SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. R.M.M., BY AND THROUGH her parents, O.M. and T.M., Defendant-Appellee
No. 16-1601
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: November 17, 2016. Filed: June 29, 2017
861 F.3d 769
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Amy Jane Goetz, of Saint Paul, MN. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Andrea Jepsen, of Saint Paul, MN.
Before BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and EBINGER,1 District Judge.
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
This case is about the provision of special education services to a young child attending a nonpublic school. Federal law grants this child neither an individual right to a free appropriate public education nor the right to dispute the provision of special education services in a due process hearing. The question before us is whether Minnesota state law grants either of these rights. After careful analysis, we determine that state law does grant these rights, and thus we affirm the district court.2
R.M.M. was a young student who voluntarily attended a Catholic private school in Minneapolis beginning in kindergarten. She struggled in the classroom and received what support and instruction the private school could offer. Finally, in the fifth grade, she received an evaluation from the Minneapolis Public Schools, Special School District No. 1 (“MPS”). The evaluation determined that R.M.M. needed special education instruction for reading, written expression, and math. MPS proposed an individual service plan that would provide R.M.M. two 30-minute reading sessions per week and two 30-minute writing sessions per week. The plan called for R.M.M. to be bussed twice per week from her private school during science class to a nearby public school for the reading and writing sessions, to be held back-to-back over the course of an hour.
R.M.M. enrolled in MPS part time in the spring of her fifth grade year. But her parents grew dissatisfied with the quality of instruction and declined to send her again after four sessions. Her private school later informed R.M.M.’s parents that it could no longer meet her educational needs and recommended that R.M.M. enroll in MPS as a full-time student. She began her sixth grade year enrolled in MPS full time.
R.M.M.’s parents then filed a complaint with the Minnesota Department of Education (“MDE”) and requested an impartial due process hearing. The amended complaint stated a claim that MPS had denied R.M.M. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) while R.M.M. was enrolled at her private school. MPS moved to dismiss the claim, but the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied the motion.
Following a three-day due process hearing, the ALJ concluded that MPS had denied R.M.M. a FAPE. MPS then filed a lawsuit in federal district court appealing the ALJ’s decision. MPS argued that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction over R.M.M.’s FAPE claims. Each party filed motions over this issue. R.M.M.’s parents moved to dismiss MPS’s appeal for failure to state a claim under
The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. On the issue of R.M.M.’s right to a FAPE, the district court first analyzed federal law. The court found that federal law did not grant the right to a FAPE to a private school student but did permit states to grant rights beyond the minimum requirements set out by federal law. Turning to Minnesota state law, the court held that Minnesota granted private school students the right to a FAPE. On the issue of a due process hearing, the court ruled in favor of R.M.M. and held that private school students in Minnesota are entitled to a due process hearing to dispute whether they have received a FAPE. MPS now appeals.
II.
We review the district court’s ultimate decision under a de novo standard. See Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1997). Our duty is to interpret and apply the law, not to
A.
Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.”
(A) have been provided at public expense under public supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
IDEA also establishes certain procedural safeguards for children with disabilities and their families. IDEA requires states to develop a “specialized course of instruction ... for each disabled student, taking into account that child’s capabilities.” Gill, 217 F.3d at 1034 (“The services that a school district will provide to a child are to be summarized in a written statement called an individualized education program or IEP.”). If “any party” is dissatisfied with the school district’s proposed plan, then that party may present a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”
As just discussed, all children with disabilities attending public school have possessed a substantive right to a FAPE since the enactment of IDEA. But the rights afforded by IDEA to a child with disabilities attending private school have changed over time.
Prior to 1997, students with disabilities attending private schools possessed an individual right to special education and related services. See Foley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cnty., 153 F.3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1998); see also John T. v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 1999) (“In implementing the IDEA, the Department of Education promulgated regulations requiring school districts to ‘provide special education and related services designed to meet the needs of private
Federal law represents the minimum requirements for the education of children with disabilities. See Gill, 217 F.3d at 1035 (discussing the ability of states to set higher standards than those in IDEA). States remain free to impose additional requirements for special education services. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281 v. Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 743 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
B.
Minnesota has long guaranteed special education services for children with disabilities under state law. See
The state legislature has further amended Minnesota’s special education laws to clarify the services owed to disabled children. In 2002, the legislature added language defining “special instruction and services.” “For purposes of state and federal special education laws, the phrase ‘special instruction and services’ in the state education code means a free and appropriate public education provided to an eligible child with disabilities....”
Minnesota law also discusses special education services for private school students. A short time after Congress passed the original IDEA statute, the Minnesota legislature added a new provision in state law stating that “no resident of a district who is eligible for special instruction and services ... shall be denied provision of this instruction and service on a shared time basis because of attendance at a non-public school.”
