155 Iowa 500 | Iowa | 1912
The defendant city owns and operates a'
That this matter may be fully understood, we here reproduce in tabulated form the results of the different readings from May 1, 1908, -down to and including November 1, 1910: (See next page.)
A glance at this table will indicate our thought. Back -of -the year 1908 we have no data; but it is apparent from the concessions made by counsel that the meter which was in place from May, 1908, -down to some time in November, 1910, was a slow one, and that it finally went dead. So that we have no reliable data
After the relading on October 10, 1910, plaintiff demanded a new meter, and this was furnished 'by the city, and a new one was installed on November 2, 1910, and the old one was taken to the waterworks and there tested by an employee of the city and a representative of the plaintiff, and it wias concluded that it nan about ten percent
A strong point in defendants’ case is that the meter in controversy from July 1, 1910, to October 10th of the same year, or for a period of one hundred and one days, registered practically the same amount per cubic feet per day as the new meter put in in November of the year 1910 for the sixty-eight days it was in operation. There was no change in this meter in controversy from the time it was installed until replaced in November; but the read
The trouble was either a defective meter or a leak in plaintiff’s pipes, and we are constrained to hold, as did the learned superior court, that the chief fault was in the piping. On no other' theory can the physical facts be harmonized with the testimony.
Defendant city is entitled to compensation for the water correctly metered to plaintiff. It is in no way interested in what the subscriber does with it, provided it is able to supply the demand and is not' responsible for any leaks-^-for these the consumer is directly responsible.
The burden then is upon the plaintiff to show that it was incorrect. Of course, this may be done by circumstantial testimony; but the circumstantial testimony here relied upon is not at all conclusive in character. The main fault in plaintiff’s argument lies in the fact that hi3 counsel assume that the normal consumption was not more
When the case went to final trial, the trial court found the amount due from plaintiff to defendant to be $557.05,
'Our examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the trial count was right in its finding as to the amount due, and if appellants desire it, appellees not complaining, judgment may be entered in this court for the amount so found due, with costs. If appellant so elects, it may have judgment in this court agains-t itself for the amount found due by filing with the clerk of this court, within twenty days from the promulgation of this opinion, á written election for such judgment, accompanied with a form of judgment and decree; a copy of such notice and decree to be served upon counsel for appellee five days before such decree and judgment is to be entered.
Our conclusion is that, while the temporary injunction was correctly issued, the final decree was correct, and that the restraining order issued by one of the judges of this court was also properly issued. The result of the whole matter, then, is that the final decree is correct, but that appellant may have a modification if he so elects.
Defendants are not entitled to any damages on the injunction bond, nor are they entitled to recover anything because of the restraining order issued by order of one of the judges of this court.
Affirmed with modification at plaintiffs’ election.