79 A. 585 | Md. | 1911
The appeal in this case is from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a suit to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore.
There is but one exception in the case, and that is to the granting, at the conclusion of the evidence offered by the plaintiff, of the defendant's prayers, instructing the jury that under the pleadings in the case, there was no evidence legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, and that the uncontradicted evidence in the case shows that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence directly contributing to the accident, and that their verdict should be for the defendant.
The accident occurred within the limits of Baltimore City, on a road called the Old Annapolis road or Russell street, and at the point where the accident happened the road runs through an open field. The two tracks of the appellee, which are constructed like railroad tracks, with T-rails, are on the *318 west side of the road, and the driveway is on the east side. To the west of the tracks there is a field which was used as the City's dumping ground, and at the place of the accident the spaces between the tracks of the appellee were filled in with cinders or ashes so as to make a crossing from the driveway to the dump. About five hundred feet south of this crossing there is a bridge called Harmon's bridge which crosses Gwynn's Falls, and the railway crosses the Falls on a trestle running parallel with and west of the bridge. There is no grade, or anything to obstruct the view, between the crossing and the bridge, and north of the crossing there are no houses for several blocks.
On the morning of the accident, July 17, 1909, the plaintiff was engaged in hauling brick to the dump, and was driving a one-horse cart down the Old Annapolis road towards the crossing and in the direction of the bridge. According to his testimony, he was sitting on the "left-hand side of the cart driving the horse," and when he got to the crossing, and was making the turn to cross the track, he looked both ways to see if a car was coming. He said: "It is an open field," and that he could see all around; that the turn he made was about the length of a horse and cart and that as he made the turn he had an unobstructed view of the tracks; that he could see nearly half a mile off, and had a clear view of the tracks beyond the bridge; "the further off I look the better I can see. — My hearing is pretty tough;" that he "didn't hear any noise because there wasn't any bells ringing or nothing else;" that the car struck the cart and injured him about two or three seconds after he looked, and as he was crossing the first track. It further appears from his testimony that he was about seventy-three years of age; that he had been hauling to this dump for many years, and had been using the crossing in question every day for the previous week.
Witness Shue, who saw the accident, says that he was driving a garbage cart just behind the plaintiff, and was on his way to the dump; that the wheel and front part of the *319 plaintiff's cart was struck by the car just as the plaintiff was crossing the first or east track; that at the crossing a person can see beyond the bridge; that he saw the car, and that when he saw it it was at the bridge and the plaintiff was not on the track, he was "a yard or two from it," but was just about to cross it, and did not stop until the car struck him; that he cannot tell how fast the car was going because he does not know how fast those cars can run, but that it was going at a pretty good speed; that there were two men on the front of the car; that one of the men had "a full uniform on," and the other man had a uniform cap on, and that the one that had the cap on was running or controlling the car.
This is substantially all of the evidence in the case, having any relation to the questions we have to consider. Even assuming that there is some evidence of negligence on the part of the appellee, we think the record discloses a clear case of contributory negligence. JUDGE ALVEY said in State, use ofBacon v. R.R. Co.,
The appellant relies upon the class of cases to which the recent case of United Railways and Electric Company v. Ward,
As the appellant by his own negligence directly contributed to the accident and injury of which he complains, there was no error in withdrawing the case from the jury, and the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed with costs. *322