Spartan Industries, Inc., which operates department stores in Dallas, San Antonio, Austin and Fort Worth, sued said cities and certain officials, including the District Attorney and Sheriff of Dallas County, seeking to enjoin them from enforcing *932 Article 286a P.C., one оf the statutes sometimes known as the “Sunday Closing Laws”. That statute provides that any person who, on both of the two cоnsecutive days of Saturday and Sunday, sells certain merchandise shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It makes certain exceptions. It states that its purpose is to promote the health, recreation and welfare of the people of Texas; that operation of any business in violation of its provisions constitutes a public nuisanсe and that any person may apply to court of competent jurisdiction for an injunction restraining its violatiоn.
Spartan alleged that it proposed to sell on both of the two consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday аll of the merchandise which it usually offered for sale, including many articles the sale of which on said two days is specifically and expressly prohibited by Article 286a P.C. It alleged that unless said officials were enjoined, they would enforce said statute, which would cause it irreparable damage, for which it had no adequate remedy at law, and еnforcement would constitute an invasion of its vested property rights. Spartan contends that Article 286a P.C. is a criminal statute, but that its tests and requirements are so uncertain as to make it void. The defendants contended that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law by raising its defenses in any proceeding brought against it under said statute; that Article 286a P.C. gave defendants authority to institute criminal proceedings but did not authorize any actual or potential violator thereof to enjoin its enforcement; that to enjoin defendants from filing complaints or otherwise enforcing sаid statute, it would be necessary for the civil court in which the suit was filed to construe a penal statute in an equity prоceeding and thus usurp jurisdiction of the criminal courts and that said court had no jurisdiction to determine the constitutionаlity of said statute; that before a civil court in an equitable proceeding may enjoin enforcement of а penal statute two things must exist: (1) the statute must be unconstitutional and (2) its enforcement must result in irreparable injury to vested property rights and that, in the language of the Supreme Court in Crouch v. Craik,
Appellant contends the court erred in dismissing its suit to restrain appellees from enforcing Article 286a P.C. because it alleged that said article wаs unconstitutional because, among other things, it is a penal statute but there is no mention of penalties in the cаption. In Ex parte Wilson,
Appellant further contends that Article 286a P.C. is so indefinite that its tests are subjective, rather than objectivе, and therefore inoperative. Said article is not indefinite. It expressly and clearly prohibits the sale of сertain merchandise under the conditions which appellant says it will sell it.
Appellant says the court erred in dismissing its case because it had alleged under oath that enforcement of said statute threatened irreparablе injury to vested property rights, for which damages it had no adequate remedy at law, and, since said statute is unconstitutional, the defendant officials were acting without authority and consent of the State to be sued was unnecessаry. We think it is evident appellant had no vested property rights entitling them to an injunction against enforcement of thе statute. See Kemp Hotel Operating Co. et al. v. City of Wichita Falls et al.,
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The decision of our Supreme Court in Crouch v. Craik,
In Ex parte Sundstrom,
In People v. Havnor,
All of appellant’s contentions have been carefully considered. They are overruled. The judgment is affirmed.