III.
The first issue before us is whether Minnesota state law goes beyond the minimum requirements of IDEA and entitles private school students the right to a FAPE. “When interpreting a statute, we must look first to the plain language of the statute.” Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Minn. 2009). “When a statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce the statute according to its terms.” Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics Advanced Info. Sys., Inc., 869 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. 2015). Our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the state legislature.
A.
A plain reading of Minnesota state law shows that private school students have a right to a FAPE.
The evolution of the language within the Minnesota Education Code over the last twenty years further demonstrates that the state legislature intended for private
A comparison of language used in Minnesota law with language in IDEA also reveals that the Minnesota legislature intended to provide private students the right to a FAPE. IDEA limits the obligations a state owes to disabled children enrolled in private schools. All IDEA requires is that “[a]mounts to be expended for the provision of [special education] services ... be equal to a proportionate amount of Federal funds made available under this subchapter.”
B.
Minnesota case law concurs with our interpretation of
Though we agree that Independent School District No. 281 is not dispositive, the court’s broad holding lends ample support to our interpretation of Minnesota law. MPS is correct that Independent School District No. 281 is not on all fours with this case. For one thing, the complaint in that case went through the state complaint procedure, not a due process hearing. Id. at 320. But these differences are not material to the issue at hand. The court of appeals issued a broad holding—school districts cannot deny special instruction and services to disabled students attending nonpublic schools.
C.
In response to the district court’s adverse ruling, MPS raises three more arguments for why Minnesota law does not provide R.M.M. the right to a FAPE. First, MPS suggests that Minnesota law requires only that public schools make a FAPE available to private school students. Alleging that Minnesota law parallels federal law, MPS asserts that both statutes require merely that special education services “must be available” to all children with disabilities.
Yet the plain language of state law belies MPS’s assertion.
Second, MPS argues that a FAPE is more than special instruction and services, and therefore it is incorrect to read Minnesota law as granting private school students a right to a FAPE. MPS points out that both federal and state definitions of a FAPE include “an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved.”
But MPS’s argument fails because, once again, it runs contrary to the plain language of Minnesota state law.
Third, MPS contends that Eighth Circuit precedent stands opposed to our holding. In a long section of its brief, MPS recites the facts and holdings of three prior cases—John T., Peter, and Foley. Each of these cases analyzed the effect of the 1997 amendments to IDEA and determined that private school students had no individual right to a FAPE. See John T., 173 F.3d at 691; Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998); Foley, 153 F.3d at 865. The Peter court, MPS continues, examined Minnesota state law after the 1997 amendments to IDEA and ultimately held that the student no longer had an individual right to a FAPE. 155 F.3d at 998.
Because neither Peter nor any other Eighth Circuit opinion has analyzed the particular Minnesota statutes at issue here, however, no circuit precedent contradicts our holding. The John T. court (Iowa) and Foley court (Missouri) analyzed claims brought under IDEA from different states. And even though Peter arose in Minnesota, the court’s analysis of the claim brought under IDEA rested solely on federal law. Id. at 998-1001. The only discussion of state law revolved around the student’s separate equal protection claim. Id. at 996-98. We have discovered no other case—and the parties have failed to offer any—that analyzes these state statutes and comes to a contrary holding.
IV.
The second issue raised on appeal is whether R.M.M. has the right to bring her claim through the impartial due process hearing. Even though R.M.M. has the right to a FAPE, we must determine whether the ALJ had jurisdiction to hear her claims. MPS says no—private school students have no right to an impartial due process hearing. First, MPS directs our attention back to the language of Minnesota Statute
MPS’s argument falters when confronted by the plain language of Minnesota law. MPS is correct that administrative interpretations may be considered when discerning the intent of the legislature. See
Federal law also provides R.M.M. and her parents access to an impartial due process hearing. Admittedly, under IDEA, due process hearings are not available for complaints from private school students about the inadequacy of the proportional funding of services or the provision of specific services to such students. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.140(a)(1). But R.M.M. does not challenge the inadequacy of proportional funding; she challenges MPS’s provision of a FAPE. Federal law offers an impartial due process hearing to settle this
V.
This case touches upon important questions regarding the needs of children with disabilities like R.M.M., the duties school districts like MPS owe these children, and the education policies chosen by governments at the state and federal level. But ultimately, this is a case about statutory interpretation. And the plain language of Minnesota law grants both the right to a FAPE and the right to an impartial due process hearing to children with disabilities attending nonpublic schools. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the district court.
SHEPHERD
CIRCUIT JUDGE