23 Tex. Ct. App. 224 | Tex. App. | 1887
In his charge to the jury the learned trial judge, upon the subject of mutual combat, charged as follows: “ Where two parties arm themselves and voluntarily engage in a combat with each other, with deadly weapons, knowing that such combat will, or may probably produce the death of either or both of them, then neither of such parties could claim the benefit of the law of self defense, but if they boih intended to kill, both may be guilty of assault with intent to murder.” And in another paragraph of the charge as follows: “But if the defendant voluntarily engaged in a combat with W. B. Howard, with deadly weapons, knowing that it would or might probably result in the death of W. B. Howard or of himself, or in some serious bodily injury which might probably result in the death of Howard or himself, * * * he could not avail himself of the privilege of self defense, no matter to what extent of danger he may have been reduced in the combat, and no matter which party struck the first blow, or fired or attempted to fire the first shot, and in such case the defendant would be guilty of assault with intent to murder.”
The above quoted paragraphs of the charge were excepted to by the defendant, and he submits the proposition that, “ where a combat is mutually waged with deadly weapons, on equal terms, where death does not ensue, the offense is aggravated assault,” and not assault with intent to murder. In support of this proposition he cites King’s case, 4 Texas Court of Appeals, 56; Wilson’s case, Id., 644; Sanches’ case, 24 California, 17, and Crowley’s case, 56 California, 36. We concede that these cases support the proposition stated, and we concede the correctness of the decisions when considered with reference to the rule at common law, and without regard to our statute of manslaughter. But, when viewed with reference to our statute of manslaughter, these decisions, in our opinion, can not be held to be the law of this State, without material qualification. To reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter, under the law of this State, the homicide must not only be committed under the immediate in
Several objections are urged by appellant’s counsel to the court’s charge upon the issue of self defense. We shall consider but one of these objections. Among other rules governing self defense the court gave the following: “Homicide, to be justifiable, must be in fact in self defense, and not merely colorably so.” This was excepted to at the time it was given. In Babb’s case, 8 Texas Court of Appeals, 173, an instruction in almost the very language of the above was held erroneous, because it destroyed all that portion of the charge which permitted defendant to invoke the right of self defense against reasonable apprehensions and expectations of death or some seriously bodily injury. In the case before us, we think the clause of the charge above quoted was well calculated to cause the jury to overlook and disregard that well settled principle of the law of self-defense, that one who commits a homicide is justified in so doing if he acts upon reasonable appearances of danger of death or
This important principle of the law of self defense is not clearly explained in any portion of the charge of the court, and even if it had been, as was said in Babb’s case, it would have been destroyed by the clause complained of, and above quoted. Because of this error in the charge the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. In other matters complained of by defendant we perceive no error.
Reversed and remanded.