regardless of all marital rights which
The appellant contends that by the terms of our statute all personal property which is subject to administration in this State is also to be distributed according to its laws, while the appellee argues that the statute applies only to such tangible property as has an actual situation here. The words “ personal property,” if not limited in their operation by the words “ situated in this State,” are certainly broad enough to embrace choses in action, and ordinarily we think would include them. The suggestion made in the case of McIntyre v. Ingraham, 35 Miss. 25, that the words “ personal estate ” do not include promissory notes, is not supported by the authorities cited. But the personal property, which the statute declares shall be distributed according to our laws, is personal property situated in this State. Without deciding what would be the result if both the evidence of the debt and the debtor were within this State at the death of the intestate, or whether there may not be cases in which, though the evidence of the debt may be in the hands of the intestate at the time of his death at his domicile in another State, the statute might be held to include the debt as situated in this State,' we are of the opinion that under the circumstances shown by the record in this cause the choses in action described in the proceedings cannot be considered as personal property situated in this State. A bequest of all one’s personal estate, or of all his goods and property, passes his notes and other choses in action. Anon., 1 P. Wms. 267 ; Crichton v. Symes, 3 Atk. 61; Moore v. Moore, 1 Bro. Ch. 127. But a bequest of all the personal property situated in a particular place
In Fleming v. Brook, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 318, the testator bequeathed to Mrs. Fleming “ all my property of whatever nature or kind the same may be that may be found in her house in Duke Street, except a bond of F. M., Esq., in my writing-box in the said house contained.” Another bond secured by mortgage, and the mortgage and several bankers’ receipts, at the death of the testator, were found in the house. It was held that neither the bond nor the bankers’ receipts passed, because choses in action have no locality. In Moore v. Moore, 1 Bro. Ch. 127, a bequest of “ all my goods and chattels in Suffolk ” was held not to pass a bond found in a drawer in the house in Suffolk, the Chancellor saying, “ Choses in action have no locality; bonds have no more locality than other choses in action, otherwise than by drawing the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court.”
To the same effect are many other cases. Jones v. Sefton, 4 Ves. 166; Hertford v. Lowther, 7 Beav. 1; Penniman v. French, 17 Pick. 404; Brooke v. Turner, 7 Sim. 671; Green v. Symonds, 1 Bro. Ch. 129, n.; Popham v. Aylesbury, Ambl. 68; Arnold v. Arnold, 2 Myl. & K. 365; Kendall v. Kendall, 4 Russ. 360; Rogers v. Thomas, 2 Keen, 8; Jackson v. Robinson, 1 Yeates, 101. - And the rule may be considered as settled that where the words used are broad enough to include choses in action, yet if they fix a locality to the property given they will be considered as excluded, unless there are Other words evidencing an intention to include them, because they have no locality. Unless, then, we can construe the statute as fixing the locality in this State of all debts due by persons resident here, the debts due to the intestate are distributable under the laws of the State of Louisiana, in which he was domiciled. Such a construction would greatly simplify the administration of the estates of non-residents, and relieve us from many complications which may and must arise in administrations which are original and independent as to tangible property situated here, and ancillary as to choses in action reduced to possession by the administrator. But the rule is so well established that choses in action have no local
Decree accordingly.